Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS
When we started this review, Dr Henry Kissinger referred to the situation in Afghanistan, and the subject has insinuated itself in the discussions of today. The strategy in Afghanistan is the formal and open topic of this evening and we are honoured and delighted to have the UK Secretary of Defence, Dr Liam Fox, with us tonight. Liam has been interested in defence issues for a very long time as the opposition spokesperson, and was very studious while in opposition to engage with the expert community throughout the world on defence matters as well as the armed forces of the UK and allies.
He came into his position as Secretary of Defence immensely prepared for a very challenging job, not only because of the operations in which the UK is involved but also because of the budgetary challenge that the military forces in the UK are faced with. Dr Fox is faced with an enormous range of operational, institutional and political issues, but clearly uppermost in his mind is his strategy in Afghanistan and a resolution to the security challenge there. The UK is a very important coalition partner to the United States and has taken on particular operations of its own as well as being an important NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) ally in defining the strategy for ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) forces. We have invited Liam Fox here to give his view of the current strategy of Afghanistan, situating it properly in the wider political context. Secretary Fox, the floor is yours.
Dr Liam Fox, Secretary of State for Defence, UK
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to such an august body. Of course, today marks the 9th anniversary of the Al-Qaeda attacks on Washington and New York that killed almost 3,000 innocent people from over 50 countries, including 66 British citizens. It was a well planned and well executed attack by a well financed and organised group of fanatics against highly symbolic targets. It was designed to create the maximum loss of life and maximum misery. It was an attack not just against people or property, but against a whole way of life; not just against the United States, but against all free peoples. The carnage did not discriminate between nationality, colour or religion. The atrocity of 9/11 changed the lives of thousands of families and it changed the way political leaders saw the world. The horror and pain of those dreadful hours is forever etched on the memories of those who witnessed them. We will not and must not forget. It is what trans-national terrorism looks like.
For the first and only time in its 60 year history, NATO invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty – an attack against one being an attack against all. In Afghanistan today, the operations of NATO and the other Coalition allies are a direct consequence of 9/11. It was there that the Taliban rulers gave Al-Qaeda sanctuary, allowed it to run terrorist training camps, and made it a base for terrorist attacks across the world. That is why the Taliban were driven out of power by Afghan and international forces, and it is why Al-Qaeda were forced to flee to the border areas of Pakistan. Although reduced and under considerable pressure, they are still there and continue to pose a real and significant threat to us.
However, I think that we need to be frank in our analysis of how we have come to the point in which we find ourselves today. The attacks of 9/11 changed our thinking so profoundly that it is difficult to make objective judgements about what went before; but there can be no doubt that 9/11 signified a failure, at least to some degree, of intelligence and policy.
Although the threat from Al-Qaeda was recognised, it was not given the prominence it required. In the UK for instance, we assessed that Afghan-grown narcotics posed a greater threat than Afghan-based terrorism. On the basis of the sporadic attacks from Al-Qaeda and their limited effect, it looked as if the threat was being contained. Well, we were wrong, and our presence in Afghanistan now is a consequence of this misjudgement. 9/11 is what failure in Afghanistan looks like, and 9/11 is what the failure to confront trans-national terrorism will look like.
As we learn the lessons of our engagement in Afghanistan, we must be careful not to use them dogmatically as exemplars of other current challenges or those that we may face in the future. We can never assume that the conflicts of the future will be the same as the conflicts of today. Afghanistan is a country with a difficult history, complex ethnic makeup and a culture of fierce independence. I think that it would be a reasonable critique to say that in 2002/2003 the international community’s plan to grow security and governance in Afghanistan was too optimistic and too unrealistic when set against the Taliban’s ability to regenerate and adapt.
It would also be a reasonable critique to say that since that time, and up to the reinvigoration of strategy and the military and political surge of the last year, our collective ambition was not complemented by a collective willingness to commit the necessary military, political and civilian effect to achieve our aims. In particular, we should rue the lost opportunities between 2002 and 2006 to build up the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) so that there were indigenous forces alongside ISAF strong enough to confront the gathering strength of the Taliban, particularly in the South. Therefore, let me suggest three lessons for the future.
First, that the threats to international security and our national interests from trans-national terrorists, who have access to all the tools of our networked and globalised world, are less susceptible to traditional responses and strategies; they demand an updated concept of deterrence. Let us remember that to terrorists who seek martyrdom and do not value their own lives, let alone those of civilians, the simple threat or use of force may not be a deterrent. In fact, it may be exactly what the terrorists are seeking. We have to demonstrate that our response to any attacks is measured and targeted, will reduce their ability to operate, and take them further from their political goals.
Second, that when the international community chooses intervention over deterrence or containment, we must match our aims and ambitions with the political, military and civilian resources commensurate with the task.
Third, when intervention becomes necessary, it is not enough for our armed forces to provide externally mediated security. That can bring only temporary relief and buy us time. Our focus must also be on the building of the capacity of indigenous governance, and specifically to build local and culturally acceptable follow-on forces to provide the foundations of lasting security.
Almost nine years on, longer than World War Two, the job in Afghanistan remains unfinished. The Government of Afghanistan is not yet capable of securing its own territory. Without the presence of ISAF, Al-Qaeda could return to Afghanistan and the threat could rise again. Not only would we risk the return of civil war in Afghanistan, creating a security vacuum, but we would also risk the destabilisation of Pakistan and other neighbouring states with significant consequences for regional and international security.
If we were to leave before 2015, a point at which on current progress we expect to have achieved our security aims, it would be a shot in the arm to violent jihadists everywhere, re-energising violent radical and extreme Islamism. It would send the signal that we did not have the moral resolve and the political fortitude to see through what we ourselves have described as a national security imperative. Premature withdrawal would also damage the credibility of NATO that has been the cornerstone of our defence for more than half a century, and also undermine the United Nations under whose authority we are operating there.
Let me be very clear. We do not seek a perfect Afghanistan, but one able to maintain its own security and prevent the return of Al-Qaeda. This aim also requires working with Pakistan to enhance their ability to tackle the threat from their side of the border. In Afghanistan, success means, first, continuing to reverse the momentum of the Taliban-led insurgency. Second, containing and reducing the threat from the insurgency to a level that allows the Afghan Government to manage it themselves.
Third, supporting the Afghan Government to develop a stable and capable enough system of national security to provide internal security for its people on an enduring basis. That is why we are supporting more effective Afghan governance at every level, and building up the capacity of the ANSF and the institutions that manage them as rapidly as is feasible.
Many ISAF patrols are conducted with Afghan forces, as ISAF and the ANSF operate together, living and working side by side. There are risks in partnering; we have sadly seen some of them. We try to reduce them to a minimum, but partnering is the quickest, most effective and ultimately the safest way to build a capable ANSF, which is the key to bringing our forces home. In Afghanistan now, I believe we have the right counterinsurgency strategy, and the tools to implement it are increasingly being put in place. We measure its success not in the number of dead terrorists or insurgents, but in the number of the local population protected and in the number of Afghans who believe we and they are gaining the upper hand and have the will to see the campaign through. However, while our aims cannot be achieved without the necessary military means, they cannot be achieved by military means alone.
Defence, diplomacy and development are all part of the same solution, seeing Afghanistan in its regional context as Henry Kissinger pointed out last night. Insurgencies usually end when there is political settlement and when government is able to provide a brighter future for its own people. Therefore, bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan is a process and not an event. Supporting and facilitating the Afghan Government's political process for reconciliation and reintegration initiatives must be an imperative. To progress this, an Afghan High Peace Council will oversee a process towards a political settlement for all the Afghan people, underpinned by the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund. Progress is being made on the security, governance and development fronts; it is hard and it is slow but it is real.
Only three weeks ago I revisited Lashkar Gah in the south of Helmand. Six months ago I would have been in body armour and an armoured vehicle; you can now walk around Lashkar Gah. The civilian airport is open with three flights a day to Kabul. The ice factory is open, not a great deal for us, but for them it is the most obvious sign that economic normality is returning, with the ability to maintain fresh produce in the local markets in the villages around.
As Afghan sovereignty grows, so the nature of ISAF operations and the role of our forces will continue to evolve. The incremental process of handing over security responsibility to Afghan control in all provinces and districts by the time of President Karzai’s stated ambition, by the end of 2014, must be based on an assessment [of] conditions on the ground. It also means that there will have to be adaptable transition along the way to meet our commitment to withdraw combat forces by 2015, and we should not raise expectations about the speed with which this change of role will happen. In fact, unrealistic expectation has sadly been a hallmark of far too much of the approach to policy on Afghanistan in the previous years. Even as transition takes place, there will be capability weaknesses inside the ANSF that need to be addressed, and our forces – and we must accept this - may have to be there in a mentoring and a training role for some considerable time. On top of that, the wider elements of reconstruction and governance in Afghanistan will require the non-governmental organisations and the wider international community to be there for a long time. All of us want our troops home as quickly as possible, but to achieve this goal the gradual drawdown in ISAF force levels so that the Afghans can take responsibility for themselves must be done in a coherent way. It must be done as an alliance, not as individual nations. This is about phasing out, not walking out.
We are six months into an 18-month military surge designed to deliver the counterinsurgency strategy, and we are not yet at the point where we can pass definitive judgment. However, over the last few years the strategic position of the insurgency has begun to deteriorate. Pakistan is taking the threat seriously, and the safe havens in Pakistan are being squeezed by Pakistani Security Forces. The ISAF coalition has increased its commitment to the mission, in manpower and equipment. The Taliban have lost significant ground in their southern heartland, including the key population centres. We have been targeting their bomb-making networks and their leadership and command structure. Their network is under significant pressure, with the senior leadership isolated, training deficient, and supplies limited. They are incapable of stopping the expansion of the ANSF, which is bringing closer the potential collapse of their strategic position. Their only realistic hope is that international resolve to continue the war will collapse before the Afghan Government itself is effective enough to stand on its own. The message we must send as an international community is that this hope is an empty one. We remember the lessons of 9/11. We will not let that threat to our people re-emerge and we are committed to finishing the task.
Ladies and gentlemen, we in this audience tonight understand the importance of the national security case for our commitment in Afghanistan. However, we should not take for granted that the images of 9/11 still resonate with the public in the same way they did six, seven or eight years ago. An 18-year-old American Marine in Helmand was only nine years old at the time of the attacks of 9/11; a 22-year-old British Lieutenant was only 13. Across the alliance we need to do much better at reminding our publics why we are fighting in Afghanistan and why the cost of failure is a price we cannot afford to pay.
We need to have clear messages for the Afghan people, and those messages need to be communicated by our deeds as well as our words. We are neither colonisers nor occupiers. We are there under United Nations authority at the invitation of the Afghan Government. We are not in Afghanistan to create a carbon copy of a western democracy, and we are not there to convert the people to western ways. We seek the government of Afghanistan by the Afghans for the Afghans. We insist only that it does not pose a threat to our security, our interests or those of our allies.
Dr John Chipman
Liam, thank you very much for that very robust and clear presentation.
