Question and Answer Session
Nobuyasu Abe, Director, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs
I am from Japan and I want to very much promote nuclear disarmament and arms reduction. I wish to raise a couple of points to Senator Margelov. One thing is that we very much want to have the United States and Russia move on to the next stage to reduce strategic weapons further after ratifying the current START and also start to touch on tactical nuclear weapons. In connection with that, I understand that many Russians now have a concern over their conventional disadvantage or inferiority vis-à-vis NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). They argue that therefore they cannot proceed too quickly in reducing the nuclear link. However, I would argue that a little differently. If I spoke to the Russian defence minister or generals in Moscow, I would argue that because Russia may be lagging behind in conventional forces, they should reduce the nuclear forces and save that money to modernise and strengthen their conventional forces. In today’s world where nuclear weapons are becoming very difficult to use, it is dangerous even for Russia to depend too much on nuclear deterrents. At the lower level of intensity conflicts, you cannot use nuclear weapons; but if you have conventional weaknesses, you have difficulty. I understand that you have some problems with your neighbours. I would use that argument.
There is also another way - a kind of trick - that you can use to promote US‑Russia reductions. One way is that if they are concerned about the conventional weaknesses but still want to maintain the parity between them, one way perhaps for the United States - as though you were playing a game of golf - you give a handicap to the other side so that you can promote them during the game. In the current New START Treaty, there is already a hidden handicap built into the treaty. That is the counting rule of the intercontinental ballistic missiles. They count the same way whether they are tipped with nuclear warheads or non‑nuclear warheads. In that sense, the US has already given a hidden handicap to Russia. This could be developed further.
Finally, I want to have the US‑ratified CTBT. This is a roadblock that is preventing the progress of nuclear disarmament. For that matter, I want Russia to speak out and demand the US to ratify CTBT as soon as possible. Russia is at a disadvantage in the current situation because they have ratified and the US has not.
Ambassador Peter Gottwald, Commissioner of the Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament, Federal Foreign Office, Germany
Thank you very much indeed. I would like to make two comments. The first is on the situation with the nuclear disarmament where we got relatively positive statements on where we stand with the New START. I think we all agree that this cannot be the end of it. I certainly also agree with what Ambassador Abe just said. But we also realise that, here in Geneva, the work of the Conference on Disarmament is not progressing; that a conference which in the past has been able to produce the Chemical Weapons Convention and the CTBT, is now, for well over a decade, in a deplorable state, it has to be said. I very much agree with what Ambassador Kennedy said about ‘patience running out’ and a need to move forward. I think this need has actually very much been accentuated by the fact that, with President Obama’s vision in Prague, we are on a good track for the nuclear arms control. The NPT review conference has given us a mandate and a job to move forward. It is simply not acceptable that this moving forward is not happening.
We are certainly looking forward to the high‑level meeting in New York. We hope that this will help to focus international attention on the necessity to move forward. But then, as has been said, we need to soberly assess what can be done. I would be interested in your view of whether you see some possibilities for doing just that.
Secondly, I very much agree with your analysis of the need to look at security and arms control contributions to security in Europe. You reminded us that, in 2008, we were all very much sobered by the fact that anybody who might have believed that military conflict in Europe was a thing of the past, was proven wrong. I am, again, encouraged by the fact that we are beginning again in Vienna to talk to each other on ways to move forward. Obviously, with a completely new security system, in the sense of President Medvedev, and new mechanisms, this is a tall order, but I think we can start by building on what we have. This is the CFE Treaty. Our feeling is that it makes a lot of sense to look at what the CFE Treaty offers in mechanisms for transparency, information exchange and verification, and see how to use that for the task at hand. Again, I would be interested in the views of the panellists in terms of how to bring that about. Definitely I see a very important need to do this job.
Dr Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
I have a couple of questions for Ambassador Kennedy. Firstly, related to CTBT. Even if [we] share your optimism and believe that the United States will ratify the CTBT, could we have the same sense of optimism regarding North Korea? Do you think North Korea would sign and ratify a CTBT? What would we do first? Rejoin the NPT or sign and ratify the CTBT? If not, then why are we wasting time on the CTBT? Without North Korea’s ratification, the CTBT would not come into force and we can focus attention on other important issues.
My second question is related to the regime. I agree with Ambassador Margelov that the current regime has its origins in the Cold War, and it is facing crisis. I am equally aware that the United States administration is acknowledging this fact. A few months ago, Senator - now Secretary - Clinton talked about a 21st century NPT with India as a full partner. Since then, we have not heard anything. Why?
Katarina Engberg, Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Defence, Sweden
I would be interested in hearing the speakers’ assessment of the prospect for next phase, covering sub‑strategic weapons, as Ambassador Kennedy was alluding to. If I could ask, in this context, for Ambassador Kennedy to expand on her point for looking for new approaches to verification, including new technologies.
David Merkel, Director, Caspian & Black Sea Policy Forum
Thank you. My question is for the Chairman. Rather than talk about high‑brow, global arms control, I would like to talk about low‑brow, partisan parliamentary politics. Years ago, when I was trying to explain why the Bush administration attempt to pass Jackson‑Vanik failed to you, after my explanation as to why Senator - then Chairman - Biden had killed it, you listened attentively and summed it up by saying, ‘So the law that was put in place to allow Jews out of the Soviet Union is being maintained to allow chickens into Russia.’ I thought that was an accurate summation of it.
Many people think that Senator Kerry make a mistake by delaying the passage of it, Senator Lugar included. After the November election, if the New START agreement is not ratified by the Senate - you have described it as ‘phase one’ of the Reset - what does that do to your job in Parliament and with the State Duma on other aspects of the Reset?
Dr Teng Jianqun, Director for the Centre of Arms Control, China Institute of International Studies
One big initiative given by President Obama is a nuclear‑free world, as Ambassador Kennedy mentioned several times during her presentation. My question is slightly personal. Can this initiative be a guideline for [your work or can treaties like the Non‑Proliferation Treaty, the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Treaty be put on your agenda during your term here?
Ambassador Fred Tanner, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy
I would like to come back to this high‑level meeting of 24 September, which Ambassador Kennedy has referred to. Of course I think the stakes are indeed very large, specifically for Geneva, with regard to the CD. I just wonder, with regards to the paralysis of the FMCT, that it may not just be a way to look at alternatives, because it is being blocked on the grounds of the consensus rule, but also why not look more to those who are actually blocking the mechanism? I just wonder how much the US - and possibly Russia - are actually trying to engage Pakistan, and possibly other countries hiding behind Pakistan, on finding constructive solutions to use the existing disarmament machineries rather than going beyond that and looking into more, I would say, perhaps exclusive arrangements which will, sooner or later, mean it will be harder to have a buy‑in of these countries. You need all of these countries on board. I look forward to a response by Laura and by the Senator on this. Thank you very much.
Jean-Louis Gergorin, Managing Director, JLG Strategy
I have a question for Senator Margelov. It is a very simple question because of your deep expertise in that field. Senator, how do you see the Iranian nuclear situation evolving? What would be the Russian Federation’s reaction to Iran starting to enrich uranium to weapons‑grade level?
Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS–Asia; Editor, Adelphis; Director, Defence and Military Analysis, IISS
Senator Margelov cited the example of Sudan as evidence that the global arms control regime does not work. I would like to raise the issue of conventional arms proliferation, particularly in the specific regional context of the Asia Pacific. A very important phenomenon, over the last 20 years or so, has been the significant modernisation and upgrading of armed forces throughout Asia, paid for by rising defence expenditure which has largely been used to buy new weapons from the United States, Russia and Europe.
My question for the two panellists is a simple one, but I know it is a hard one to answer. What sort of arms control measures, if any, might conceivably help to mitigate the potentially destabilising trend of conventional arms proliferation in the Asia Pacific region?
Mikhail Margelov
I will start with one of my favourite topics: Iran. When President Ahmadinejad made one of his brilliant statements, saying that Russia and the UK have to pay contribution to the Islamic Republic of Iran for the occupation of Iranian territory during World War II, and he said that prior to the V‑Day this year, I invited an Iranian Ambassador to my office in Moscow. When he came, I reminded him that the Soviet‑Iranian Treaty of 1921, which allows Soviet and Russian troops to be deployed on the Iranian territory, is still valid. I have not read the cable from Iranian Ambassador to Iran. I do not know if it was intercepted or not. But I can imagine what this man wrote in that cable.
We do not have any illusions about the character of the Iranian regime at all. That is why, if we cooperate with Iran in the sphere of nuclear energy, when we build Bushehr, this is how we try to keep these people playing by the rules of IAEA. That is the only legal mechanism to make them cooperate with international institutions.
Three months ago, I was hosting, in Moscow, the delegation from Israeli Knesset. I made them talk to Sergey Kirienko, the head of our Atomic Energy Agency, about Iran. They had a long, in‑depth conversation. I think they were convinced. We do not have any hidden agenda when dealing with Iran. They are our neighbour, our difficult neighbour, and, believe me, during the 1990s, we still did not know how many Islamic sport camps they had deployed in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and the Caucusus. We have to play chess with them. We do not believe in our oriental policy in playing rugby. It is difficult to do politics in the oriental countries and we know that.
On non‑proliferation, further reductions and other issues, in appointing a former furniture trader as our defence minister, the Russian president sent a very important signal to the rest of the world: we are a peaceful nation; we are a peace‑loving nation. We are not aggressors. When we talk about further reductions in nuclear and non‑nuclear arms, firstly we think about our national interests. We truly believe that the continuation of talks on further nuclear reductions should involve other members of the club – the UK, France, China and others – otherwise it will be a Russian‑American story of how we saved the world, in which others are not involved. I am not happy with that approach.
I am involved in a Global Zero project, and we co‑chair that Russian‑American project, together with Ambassador Bruce Blair. The last summit of the Global Zero movement was in Paris in spring. Two presidents, President Medvedev and President Obama, sent letters to that summit supporting the idea of a nuclear‑free world. We understand that it is not realistic to see a nuclear‑free world in 10 or 20 years, but it probably will be sometime. We need that as a goal to move towards.
Last but not least is the very important question about what will happen if the START 3 agreement is not ratified. Firstly, it will weaken the position of Presidents Obama and Medvedev, regarding the public opinion in those countries. START 3 is the first achievement on the international opinion of two young presidents who represent the new political generation, which does not have the bitter feeling of defeat or great feeling of victory from the Cold War. They need success. I want to be an optimist. I see how much work is being done by the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon convincing my colleagues on Capitol Hill that the issue of national security for Americans should be an issue of national consensus. It is not an issue for debate between Democrats and Republicans. That is also the case in Russia: all the best experts, who are against the START 3 agreement in Russia, belong to the Communist faction in the Duma. They are very experienced people and it is difficult to argue with them, but we shall be. We will ultimately deliver that. I am happy that our office and generals are very disciplined. If the Commander‑in‑Chief says that black is black and white is white, they agree with that.
Ambassador Laura Kennedy
Let me start with Fred Tanner, who mentioned Pakistan, the CD and paralysis, and asked about the US and Russia engaging Pakistan on this issue. Let me say first that Pakistan is a very good friend, partner and ally of the US. Of course we discuss this issue with them, as we do the whole range of strategic issues. I will not try to characterise Pakistan’s views; they are extremely eloquent at doing that themselves. Let me say that of course we have a dialogue on this issue. We would not encourage them to follow a path that we did not believe could be consistent with their national security.
Obviously, countries differ. Diplomacy after all is a matter of trying to persuade, not to force. With that said, as I mentioned in my speech, the CD is an institution that sticks out for us. We have had an extraordinary string of progress and will start moving ahead with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), nuclear‑weapons‑free zone, a nuclear security summit, a nuclear posture review and reviews across the board. This is one area that sticks out. Many countries are frustrated. We certainly believe that the CD is the correct forum to go forward with this. It has the right stakeholders and operates on consensus. We very much agree that consensus is not only desirable but essential when doing a serious negotiation. Not to be able even to begin that is a problem for many nations, which is why I say it could be time to explore other ways of doing this. We will not, however, drop our efforts to agree a programme of work in the CD. Again, the issues are too important to stay bottled up, so it may indeed be time to look at other ways. For example, the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the cornerstone of the non‑proliferation regime, was agreed and did not include many of the key stakeholders of today, who only lately joined.
Our Chinese colleague asked about no first use. Looking towards what the CD could do, a balanced programme of work would indeed include the issue of negative security assurances. We have said that we are not only willing but eager to engage on this issue. Of course, there are differences among the nuclear weapon states on nuclear doctrine. For our part, our administration conducted a major nuclear posture review. As I alluded to in my speech, Secretary Clinton brought up the issue of regional negative security assurances, in the form of nuclear‑weapons‑free zone. Our intention is to engage in a whole variety of them.
I believe our Swedish participant raised the issue of new approaches to verification. In this connection, I might commend, if it is not out of order, another institution, the Arms Control Association, that in its most recent issue published an article specifically focused on verification, by Rose Gottemoeller. It is the most comprehensive discussion of new approaches to verification. Rather than taking everyone’s time, I would commend that; it is in the most recent issue. Indeed, this treaty did come up with many novel approaches, but lots more work needs to be done as we look at new and more far‑reaching regimes.
Let me turn to the multilateral arena, which we need when we get to that nuclear‑weapons‑free world that President Obama, for one, has so eloquently laid out. There is a huge and unimaginably complex range of verification measures that will need to be identified, explored and developed. I would point to one thing: that the five officially recognised nuclear‑weapon states are starting to look at these issues as a group. How do transparency and confidence‑building measures work? There was for example a conference in London a while ago that started to deal with these issues. We mentioned it in the communiqué that the five permanent members of the nuclear‑weapon states put out during the review conference, which was negotiated here in Geneva. This is an example that, of all the tasks out there, we are starting to grapple gingerly with these unimaginably complex issues.
If you will forgive me segueing in another direction, that is why we for one believe that a nuclear weapons convention with a time‑bound framework is not the correct route to take. We believe you need a step‑by‑step framework for different approaches and regimes, because reaching zero, that last step, will be the most complex, difficult undertaking that has ever been seen in the disarmament world. We are working on this. There are many interesting things being done by the UK and Norway, for example, which carried out a pilot project about how one would verify, involving the NGO VERTIC. There are many interesting things happening. For a specific detailed look at verification, I would commend this Arms Control Association article.
Dr Nayan raised the issue of CTBT ratification and what the point is of the US ratifying when the prospects of North Korea may be remote or nil. I still do not think that in any way lessens the importance of the various states which have yet to ratify from going forward. Ideally, this will provide the example and pressure for North Korea to join. It is of course an interesting ratification process that CTBT laid out. I have certainly heard a number of states say that that is not the way that one should design ratification for future regimes.
On steps in Asia, this is far from my current work, where we deal with global rather than regional issues. On the other hand, I would say that this is certainly an extremely important issue. It is one in which my country is increasingly engaged in Asia. As you know, we recently appointed our first envoy specifically to ASEAN, now our Ambassador for Indonesia. We have a new focus on engaging in APEC, and certainly our arms control possibilities there have very much become part of our intense interest and desire to engage.
Mark Fitzpatrick
Thank you very much, Laura, for so ably stepping in. Thank you very much, Mikhail, for so interestingly talking about boredom. Please join me in thanking both speakers.
