Dr John Chipman, Director General and Chief Executive, IISS
Ladies and gentlemen, we have an intention to begin the second plenary session on Security Systems and Institutions: Regional Perspectives. We had a US point of view to begin our session, but we are delighted here to have perspectives from Latin America, Asia and Europe, each with a particular regional accent. Let me begin by asking Ambassador Celso Amorim, the Minister of External Relations of Brazil, to speak. Celso Amorim is responsible for executing the foreign policy of one of the rising powers in the world, and Brazil has taken a much more extrovert approach, not only to the management of good, neighbourly relations in its own continent, the leadership it has shown in the establishment of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defence Council, but also in promoting its perspectives in the Middle East, Africa and other parts of the world. We look forward to your point of view, Minister.
Ambassador Celso Amorim, Minister of External Relations, Brazil
Thank you very much, Dr Chipman. I would also like to greet the Permanent Secretary of India and, of course, my good friend Javier Solana. While I am aware that this particular panel is specifically devoted to regional perspectives, I cannot forget that it is inscribed in the broader context of global security governance and the emerging distribution of power. I will try to be as succinct as possible and address these two aspects.
I do not think I need to go into much detail about regional questions in Latin America or, more specifically, South America, for a couple of reasons: firstly, because I understand that, when this conference breaks out into different groups, there will be a specific discussion on South America, with the participation of very knowledgeable aspects; secondly, by and large South America has been a region of peace, in which armed conflict has not existed for nearly 20 years. In any case, the ones which occurred then were minor compared to those that affect other regions of the world, including Europe. Thirdly, my country Brazil and myself have been involved in trying to find solutions to other situations of much greater purport. It may be unreasonable of me at least not to mention them here.
Let me start with South America. I use the term ‘South America’ here, rather than ‘Latin America’, because despite the obvious historical affinities that bring together the whole of Latin American and Caribbean countries, South America constitutes a distinct geopolitical entity. It is very different from what happens in Central America and Mexico and, to some extent, the Caribbean.
The first comment that comes to my mind, apart from the one I have already made about it being a region of peace, has to do with the new level of self‑esteem and self‑assertion, which are very much characteristics of South America today. It suffices for anyone to take the last issue of The Economist, whichis normally not very kind to South American countries, especially because of the progressive governments there. One will see references to the South or Latin American ‘decade’. Maybe most tellingly, The Economist refers to Latin America, and to South America more appropriately, as a region which is nobody’s backyard. This is a very telling way of referring to our region. It is a clear allusion to the previously accepted notion that South America, as well as the whole of Latin America, was almost totally dependent on the United States for economic and military help.
I will not bother you with too many figures, but just one figure relating to Brazil will illustrate this fact. Whereas eight years ago, the United States was responsible for about 26% of Brazilian exports, and more or less the same proportion was absorbed by Europe, and a large portion of our sales of manufactures would go to the United States, today’s share by the US of our total exports fell to less than 10%. It was surpassed by China. Of course, there the price and demand of commodities play an important role. It is quickly losing ground to Argentina, which was our second trading partner over the last few months, from the point of view of Brazilian exports, and will probably soon occupy second place. When we consider the manufactured content of our exports, we see that 47% of our total exports of manufactured goods go to other Latin American countries themselves, which of course come far ahead of the US or, for that matter, Europe. This is a totally complete change to our integration into the world, as far as trade is concerned. This has repercussions that go far beyond purely trade relations.
Similar trends are also taking place in other South American countries. Brazil is becoming a bigger market for many countries. For many countries in South America, Brazil is the biggest importing market. This also to some extent reflects on investment and other aspects of economic relations. Manufacture has contributed to this change, but most important was the economic and physical integration of South America.
Integration efforts have been taking place for half a century. Our ALAC, as it was called, which then became the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), was founded precisely 50 years ago. It is only in the last two decades or so that these processes have taken full force. In spite of its shortcomings, Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) has asserted itself as an important regional grouping that not only promotes economic openness inside, but also acts internationally as an important interlocutor. Most of the agreements we have or are discussing do not involve the individual countries of Mercosur. A series of bilateral and biregional agreements with other South American countries, more specifically the Andean countries, has since the middle of the last decade transformed the whole of South America into a truly free trade zone. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which was promoted by the US and would probably have consolidated the backyard status of South America, gave way to a free trade area of South American countries, which allows us for instance to buy Uruguayan butter in Peru and Peruvian cement in Brazil. This is something that never happened before. This is also to do with road links, which for instance allow products from the east of Peru to be sold in the west of Brazil. This never happened before.
Of course, much has to be done. Everyone knows Mercosur still has a lot to do to become a perfect customs union. It still has shortcomings, even in the internal liberalisation process. It can be easily affirmed that South America has progressively become what I call a ‘security community’. I believe this is Karl Deutsch’s term when he says that war is unconceivable among a certain group of countries. It is certainly unconceivable today in Mercosur, and it is becoming increasingly less conceivable to the whole of South America. This is an essential way to look at the problems of security in our region.
Recent developments and settlements of different disputes, some of which seemed to be very difficult at first, demonstrate that peace has become a supreme value to our regions. More importantly, these settlements have been obtained without any outside interference, even by the Organization of American States (OAS) most of the time. For instance, take the Ecuador/Colombia conflict, where the solutions were found through the good offices of countries like Brazil and others. Mainly in the Rio group, take the Bolivia internal strife, which were basically treated by UNASUR.
Take the more recent Venezuela/Colombia difficulties, which of course to a large extent were resolved by bilateral decisions, but to take the words of the Colombian foreign minister and other Colombian officials, were to a large extent also helped by countries like Brazil and also UNASUR. It is a very important fact that the Secretary‑General of UNASUR, the former President of Argentina Néstor Kirchner, participated in a large part of the meeting between Presidents Chávez and Santos, the newly elected President of Colombia.
This is extremely important and shows that, in contrast to what happened when the subject was brought to the OAS, which inflamed the discussions, when it was brought to a different context it was treated bilaterally with the help of other South American countries and UNASUR and found a different solution. This has to do with the creation of UNASUR itself as a political process based on free trade agreements and a big effort in integrating infrastructure, but also the development, as mentioned, of institutions like the Defence Council and a council to combat drugs. Of course, all these are still in their infancy, but they are already showing results. I will mention again, for instance, that the joint meetings of foreign and defence ministers of UNASUR were absolutely instrumental in defusing the question of US bases in Colombia. This was done by obtaining very specific ‘negative assurance securities’, as we call it in disarmament jargon. These were given by Colombia. Also a clause about respecting territorial integrity is meant to be present in any agreement of South American countries with countries outside the region.
By way of concluding this part, I would say that the more South America is left to itself, the greater its chances of finding peaceful solutions to its problems. This of course does not dispense with the need for opening markets, or alleviating, reducing or eliminating subsidies by rich countries, which of course stifle the economies of many countries in the region. I would also add that, for the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean beyond South America, which is a different geopolitical reality to some extent, the need for clear cooperation with the US, Canada and other actors is of course of great importance. Again, even here, this could be better achieved with the active help of South America as a new source of economic and political support. This has certainly been the case in Haiti, where South America took leadership, not only of the military force but also in contributing to the fund that opened to help Haiti. The first country to give money was Brazil; it gave $55 million. The second, quite a while later, was Norway. Some countries in the region have not yet done what they have promised. Also in terms of its military presence, South America has been of great importance, as it has too with its political leadership, with countries like Chile and Argentina exerting a very important role.
I will not mention the Middle East, but I would say that Brazil has a great interest in following subjects here for several reasons: firstly, it affects the whole of mankind; and secondly, we have a community of about 12 million Arabs. We would probably be the fourth or fifth Arab country, if you were to take all these people and make them an independent entity. We also have a very active Jewish community, which has made a great contribution to the Brazilian culture, politics and economy. In a way, we have the capacity to deal with different interlocutors, which not many countries in the world have, quite honestly. If you look for an identity for Brazil, the most singular factor is our mixture. That of course may help us understand the different ways of thinking of those who pray according to the Koran or the Bible, or who accept the Gospels.
Although not in a central way, we have been active in questions like the problems between Syria and Israel. We have also been talking to the Palestinians. I can come back to our views if they are of interest. In relation to Iran, I will just say this: of course there were different views on tactics, as was said by Mr Steinberg before, but we have the same objective of ensuring non‑proliferation, but at the same time respecting the right of every country to have nuclear programmes of their own.
The reason we were so clearly involved in the Iranian question more recently is threefold: firstly, because as non‑permanent members of the Security Council, we feel a responsibility to help in world peace, and not only to vote on what others propose, so there was something to do there; secondly, we saw a concrete possibility because the swap agreement that was proposed some months before we were involved – as Mr Solana knows very well, because we have discussed it over the phone – offered an opportunity to come to some sort of meaningful agreement, which I had never seen before; and thirdly, because Brazil, as a country which has good relations with other developing countries in several fora, including Iran in the context of G15 and other groups, could be able, together with Turkey, to develop a kind of dialogue that other countries probably were not able to.
There has been a lot of discussion about this agreement. We did not invent anything; we just used the agreement that had been proposed by the US and others. We did not deal with any subjective factors, intentions or motivations. We dealt with three very concrete points that were being discussed and about which there were doubts: quantity, time and place. In these three crucial questions, Iran did exactly what was asked of it. We were surprised – not totally surprised, because we are not naïve, but a bit disappointed – that the agreement was not used in an immediate way, although we still hope it can be a basis for the future. We are sure there are other questions pending the 20% enrichment and the inventory of light enriched uranium, but all of these can of course be dealt with on the basis of the agreement we reached.
The main purpose of this agreement was to build confidence. This certainly is our hope – that it still comes to something – because the alternatives either will not come to anything real, like sanctions, or will have tremendous human consequences. I do not even like to think about any kind of armed action. Brazil is ready to cooperate. I cannot speak for them, but I believe Turkey is too. Of course, this depends on other countries as well. The odds are open in this respect, but we are prepared to be helpful. Thank you.
Dr John Chipman
Minister, thank you very much for your remarks. I am sure there will be questions on some of the points you raised, exactly as you anticipated.
