Question and Answer Session
Major General Mahmoud Irdaisat, Director, Centre for Strategic Studies, Royal
Jordanian National Defence College
My question is to Mr Hokayem. You have rightly tackled the question of the
relationship between Hezbollah, Iran and Syria; a relationship that is serving
each of them and that they will not give up easily. You described the symptoms of a situation in
the Middle East rather than describing the illness which created those
symptoms. In my view that illness is the
42 year Israeli occupation of Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian land. You never mentioned the environment which
created Hezbollah, rather we went into Iran as a political slogan of serving
which Iran makes. Yes, there is no love
lost between myself and Hezbollah or even Iran.
However, what is the indirect role of occupiers in the region who
created Hezbollah and even Hamas? It is
an occupation and we are not addressing this; we are looking at the peripheries
but not getting inside the situation as to why Hezbollah is there. Yes, it has relations with Iran and Syria,
but it was created in 1982 after the Israeli occupation of southern
Lebanon. This has not been
mentioned. I want to ask if it is not
important that we address the real issue in this case, which is the Israeli
occupation which created most of the non-state actors in the region? It will create more if we do not address this
issue now.
Ambassador Wali-ur
Rahman, Chairman, Bangladesh Heritage Foundation
I have a question for both speakers but
particularly Nigel Inkster. The details
you have provided on both FARC and Hezbollah is certainly revealing but I am a
little surprised, particularly with Nigel, that you have left out – and I hope
not deliberately – the non-state actors known as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM) being financed by a state known to us all. Perhaps this [is] because that country’s
support is needed to contain the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. However, the reality on the ground is that
the Taliban, LeT and JeM are killing more people on a weekly basis in Pakistan,
let alone Afghanistan, than those killed [in] Afghanistan and Iran combined.
Jean-Louis Gergorin, Managing Director, JLG Strategy
My question is … directed at both speakers on
Hezbollah. I want to have your
assessment of the international extent of Hezbollah’s influence beyond Lebanon,
into the Middle East but also in Europe and Latin America. Should these international networks exist,
and they seem to, how are they correlated with Syrian and Iranian intelligence
in these regions of the world?
Edward Carr, The Economist
I have been called many things in my time, but that
was an innovation from Nigel so thank you very much for that. I would just like to raise one thing. I completely agree that regional security
architectures are desirable, but a precursor to that are the nation-states who
play a proper role and are determined to do something about it. What strikes me in the case of FARC is
Brazil’s reluctance to stand up and be counted.
Perhaps this is because Lula’s worried about his domestic constituency.
Nigel Inkster
I will pick up the Hezbollah point first, because
of course Hezbollah is an organisation which does have some presence in the
Latin American region, in the tri-border area between Argentina, Brazil and
Paraguay as well as parts of Central America and the Andean region. Quite what these presences amount to is difficult
to assess. I must admit that I have not
looked into this in inordinate detail. As far as I can ascertain, the main
focus of Hezbollah activity in this region is economic rather than the practice
of subversion. However, whether part of
the agenda is to achieve tie-ups with local organisations in Latin America who
might be deployed asymmetrically against US interests is a factor that I think
we need to take into account.
To pick up on Ambassador Wali-ur Rahman’s point, the exam question was to look at
this one very specific case of how relations exist between state and non-state
groups. I suppose I could have taken a
different approach and looked at this from a wider conceptual perspective,
looking at different perspectives, but that’s not what I was asked to do. Certainly this is a particularly complex
issue in respect of South Asia. I do not
think we have the time to go into it now but you raise a perfectly valid point.
On the question of Brazil: one sympathises with Brazil,
who has arguably risen very recently to this new position of international
prominence and again, arguably, is to some extent feeling its way. However, I have to say that I tend to agree
that at some point there will be some need to come down off the fence if this
situation is going to be adequately addressed.
I think in terms of the relationship between the governments of the
countries of the region – Venezuela and Colombia on the one side – but also
addressing the question of whether there can be in political terms any kind of
equivalence between an organisation like FARC, which comprises around 8000
people and not representing any obvious political constituency, and a nation-state
like Colombia with 42 million people and quite a large economy.
Emile Hokayem
Obviously, Israeli occupation of Arab territories
has a lot to do with the emergence of a number of non-state actors. However, in the case of Lebanon you have to
add another dimension. It is a weak
state which has rarely been in control of its own territory, population and
destiny. The first Israeli invasion of Lebanon
was in 1978, not 1982. Hezbollah was
created in 1982 after the big Israeli invasion, but the other indispensable
factor was the Iranian decision to build it at the time. There is also a question of whether those
non-state actors have only territorial objectives, such as freeing a piece of
land, or broader objectives. This is the
big question when it comes to Hezbollah.
Most of southern Lebanon was freed in 2000, with a dispute over two
small villages which could actually be settled easily if the two countries
accepted drawing their borders. However,
Hezbollah has refused to disarm even if this border was withdrawn, keeping
pretext after pretext. Therefore you
have to inscribe the objectives of this organisation in a broader context. There is absolutely no doubt that Hezbollah
has turned into a strategic actor in the region. Of course it has served its own goals, but
over time it has also served the goals of Iran and Syria. Would peace between Lebanon, Syria and Israel
help mitigate this? Yes, but there is no
assurance at all. Today, Syria is in no
position operationally to disarm Hezbollah because it has left Lebanon. The
Lebanese themselves will not disarm Hezbollah if Hezbollah refuse to do
it. The key to that dilemma resides in
Iran, and if you accept that, then you have to accept that it is much broader
than simply territory. However, I agree
with you regarding the fundamental conditions that led to the birth of the
movement.
Regarding Hezbollah’s international influence,
there is evidence that Hezbollah was involved in Iraq. The US military have presumably arrested a
very senior Hezbollah operative there.
Hezbollah is also allegedly implicated in the 1996 Khobar bombing in
Saudi Arabia, as well as the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Argentina and the 1980s
bombings in Paris. There is plenty of
evidence of that, but I think that Hezbollah’s foreign posture has changed a
lot. It is no longer a terrorist
movement wanting to punish left and right; it is much more strategic in its
views of force. When it comes to foreign
operations I suspect that the primary driver is probably Iran rather than
Hezbollah itself. As a Lebanese and Arab
actor, I do not think that at this point Hezbollah has an interest in operating
on faraway lands on operations that could muddy its image very badly.
Tim Willasey-Wilsey,
International Advisor, Royal Bank of Scotland
I have [a] question for Nigel or Emile. Emile, you made the clear point that
Hezbollah is no longer a proxy of Iran.
You also made the equally clear point that Hezbollah would have a lot to
lose from another war with Israel. This
leads me to the obvious question: If Israel does anything against the Iran
nuclear programme, to what extent [can] Iran be sure that Hezbollah will act in
its support?
Dr Eric Thompson,
Director, International Affairs Group, Center for Naval Analyses
My question is also for Emile on this point. You noted that the three-way alliance is
becoming a more and more solid brotherhood or partnership. There is a lot of interest in Washington
regarding what we can do to disrupt some of that relationship. However, thinking about regional
architecture, my question is: with the growing relationship between Turkey and
Damascus and the expanding interest of Riyadh in getting involved in issues
involving Lebanon, are there regional forces which may actually be able to
change the calculus in Damascus as to the utility of this relationship being
central to their security?
Nishchal Pandey,
Director, Centre for South Asian Studies
My question is for Nigel Inkster. In my own country of Nepal, there was a
similar test case of an equally violent, extreme leftist outfit, the Communist
Party, Maoist. After the ten-year
peoples’ war, and costing nearly 13,000 lives, they joined the political
mainstream in 2006 and even won the election in 2008. Therefore, why can’t the Colombian government
and perhaps the regional actors in Latin America push for some concessional
measures, including constitutional reforms, to bring FARC into the electoral
process? I think that the manner in
which we have dealt with a similar kind of ideology in our country is unique
and there are lessons that can be drawn from it.
James Hackett, Editor of
The Military Balance, IISS
My question is [for] Emile, concerning the
Hezbollah acquisition of advanced weaponry that you referred to; you mentioned
the M600 variant. Firstly, by what
routes do they obtain this advanced equipment?
Secondly, given the obvious problems that training with such equipment
in Lebanon would pose for health and safety, does Hezbollah send its personnel
to other countries for training or is this equipment operated by non-Hezbollah
personnel?
Dr David R Mares,
Professor, Political Science and Director, Center for Iberian and Latin
American Studies, University of California, San Diego
In the case of Colombia, the country did undergo a
constitutional reform and the first version of Plan Colombia had called for
much social development. However, Latin
America never stepped up with any aid for Colombia. One of the problems for Brazil in playing a
more important role in the region is that Brazil is feared by its
neighbours. Brazil is huge, has a large
economy, it is Portuguese-speaking; there is a lot of concern about what is
called sub-imperialism in Latin America.
Therefore, Brazil has to play very carefully as it moves forward in
trying to be a leader. It is lying
behind this sovereignty issue, but all that is doing is permitting not just FARC,
but if you think about the instabilities in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, we could
be entering into a phase where the spillover of FARC increases rather than
decreases.
Katarina Engberg, Deputy
Director-General, Ministry of Defence, Sweden
What is the impact of the Sunni political realignment
in Iraq on the situation of the Shi’ite part of the Lebanese population?
Emile Hokayem
On the question of Hezbollah’s response to an
Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, I think that many people assume
that the response would be automatic. I
do think it would be. I believe that it
depends on how Iran assesses the strike.
If it is deemed existential, they are brothers in arms, and I have no
doubt that they will fight together and there would be a very bloody front on
the Lebanese-Israeli border. However,
Iran may not deem an attack to be existential.
They might think that there are other ways they can escalate, wait a bit
longer and respond in asymmetric ways on faraway lands and the Gulf and so
on. The problem with Hezbollah is that
it has become a very precious instrument.
You really want to use it when it makes a real difference, and you do
not want to expose it unnecessarily. It
is just too good. The fighters are
determined and highly skilled; it is probably one of the most flexible of all
the military organisations that I know.
They surpass the US military and others in that regard; they have
adapted their doctrine very quickly.
Therefore it is a tool that you would want to use very, very carefully. Again, I believe that the call on that one
would be made in Tehran.
On the issue of weaponry and supply routes, I think
that the one that is most used is through Syria. I think that there are probably stocks of
weaponry in Syria and they do not all make it through into Lebanon. However, what we have also seen in recent
years is a diversification of supply routes.
A year and a half ago a ship called the Francorp was stopped on its
route to probably Lebanon, and it was packed with small and light weaponry. I really do not know what to make of them,
but there were rumours that trains going through Turkey were used. Personally I doubt it, but it is out there in
the open. When it comes to training it
is a very important question. With
missiles and rockets, they probably travel to Iran to receive most of their
training. When it comes to guerrilla
training I suspect that much of it happens within Lebanon. You need to know the landscape and the hills
and they are very good at it. I do not
think that the Iranians would add much on that level.
Regarding the role that regional actors can play in
potentially weakening the alliance – the Turkish and Syrian rapprochement that
was mentioned – I think that they can certainly mitigate a conflict. They cannot solve or prevent it, and I don’t
see any willingness coming from Damascus to break an alliance that has provided
it with so much prestige, regional reach, leverage against Israel and so
on. I think that too much can be made of
these new connections. They may
develop. The economic factor between
Turkey and Syria may become so important for a Syrian economy that is so
crippled that it will change the game in five years’ time. However, in the current conditions and with
the prospect of a conflict in coming years, I doubt that they will make much of
a difference in preventing that conflict, although they could perhaps manage
it.
Lastly, on the impact of Iraq and the impact of
changes there on the Lebanese Shia community.
I would be careful not to overestimate this impact. The Lebanese Shia community is in a very
different place to the Iraqi Shia community.
It is more prominent and was not as repressed as its counterpart in Iraq. What is interesting about Lebanon is that it
has this sectarian political system, and the question is whether the Shia
community, which is perhaps currently the largest community in the country,
wants to overthrow the system or actually maximise its benefits in the
system. This is still not very
clear. Ironically, Hezbollah does not
want to do away with the sectarian system, because if they start working on
political reform in Lebanon it will endanger the resistance…. Therefore they prefer to have all the Shia
community on their side and play the other communities rather than working
towards political reform. In Iraq, I
believe that the upheaval of the past seven years has put the Shia community in
a very different place.
Nigel Inkster
I will pick up on the Nepal point first. I do not think that the two cases have much to
do with [each] other, it has to be said.
In the case of Nepal at the time the Maoists began, we were looking at a
system which was far from being democratic and has only recently changed in
that regard. In the case of Colombia, it
is a country characterised by significant social and economic inequalities, but
it is a genuine democracy. The elections
that take place there are genuine elections and are generally validated by the
international community as broadly free and fair. The Maoists in Nepal arguably represented a
clear and defined political interest group or community; it is not clear to me
that this is necessarily true in the case of FARC. A few weeks ago, FARC made another not very
convincing proposal to enter into peace talks subject to the condition that
there should be a comprehensive evaluation of the economic model under which
Colombia would in future operate. What
they appear to be suggesting is that Colombia should move to an economic model
which in Venezuela has not been delivering wonderful benefits and one of whose
longest serving practitioners, Fidel Castro, who appears to have only last week
repudiated as a model. Therefore it is
not clear to me that there is much there to form the basis of a credible
negotiation.
Picking up on David Mare’s point, and I recognise
that his knowledge of Latin America is incomparably greater and more profound
than mine, I think he raises an important point here. Over the last decade or so, South America has
seen a very significant constitutional and economic renaissance. However, I think that may perhaps mask the
extent to which unresolved border disputes and other tensions between countries
in Latin America remain; they lie below the surface and they have not gone away
or been resolved. Together with this you
have the activities of a number of different non-state groups linking in, and
we have seen by looking at FARC the extent to which a form of Latin American
regional network of aspirant guerrilla organisations have formed. These include the Mapuche Indians in Chile
and Bolivian groups. They all have some
degree of engagement with FARC even though, as in the case of Sendero Luminoso,
there has not been much of a meeting of minds.
Therefore the point that I am attempting to make is that we should not
assume that Latin America in terms of regional security is absolutely destined
for the sunlit uplands. Things could go
in other directions and it seems to me that in this context, failure to address
a problem like FARC in a substantive way while the opportunity arises could
come back to haunt us. I agree entirely
with the point about Brazil and I am guilty of having underplayed the extent to
which people are concerned about Brazil’s influence; that is a very fair point.
Adam Ward
This whole topic is the subject of ongoing research
at the IISS, which we are looking forward to presenting to you in coming months
in various ways.
