Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, IISS
After these two excellent, very detailed data‑intensive presentations, I would like to focus more on the security‑related issue and look at energy security as the factor in the European security debate and the Euro‑Atlantic security debate, in particular on the current debate on the prospects of developing the relations between Russia and the West, which of course have been closely linked to the debate on energy security in Europe.
I would argue that there is no other issue in the European and Euro‑Atlantic energy debate over the past decade that has undergone such a remarkable metamorphosis over just a few years. In 2006, Tony Blair famously wrote: ‘In the future, energy security will be almost as important as defence.’ That sentiment very much reflected the mood that existed in Europe around that time. We all remember the aftermath of the gas supply interruption in Europe following the Russian‑Ukrainian gas dispute. There has been an intense sense and perception that energy security is one of the core and fundamental security challenges for Europe and the Euro‑Atlantic area. In fact, all the opinion polls demonstrated at that time that the perceptions of energy and security were much higher than the perceptions of the conventional security threats to Europe. If anything, such perceptions of insecurity had been even more profound if we look beyond the immediate area of the integrated European space: in the former Soviet Union, in Eurasia, where energy security has not only been synonymous to providing for the sovereignty of independent states, but also for their prospects of integration and close cooperation with the West.
However, over the past five years, we have seen fundamental change both in the perceptions of energy security, but in the instruments and the impact of the policies that have been deployed to address the energy security concerns. I would argue that the policies since 2006 have seen at least five parallel developments in the energy security field in Eurasia. First of all, the energy security debate has been fundamentally translated into a zero-sum factor in the relationship between Russia and the West. From the point of view of the European and Euro‑Atlantic community, it has been perceived that there is less dependency on imports from Russia, which has been seen in the aftermath of disruptions of suppliers following the Ukrainian‑Russian crisis as an unreliable supplier. This will benefit European security and can in fact be achieved through the greater diversification of energy supplies by passing Russia; from originating from the Caspian Sea basin, particularly from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Now, five years later, we have seen that these plans for developing zero-sum projects for the diversification of energy supplies to Europe has not really come to fruition. In fact, they have produced and generated a substantial amount of insecurity and tension in the post‑Soviet space. It can also be argued that it even contributed to the sources of conflict including the Georgian‑Russian war in 2008.
We have seen, in the last several years, a rethinking of the zero-sum approach. This brings about a new strategy in Eurasia. The second factor that has been very important over recent years has been the correlation between the energy factor and the domestic transformation of countries in the post‑Soviet space. While of course energy has been extremely important for their perceptions of sovereignty, at the same time we have also seen that energy has been a major obstacle for domestic transformation and reform within a number of countries. This so‑called ‘perceived energy curse’ has been particularly apparent in the post‑Soviet space.
In Russia, the reliance on oil and gas exports has been perceived as one of the major obstacles for conducting reforms. It is obviously very welcome that President Medvedev today, within the general debate on the future modernisation strategy for Russia, identified the need for diversification of Russia’s economy from dependence on oil and gas to becoming a much more modern and diversified economy as one of the key priorities.
We have also witnessed, in the post‑Soviet Eurasia, that the countries which are particularly rich with energy resources - such as Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan - have demonstrated propensities to developing more authoritarian and consolidated political systems, and are much less open to integrated economies. On the whole, this has represented a challenge to promoting the transformation in the post‑Soviet area.
The third factor is about linkages between energy security and conflicts in the post‑Soviet space. Particularly if we look at the South Caucasus, the linkages between regional divisions and instabilities and the energy security concerns are very direct and clear. On the one hand, we have seen the resources which Azerbaijan derived from energy exports being increasingly applied in order to increase defence budgets and initiating the regional arms race, which now represents a particular source of concern for the international community, particularly in the context of the increasing fears about the new escalation of the Nagorno‑Karabakh conflict.
At the same time, the geopolitical rivalries over the energy transportation routes have provided a much more volatile and destabilised environment around Georgia, which is one of the key transport corridors in the South Caucasus. Some people argued - particularly in our break‑out group on the subject of the South Caucasus - that this has contributed to the deterioration of the Georgian‑Russian relations, which of course led to eventual conflict in 2008.
The third factor, which is very important, is about how the energy security had influenced the development of relations between Russia and European and Euro‑Atlantic institutions. Following the disruption of energy supplies to Europe, we have seen a growing interest within NATO and within the European Union to develop a much greater role within the energy security domain. Clearly within the European Union this is a natural and important factor in the number of instruments that have been developed within the European Union, both internally to develop a much more flexible and integrated internal energy market which allows - as was described previously - to minimise the consequences of the supply interruptions, as well as the joint mechanisms between Russia and the European Union, such as the Early Warning System, which was applied very effectively earlier this year during the new crisis in the Russian‑Belarusian relations and prevented the sense of crisis which we witnessed during the Russian‑Ukrainian crisis. All of those instruments were very welcome and positive.
The relationship with NATO has been somewhat different. On the one hand, we have seen a growing debate within NATO in terms of to what extent NATO should be engaged in energy security. Although there is still no clear consensus within the North Atlantic community of what role NATO should play, there is a general perception that clearly NATO should not be the main or leading player on the energy security field. But, of course, as we see the debate over the new NATO strategy concept developing, it is very likely that we are going to see a growing NATO role in the energy security field.
There are a number of areas in which NATO could play a role in energy security policy issues. The important role that NATO is already playing today, to some extent, is in its monitoring of the energy security situation. This is being done through various regional consultations, both with allies and partners, about the potential sources of supply interruptions.
The second factor could be the energy assistance to allies in case of interruptions to supplies or in case of the greater vulnerability of energy‑related infrastructure, particularly in cases of terrorist attacks or conflicts in which more prolonged or sustained interruptions would be observed. The Maritime Surveillance and the threat-based response is of course a very important factor. We have seen growing cooperation, both within NATO but also between NATO and other partners, in terms of anti‑piracy operations, which have also relevance to energy security perceptions.
The more controversial issue that is now being debated is: to what extent could NATO play a role in interdictions operations, for example, in the case of regional conflicts when NATO can collectively deploy their assets to protect certain energy infrastructure or energy supply routes? We saw the protection of supply tankers from Kuwait during the Iran‑Iraq war, for example.
Clearly, all of these developments would be welcome only if they are seen as developing cooperatively with Russia. The perception within Russia of NATO entering into the energy security field without qualitatively improving its relations is seen as a major source of concern. Many in Russia have interpreted a greater role which NATO now seeks in the field of energy security as a potential attempt to apply that role vis à vis Russia which remains, as was described by previous speakers, and will remain in the foreseeable future, as an important supplier of energy to the Euro‑Atlantic area, particularly to Europe.
What measures could be foreseen in developing the type of Russian‑NATO cooperation which could provide for a more comprehensive approach which complements that of Russia‑EU cooperation and energy security? I will identify the four potential areas. The first is on the political side. I believe that the potential of the Russia‑NATO Council, which has been created precisely for joint decision‑making, has been underutilised. As we see the ways to transform the NATO‑Russia relations and grant the Russia‑NATO Council a greater decision‑making role, it would be advisable in my view to put the issues of energy security within the competence of the Russia‑NATO Council in which a majority or an important part of the decision‑making within NATO should be placed within the Russia‑NATO Council framework. That will be reassuring both for NATO allies and for Russia, and will create a pattern in which NATO and Russia can address all energy security concerns cooperatively.
The maritime cooperation, which we are already observing with the anti‑piracy operations, could be extended further to develop a much more comprehensive plan and programme on the maritime cooperation to address the potential energy security threats. That should cover a much wider geographic area than just what we have seen in the Gulf of Aden. That can also cover the Black Sea region and the Arctic, for example. The Arctic, as Jim Steinberg mentioned in his presentation, is becoming an increasingly important area of cooperation with Russia.
Finally, it is very important to develop joint capabilities to deal with potential accidents and terrorist threats. We have seen Russia being particularly vulnerable to terrorism related to energy infrastructure in the last month. We have seen explosions on two Russian hydropower stations. Jihad organisations have claimed responsibility for both. It is not definitively clear whether a large accident or large explosions was indeed a terrorist attack, but it is within the realm of possibility that it is. Those types of attacks could continue. The response to potential vulnerability of terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure around the European and Eurasian region would be very welcome and an important area of cooperation.
Finally, at one of the recent workshops that the IISS organised in our new office in Manama, we discussed the possibility of Russia‑US missile defence cooperation and where we can envision potential areas where Russia and the United States could cooperate in a more neutral way. At the same time, they can build the confidence and trust that is required to then expand and greatly enhance the general cooperation on missile defence.
One of the proposals there, which I thought was very interesting, is to cooperate in developing a joint missile defence for the Gulf region, which would be directed at cooperative efforts to protect the energy security infrastructure in the Gulf by bringing together Russia, United States and possibly NATO countries against the Iranian missile threat, which of course is much more urgent and immediate for the Gulf region than it is, at the moment at least, for Europe and the Euratlantic area.
So a number of ideas are on the table and I think we are now entering a new period in energy security when we should learn from mistakes and problems that we have observed in the period when energy security has been a source of zero‑sum geopolitics; a period that has actually, instead of providing energy security, securitised energy and actually diminished significantly the sense of safety, security and alliance reliability perceptions in the region. We have to enter a new era, where energy security should be addressed through cooperative energy security in a win‑win approach. As I mentioned, the cooperation between Russia and NATO in that field would be an important instrument. Thank you.
Dr Andrew Parasiliti
Thank you. I am struck by several key points raised by the panel. One is the theme of the interdependence of energy markets and security. Another is the need for long‑term policies, planning and strategies, including international diplomacy, in addressing these needs and the recognition, in addition to long‑term planning, of the planning for potential crises and volatilities in these markets. Others are the relationship of energy security to the international economy and to the climate and the role of public and private players as well as international organisations like the IEA. Then I think what Oksana just presented about the relationship of energy security, the political developments in security issues in Eurasia, including Russia, Europe and the post‑Soviet states, and some ideas about a potential role for NATO in energy security.
