Presentation of Prof. Akihiko Tanaka,
Professor, Tokyo University
At the IISS-JIIA Conference 2-4 June 2008
Hotel Okura, Tokyo, Japan
Sixth Session - Strengthening Major Power Relations: Forging a Common Security Agenda
Important Steps for Strengthening Regional and International Institutions
I do not want to talk about strengthening of regional and international institutions based only on general theories of institutions and institution building. However, listening to the discussions of yesterday and today and reading the background papers prepared by IISS, I think it is worth noting that there are two types of international and regional institutions: one, institutions for problem solving, decision-making and implementation and two, institutions for communication, socialization, and confidence building.
In terms of the first type, whether successful or not, the NPT is an institution intended to solve proliferation problems in general, while the Six-party Talks are an institution for resolving the specific North Korea’s nuclear issue. The Kyoto system and the discussions to create a post-Kyoto system are attempts at problem-solving with regard to climate change. Military alliances are this type of institution. On the other hand, ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit, ARF, SCO, the G8, and the Shangri-La Dialogue are institutions basically for communication, socialization and confidence building.
In general, institutionsforproblem-solving and implementation seem more difficult to create and to maintain than those for communication. However, I do not think that all problem-solving institutions are equally difficult to establish. The Universal Postal Union, for example, has been around for more than a century. The Internet is a great institution created without major inter-governmental conventions, and it has solved the problem of massive and rapid communication. These institutions appear possible because participants believe their creation gives what many Chinese friends call a “win-win solution”. If we can find a technical and organizational solution that produces plus-sum results, it may not be so difficult to create problem-solving institutions. Of course, as the discussion yesterday vividly demonstrated, institutions for preventing proliferation are extremely difficult to operate. The Six-Party Talks are always difficult to conduct, and the creation of an international institution to reduce greenhouse gases requires tremendous efforts.
On the other hand, institutions for communication and socialization may not always be easy. It was only in 1997 that an institution, ASEAN+3,was able to bring together the leaders of East Asia. Japan and China were not able to institutionalize summit meetings during the Koizumi era.
What has been the record of institutionalization in Asia and East Asia?The general impression seems to be that Asia now has many institutions for communication and socialization but that it has very few successful problem-solving institutions. APEC, ARF, ASEM, ASEAN+3, EAS and the Shangri-La Dialogue all appear to function as institutions for better communication and socialization. In fact, however, there are problem-solving institutions in Asia. The ADB has been around for four decades. Many FTAs are emerging. The Chiang-Mai Initiative for creating a swap network among regional countries seems to be the most successful multilateral mechanism in the financial area.
Unfortunately those of us working in defense and security fields may not be able to find many problem-solving institutions. Going beyond Asiaand examining the wider international arena, the areas that we discussed yesterday -- energy, environment, and non-proliferation -- all have few successful and fully effective institutions for problem-solving. Is IISS destined to be incapable of contributing to problem solving?
Why is it the case that we have difficulty in creating security-related problem-solving institutions? Maybe this is nothing surprising. Security issues, even broadly conceived, may have intrinsic difficulty in creating a win-win distribution of benefits by creating institutions. A game theorist may be tempted to conclude that everything is either a prisoners’ dilemma or a game of chicken. Still, this does not mean that we cannot do anything. Although I have no general solutions, let me dwell on some further thinking over measures to cope with the difficulty.
If the difficulty, as I said before, is derived from the nature of the game, prisoners’ dilemma or chicken, this is not new to strategists. We all struggled to overcome these difficulties during the Cold War. One way to resolve this difficulty is to change the nature of the game, which can be done by two different methods. One is to introduce outside elements into the game or, to use a bit of jargon, to introduce side payments. The other is to change peoples’ conception of benefits and costs, that is, to change the payoff matrix by changing peoples’ belief structure.
Neither of these is easy. For example, introducing side payments often means introducing unequal rights and obligations; somebody may have to pay disproportionate costs while others are allowed to free-ride. At the same time, those who pay disproportionate costs may demand disproportionate privileges. This often collides with the principle of sovereign equality among nations.
In fact, however, more or less functioning institutions for problem solving contain this mechanism; the United Nations gives disproportionate privileges to the permanent members of the Security Council, who in turn are expected to bear a disproportionate burden. The IMF and the World Bank also have similar structures. The NPT is also designed in this fashion. To put it bluntly, this is an attempt to introduce inequality in order to resolve pressing issues. Obviously, this creates problems. People immediately start saying the structure is unfair. Is there a fair inequality? Such phrases as “common but differentiated responsibilities” are signs of a struggle to overcome this difficulty.
Another way to change the nature of the game is to change peoples’ belief structures. If one can demonstrate that the belief structure that creates the payoff matrix is wrong, not consistent with scientific findings, not taking dire consequences into consideration, not promoting the norms we all share, then one may be able to persuade participants of the game to change their minds. Al Gore, Ambassador Nishimura, and Professor Morton are all doing this.
Finding fairness among differentiated rights and obligations and finding truths, inconvenient or not, to persuade people -- these are the challenges that must be met to create institutions for problem-solving in difficult areas.
Having said all this, I do not mean that there are no promising areas of institution-building for problem solving in the area of security. It may be possible to find areas where we can create viable institutions without creating dilemmas. Many types of cooperation have simply not been tried. I personally think that cooperative mechanisms to safeguard sea-lines of communication can be developed among East Asian countries together with the U.S. I think that the countries of East Asia can all benefit by creating a mechanism to cope with disasters; all military and other organizations can participate in disasterrelief more effectively if there is prior coordination.
Finally, I would like to argue for the importance of the institutions for communication, socialization, and confidence building. They have intrinsic value where sufficient communication and mutual confidence are still lacking. These institutions are especially important for such countries as Japan, South Korea and China. I think it is a great step forward that the leaders of the three countries have agreed to holda trilateral summit outside the ASEAN framework. The first China-Japan-South Korea summit is now scheduled to take place in Japan in the autumn. This is a welcome development.
More fundamentally, institutions for communications and confidence building are instrumental in creating problem-solving institutions. Out of frank discussion and deliberation we may be able find win-win solutions. Even for areas full of dilemmas, institutions for communication and confidence building are essential; frank discussion may enable us to find a new belief structure that can solve the problem; without frank discussion, we cannot agree on the “fairness” of differentiated rights and obligations.
IISS is in fact a great institution for such purposes, and the Shangri-La Dialogue is indeed a great institution for such purposes targeted at Asia. I thank John Chipmanfor creating the Shangri-La Dialogue and the founding fathers of the IISS for creating this marvelous institution.
