Question and Answer Session
Ellen Laipson, President and Chief Executive Officer, Henry L Stimson Center; Member of the Council, IISS
I would like to hear in greater depth how India sees the current and prospective situations in Afghanistan and the extent to which you see the other stakeholders, particularly Pakistan and Iran, as able to work together in any way. Are there shared basic principles about what the future for Afghanistan can be? How receptive are the Afghan parties to the role of their neighbours? There is always this tension between what is seen as interference in a weak state and a desire to have the larger states being helpful and supportive. Finally, assuming that the United States has less of a presence in Afghanistan in one or two years’ time, how do we avoid Afghanistan becoming a proxy in relations between India and Pakistan in a way that would be unhelpful to regional stability?
Dr Andrew Parasiliti, Executive Director, IISS-US; Corresponding Director, IISS-Middle East
I would be interested in Mr Amorim’s observations on the lessons learned from dealing with Iran for the United States, based upon his negotiating experience, about Iran’s nuclear intentions and also the lessons learned from managing your relationship with the United States, given the US reaction to the joint declaration of 17 May. I would also like to ask Dr Solana whether there is now a distinct diplomatic role for the European Union in dealing with Iran, other than support for US sanctions, reflecting on your experience and leadership on this issue. In particular, is there any life in the June 2008 incentive proposal?
Barry Desker, Dean, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Both India and Brazil emphasise sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Does this not undermine your claims to a critical role in institutions of global governance, as it works against emerging doctrines such as the responsibility to protect?
Professor Dr Huseyin Bagci, Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Turkey
Brazil is not only exporting soccer players to the Middle East, but also politics. You are now directly involved with Turkey in relation to Iran. The tactics and objectives are important here; there is most probably synchronised action between America, Turkey and Brazil to avoid putting Iran in a corner. It is a good tactic. In addition, relations between Turkey and Israel have suffered very badly in recent months. Many countries applauded Turkish policy towards Israel, which is not good for either Turkey or Israel. Israel has been and will remain important for Turkey for future developments in the Middle East. How do you see the future Turkey as a regional player? Is this togetherness just a temporary thing, or will this love for the Middle East continue?
Turkey is strong at the moment, because it is negotiating with the European Union and therefore has a different image. I want to know how Turkey will be placed in security terms for the long term, when Europe is a permanent power and Turkey is a regional player. Will it become part of this European security structure or will it remain as a strategic partner of the United States in a global and regional sense? Is the European Union or the United States more important? What is their view of the growing importance of Turkey for tackling the challenges in this part of the world?
Alison Smale, Executive Editor, International Herald Tribune; Member of the Council, IISS
I am not sure I would regard the Kosovo question as resolved. In general in relation to the remnants of former Yugoslavia, Europe has not covered itself in glory over being able to solve conflicts in its own backyard. The situation in Bosnia remains very unstable, Macedonia remains a completely unresolved question, and I am not sure I would say Georgia is making all that much progress. Could you give some more detail about what Europe can do to convince people that it really can take care of its own security concerns before it starts running around the world telling other people what to do?
Marcia Poole, Senior Director, Communications, Amnesty International
In an earlier session we spoke about how the established powers, notably the US, are working with the emerging powers and the changing world order to tackle challenges such as nuclear non-proliferation. We did not, however, touch upon persistent problems that still pose a major threat to peace and security and underlie some of the new problems; I am thinking about the disenfranchisement of huge swathes of the world population caused by widespread human rights’ violations and global poverty on a dismal scale. Next week in New York we have the UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals and there are a number of countries in danger of not reaching these by 2015.
Brazil has had tremendous success in combating poverty, access to primary education and combating hunger. My question is how can Brazil combine its domestic experience with its emerging role on the world stage to work with other emerging powers, but also with established powers, to make sure this changing world order is fairer when it comes to global social justice?
Participant, New Delhi, India
On the big economic grouping, I feel this grouping has acquired more content in the last few years, and if this is so how do you see it impacting the WTO (World Trade Organisation) in general and the Doha Round in particular, if and when it is resumed? Secondly, how does Brazil now view the prospect of seats for India and Brazil on the Security Council in the context of the economic and political surge in these two countries, which are also major democracies where the armed forces have been and remain completely and totally apolitical? Thirdly, last evening Dr Henry Kissinger referred to a regional solution to the Afghan imbroglio. Are there any specific suggestions in respect of India and Pakistan being partners, not rivals, in Afghanistan’s reconstruction to bring peace and prosperity to this war‑ravaged neighbour of these two countries?
James Lockhart-Smith, Research Associate, IISS
I agree with the overall aspiration for a security community in South America, but Ambassador Amorim implied in his presentation that the glass is not just half full, but overflowing with goodwill and real problem‑solving capacity. He mentioned the solution to the Colombia/Venezuela dispute. The key variable there was the change of government in Colombia rather than the success or otherwise of international and regional agencies. Furthermore, the problems have not really been solved. The agreement is facing internal challenges in Colombia, and of course the FARC is still in Venezuela. If there had been no change of government in Colombia, do we really think that particular dispute could have been resolved? I do agree, but I would modify the degree to which we think regional agencies are really functioning as solvers of problems.
Christian Le Miere, Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security, IISS
The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean to India was mentioned, but India’s regional dominance of the Indian Ocean is now being challenged by China. The Indian and Chinese strategic and military elites very rarely if ever have any dialogue. Is there any plan to increase dialogue with the Chinese navy or other Chinese bodies to manage the transition to a more competitive Indian Ocean atmosphere?
Ambassador Jayant Prasad
There were questions on Afghanistan. How does India or how do I see the situation in Kabul just two months ago? What I am going to say goes against the grain of conventional wisdom, because a sense of doom and gloom pervades any discussion on Afghanistan. It is true that in terms of security and stability every succeeding year after 2002 has been worse than the preceding one, including the current year so far. In the midst of all this and in the context of the great uncertainties that confront Afghanistan, however, there has been tremendous progress in parts of the country, although not the whole country. We therefore need a differentiated strategy until such time as counter-insurgency succeeds in the south; we need a holding operation there, containment and development in the rest of the country.
You cannot prevent Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for terrorism unless you have a modicum of development there and the establishment of a functioning state system. The progress includes quite remarkable things. The ring road has been re‑established; India has built a road, which has created supplementary trade for Afghanistan with southern Iran. Kabul was known as the capital of darkness for 20 years, but now Uzbek Electricity comes to Kabul via transmission lines that we have built, with a large substation just outside Kabul to handle that. It is, therefore, not a hopeless case.
Turning to the more challenging question of how India and Pakistan prevent Afghanistan from becoming the site of a proxy battle. Why is India in Afghanistan? We are in Afghanistan for the same reason as the rest of the international community: we want to prevent it from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. In 1998, when the US missions in East Africa were bombed, cruise missiles were used against al‑Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. A number of newspapers interviewed the survivors in Peshawar. They were not Arabs or Afghans, they were people being trained to fight in Kashmir; we therefore have an interest in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Equally, we have an interest in getting the Afghans on their feet and making their own decisions. If these two conditions are met, our strategic interest is also fully met.
I think the security interests of any outside countries in Afghanistan should not be defined in terms of extraterritoriality or having a veto over decisions that Afghans themselves make. As for the question about whether India and Pakistan can work together, that is the vision of Dr Manmohan Singh. There are variants on what he has said, which is breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore and dinner in Kabul. That is his vision of the intertwined destinies of the countries of the region. We see the distant future of Afghanistan as a hub for trade, transportation, energy and natural resources; that is the future we should remember. Maybe, some day, we can achieve it.
What can we do now? First and foremost we must listen to Afghan voices and build Afghan capacity. The international community has begun to do that in earnest – the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Police and other governance institutions. Only the Afghans can take care of Afghanistan. There is also a need to pinpoint the enemy. There is some confusion from time to time about who the friends and enemies are. Separate the Taliban from the Pashtuns; have a regional solution and take remedial steps, whatever is required to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism. This is my solution.
In relation to China and India, we believe there is enough space in Asia and the world to allow both India and China to grow. China has done exceptionally well. We started our economic reforms late in the day, in 1991. As far as military engagements are concerned, we are engaged all across the board. It may not surprise everyone to know that trade in goods between India and China has surpassed the trade that we have with any other single country, including the United States. We are engaged with the Chinese in military exercises and exchanges. And we hope to nurture this relationship. There will be an element of competition, that we are aware of, but there is also a determination on both sides to remain cooperatively engaged.
Dr Javier Solana
I will start with the question about Iran. I had represented the E5 plus the European Union for a long period of time. The last meeting that I participated in physically was in Geneva on 19 October. It was a very good meeting, a successful meeting. There was a referendum. When the negotiators from Iran returned home, the problems started. It was probably too close to the elections, and they were unable to sign the referendum. At that time, there were two things. A new infrastructure had begun in September, and the second was the question of the Iran reactor. These two things were still open when Brazil and Turkey started.
The problem is that time moves. When you have x kilograms of low‑enriched uranium, in the year 2009 and the year 2010, and 2011, and so on, you have more. Therefore, the deal is a deal which is less equitable and less fair. We are still maintaining the same deal on the table, with Brazil and Turkey, but as time goes by we have to remember that the number of atoms that are enriched with uranium keep increasing and therefore the negotiation has to take that into consideration.
With regards to Turkey, I do not think you have to choose. I think that Turkey should be a member of the European Union. I think they should continue the process of negotiation. More chapters have to be open during this period of time. Last year was short in the number of chapters being opened. I think they will continue to be opened in the coming period ahead of us. It will be a long process. You are aware of that. This is not going to be a short process. It is very important for your country. I agree with you that much of the transformation has to do with the process of the relationship with the European Union.
We begin to think that this process is eternal. You may have other opinions which are different. I very much hope that that will not be the case. The second thing which I think is very, very important is to allow Turkey to participate in a much fuller manner in the foreign security structures of the European Union. That is something that I have been pleading for and fighting for a long time. It has not been possible. I very much hope it will be possible in the future.
As I said at the very end, we have to think, in the security structure of the continent - Turkey is a member of the OEC, and so on - what is the role of a Turkey which has more protagonism and autonomy than it used to have?
I accompanied your country in the negotiations with Armenia. I was one of the witnesses during the Hillary Clinton negotiation. Mine was one of the final signatures. I think that is an important step that was taken. We are grateful for these efforts.
The third piece is about the neighbourhood of the European Union. Let me be very blunt here. The European Union has played a great role in the neighbourhood. Today the European Union has 27 members that were not members before. They are now in peace, stability, and prosperity. Vast changes of regimes in those countries have taken place in peace due to the magnetic pull that the European Union signifies. Now you tell me that the European Union has not played correctly in the neighbourhood, then I do not [know] what it is to play correctly. We have 27 members. It was unthinkable not long ago that it could be transformed, economically and politically, as it has been. That has been done thanks to the magnetic pull and the magnetic attraction of the European Union.
You say that Kosovo and Serbia are slow. I do not have to remind you of the history of Kosovo. Also remember that still, not long ago, the president of Serbia said they would never recognise the legality of that decision. Never is not never. The day before yesterday, in the plenary session of the United Nations, the foreign minister of Serbia recognised the legality of the decision and is ready to talk. This has happened in a very short period of time, compared to other units of time. You can compare it to Afghanistan. It is a short period of time, in real terms.
With regards to Georgia, this took place in 2008 and not 2001. Remember, many things were signed by President Sarkozy - and I was witness to that - to open or to maintain negotiation in Geneva. That was to last until the end of the year 2008, and that would be the end. They could not talk about anything. They are still meeting. Pierre Morel - who is here - conducted those negotiations. These negotiations will continue throughout 2010 and 2011. The agenda has been opened. Again, one is short, one is long. I believe this is rather short, considering the times in which we are accustomed to seeing problems of this nature.
A fantastic job has been done in the Balkans. This is thanks, again, to the magnetic pull that the European Union still has. Serbia would not have done what it did if it was not closer to entering into the process to enter the European Union. We have this magnetic pull, this soft power, which has been used in a very intelligent manner. I am very proud to be able to say this.
Celso Amorim
I will try to reply to the questions. I have regrouped them into six different questions. I shall first try to answer the ones that are related to specific situations, and then move to the more conceptual ones. First, concerning Iran, and the lessons taken from there and how we manage the relations with the United States. In terms of the lessons taken from there, I first must mention that perhaps some of you have not followed these as closely as we have. The main question that was put to us before President Lula went to Iran - and of course that was the culmination of a process - but the main questions were whether the Iranians would deceive us, whether the Iranians would accept anything that we proposed, if the Iranians were prepared to negotiate, and questions of this nature.
There was much scepticism. Leaders of the most important countries that were involved in these questions would say, ‘Well this is Iran’s last chance.’ They said that very clearly. President Lula’s visit to Iran was said to be Iran’s last chance. It was not certain at that time whether the prime minister of Turkey would be visiting or not, so President Lula’s visit to Iran was said to be Iran’s last chance. But I am sure they were saying that with a sort of internal feeling, hoping very much that President Lula would not succeed. That would then prove the point that they had already in mind, that Iran was deceitful and impossible to negotiate with. I can say, to the disappointment of some, that the negotiation that we had in Iran together with Turkey was successful.
It was a very simple negotiation in a way. It was complicated to arrive at a result, but the main points that had been put to us in a very clear way, at the highest level - and I do not want to go through everything that has been published - but the main things that were put to us were the following: the October proposal is still on the table; there is still an opportunity for confidence building. The three main questions included that the quantity must be 1,200 - I am talking about 15 days before President Lula’s visit; not six months before - the quantity must be 1,200, the place must be outside Iran (and even the words ‘escrow account’ were used to express this idea), and the time must be now. We cannot act, as Iran suggests, on the basis of some alternative because it would require eight or 10 months for the fuel to be ready. This was funny because, after we had made the agreement, it was no longer eight to 10 months; it became two years. At that time, it was said it would be ready within eight to 10 months. We could not wait 10 months because Iran would continue to produce uranium during this period.
These were three very concrete questions; three very specific, material questions that have nothing to do with intentions. There was one question relating to quantity, one question relating to timing, and one question relating to location. On these three crucial questions, Iran agreed with what Turkey and Brazil proposed, on the basis of what had been requested to us. It is true, as Mr Solana said, that of course, as time goes by, the proportion of 1,200 is less significant - at the beginning it was 80%, then it was 60% - and I am not an expert on that, but I have the word of Mr El Baradei who is certainly an expert on that, with a Nobel Prize for the work he has done in this area, who said that it was still a significant quantity, at that time. He said the fears that Iran was going to produce a nuclear weapon were highly exaggerated. He said two other very interesting things. In an interview to a Brazilian paper - and I checked the English version with him so I can repeat it here now - he confirmed that he said, ‘Those who proposed the agreement and who are now proposing sanctions could not take yes for an answer.’ Why they could not take yes for an answer I do not know, but that was his evaluation.
He also said something which, in my opinion, revealed a lot of humility, because he was part of that proposal with Mr Solana, and we have discussed this before. I may not be quoting precisely, but he said, ‘Our biggest mistake was to hope to solve all the problems beforehand, and this agreement should be a confidence-building agreement.’ With regards to the 20% enrichment, Mr Ahmadinejad has said publicly that he would be prepared to interrupt the production of the 20% if the fuel for the TOR arrives. He is on the record in saying this. Of course it is a question of checking on the negotiating table, but if you do not see it on the negotiating table it is impossible to check. The question of the increased inventory will still remain, and that is something that has to be tackled.
As I said, however, this was a gateway agreement; it was an agreement of confidence building and not an agreement to solve all the problems. I think it is perfectly possible to solve this agreement once the parties are around the table. There is a difficulty because Iran is insisting that Turkey and Brazil participate in any further discussion. Some of the European countries seem, at least, to favour that or to accept that. As far as I know, the United States has not accepted that idea. I am not sure how we will move forward from there, but I am still hopeful that an agreement can be arrived at on the basis of this Tehran agreement.
Let me tell you something else. Even if the Tehran agreement takes place, and even if these other questions are resolved, this does not solve the whole Iranian question or the whole nuclear issue in Iran. There are suspicions about weaponisation and so on. This would create the necessary confidence to continue the discussion, however. I can understand all the reasons for suspicions towards Iran, but even at the height of the Cold War, when the systems, the ideologies and the beliefs were totally different between, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union, it was still possible to maintain a dialogue. I cannot understand why a dialogue is not possible in this particular case.
The second question has to do with Turkey. I cannot speak for Turkey, but in my perception of Turkey, in a way Turkey has similar characteristics to those of Brazil. It is a country of multiple identities: it is Muslim, NATO, Europe, Asia, and so on. In our case: we are black, we are Africans, we are Igbo‑Americans, we are Western, we are Amerindians, and so on. This puts us in a special position. This is not a weakness but a strength. In today’s world, you have to be tolerant. We are just seeing how important it is to be tolerant these days. This multiple identity is a source of strength. The question of how to use it is up to Turkey to know, but I think it is destined to have a very important role to play in the Middle East as well as being a member of the European Union.
With regards to the question of Venezuela and Colombia, I agree with you. There are other factors that have played into this. The succession and the new government in Colombia was certainly one of these factors. But I would not underestimate the work that has been done by Brazil and others. This was even recognised by the foreign minister of Colombia, who said that Brazil and UNASUR had important roles in helping with the dialogue. Of course the structural problems are still there, but you first must restart the dialogue. The fact that they have both already appointed ambassadors is of great interest, and of course our countries will continue to have a role there. It is easier to be done in the context of UNASUR, despite its immaturity from an institutional point of view, because there are no big suspicions, whereas in the context of the OAS, unfortunately - rightly or wrongly, I do not want to go into that area - there are many suspicions, some of which have stemmed from recent facts. People talk a lot about Chávez being radical, but people must not forget that, in 2002, there was indeed a coup d’état against Chávez, and yes it was somehow tolerated by other countries, and this has left a mark.
Our relationship with Colombia is essential. It is very telling and very meaningful that the president of Colombia decided that the first country he would visit would be Brazil. He went to the south and not to the north. This is a good omen for the future of South American cooperation and South American security.
With regards to the question of sovereignty versus responsibility to protect, [it] is not a simple one. Of course the responsibility to protect has often been used as a pretext for interventionism. We do not agree with that. On the other hand, we do see the need for countries to be willing to participate in efforts to restore either the political system or the social fabric. I will give two examples in the case of Brazil. One was with Venezuela, when it was necessary to create a group of friends of Venezuela that ensured the realisation of a referendum. It had been in their constitution, but there had been doubts over whether it would be realised or not. That helped to pacify the internal situation in Venezuela to some extent.
There are many other examples I could give, but the second example I give has to do with Haiti. Here, the presence of Brazil and other South American countries has been of great importance, including the cooperation with Caribbean countries that have maybe even more legitimacy than we have to be present there. We only did that because there was a UN mandate. We would never have done it without a UN mandate. We did not ask for it, but it was given. We do not like the words ‘responsibility to protect’ because we think it sounds too interventionist. We use another expression. We say that we temper non‑intervention with non‑indifference. That is how we try to act in this regard.
In a way, this has to do with our role in relation to Africa, where Brazil - like India and others - has a very important role. The role is mainly in the areas of technical assistance and humanitarian aid. We have a project, for example, with antiretroviral medicaments in Mozambique. I do not want to make Brazilian propaganda, but of course we think Africa is very important. It is important because it is part of our identity, as I mentioned before. It is important because it is a new horizon, including economically. The economists are saying that this will be the decade of Latin America. I believe that, in two or three decades, we will be seeing the decades of Africa and we want to be part of that. By helping them, we are helping ourselves. Generosity in foreign policy cannot be equalled to ‘just being a good guy.’ Generosity is to see your own interests in the long term, and equating your interests in the long term with the interests of peace and prosperity for all. That is what we are trying to do in Africa.
There was one last question and that has to do with the reform of the Security Council. What happened in relation to the attempt by Turkey and Brazil to make a concrete proposal in relation to Iran shows how resistant the P5 are to any change in the existing decision making in questions of peace and security. It shows how difficult it will be to reform the Security Council, but it is necessary. It is not necessary because Brazil or India or South Africa aspire to be there; it is necessary for the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the decision of the Security Council itself, and it will come. What happened in the G20 in relation to the G8 is an example. One day or another, in one fashion or another, the reform will come, and I am sure that the large emerging countries will be there.
Dr John Chipman
Minister Amorim, Javier Solana and Ambassador, thank you very much indeed. I must apologise to many others for the fact that the agenda states that we need to end this session at 12 o’clock and begin the next session at 12 o’clock, which is already a fairly acrobatic act. I have to leave a legacy of good organisation and an example of discipline to my successor in the chair, Adam Ward. I will close this session now by thanking the three on the panel for extraordinary presentations and, shall I say, vigorous and frank and complete answers to all the questions posed. Thank you very much.
