As Prepared:
In November 2010 NATO and President Karzai agreed that the Afghan authorities would take the lead for security across the country from the end of 2014. The Afghan authorities have now done so for a first tranche of districts and provinces across the country, including most of Kabul.
This has been enabled by the 2009/10 surge of 30,000 additional US troops. This has peaked and will be withdrawn by mid-2012, with the remaining 68,000 US forces “coming home at a steady pace” as the Afghan forces assumed security leadership. It is planned that the ANSF will grow to their full size of 305,000 in the same period.
There has been military progress made since December 2009. This includes growth in size, capability and confidence of the Afghan National Army, which together with the reinforcing US and NATO troops have cleared and held former Taliban strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. These gains have not been rolled back by the insurgents in this fighting season. Greatly improved intelligence and a threefold increase in NATO special forces has caused significant attrition of insurgent leaders inside Afghanistan. The recent spectacular terrorist attacks in Kabul and Kandahar have been contained and then counter-attacked by the Afghan forces with ISAF support being limited to helicopters and military advisors.
But significant security challenges remain. There has been much less military progress in south eastern Afghanistan, the heartland of the Haqqani Network. US reductions will probably be matched, if not overtaken, by similar reductions in the 40,000 non-US troops in the country. This will encourage insurgents who think that they can outlast the US and NATO effort. Indeed there is little evidence that military efforts in Afghanistan or Pakistan are having any coercive effect in bringing insurgents to the conference table, let alone keep them there and force them into an acceptable deal.
What does this mean for the future? I assess that the ANSF will successfully reach full strength and that the ANA will improve its capability. So as NATO reduces it will, for example, be capable of holding those areas in southern Afghanistan that are now clear of insurgents. But the NATO drawdown makes it far less likely the Haqqani Network’s strongholds in south east Afghanistan can be cleared, let alone held and built or that Haqqani efforts to mount spectacular attacks can be fully interdicted. And as Nigel says, this is unlikely to be complemented by Pakistan tackling Haqqani bases in North Waziristan.
The ANP capability is less advanced than the ANA. It will improve, but its ability to improve the lot of the ordinary Afghan depends on corresponding improvements in the whole machinery of justice, including courts, lawyers and prisons. These areas lag even further behind, as shown by the Kandahar jail break and NATO’s recent refusal to sent its detainees to Afghan prisons..
Despite the US “civilian surge”, it is far from clear that that there will be sufficient improvement in Afghan governance and reduction in corruption to neutralise the root causes of the insurgency, even in areas that have been “cleared and held”. An important “known unknown” is the extent to which insurgents are motivated by the extent to which insurgents are motivated by the presence of foreign troops. Insurgent “foot soldiers” and leaders whose principal motivation is nationalist resistance to infidels might lay down their arms if foreigners withdrew.
The most likely security outcome in 2015 is a situation much like today, a patchwork of security with the ANSF suppressing much insurgent activity in many areas but others, such as eastern Afghanistan remaining under insurgent sway.
The US and NATO footprint from 2015 will be influenced by the confidence of Afghan authorities and their desire to exert their national sovereignty. This could well include rejecting foreign advice and assistance and insisting that any foreign troops or personnel remaining in Afghanistan operate under Afghan direction. Contributing nations will be attempting to minmise their footprint in Afghanistan, especially in terms of numbers of boots on the ground, reducing their people to a minimum numbers of advisors, principally in training bases and the Kabul ministries. And it may be possible to provide the fixed wing air support required by Afghan forces from outside the country, from bases in the region, or from aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean. This combination of regional and seaborne basing might also be sufficient for any US Special Forces needed to counter any residual Al Qaida threat beyond the capability of the ANSF.
A key constraint will be the affordability of the ANSF. By 2015 they will probably cost about cost $6 Billion a year, almost all of which is currently provided by foreign donors. Balancing the need to counter residual insurgency and meet Afghanistan’s as yet undefined external security requirements, with the likely national and international resources available will be a significant challenge.
If might be possible, or even necessary, to reduce the size of the ANSF. For example if the security situation improves, or Afghan government finnaces contrac. This would potentially allow literate, numerate, well-trained and self-confident people to make a wider contribution to the future of Afghanistan. But Afghan economy, security and political climate has not improved sufficiently, there will be strong incentives for these people to use their skills in the service of warlords or criminal enterprises.
