(Please do not cite without permission from the author)
Introduction:
I would like to begin by congratulating the International Institute for Strategic Studies on their 50th anniversary and to thank both the IISS and the Japan Institute of International Affairs for inviting me to participate in this prestigious conference. Although my talk this morning does fall under the category of an Asian environmental nightmare, the silver lining lies in the fact that environmental issues, and particularly climate change, is now high on the international political agenda. This morning’s session is, of course, timely in the lead up to the G8 Summit in Hokkaido and it almost falls on World Environment Day (June 5). This year’s slogan is ‘stand up to climate change’, while I agree with the sentiment, I also think there is a need to sit down and reflect on some of the changes that have taken place. So with that in mind, I will start my talk by making three general points about the transnational dimension of China’s environmental crisis:
1. The Transnational Dimension of China’s Environmental Crisis
First, although environmental problems in China have a long history, their transboundary effects are relatively new and linked to the broader processes of globalisation.
Since ancient times, China’s ecological balance has been disrupted by the extraction of natural resources in the pursuit of state military power and excessive land cultivation. Problems of landslides, flooding, deforestation, and increased silt loads in rivers have existed for centuries. The uniqueness of the current environmental crisis lies in its scale, severity, and interdependence with the outside world.
China is now home to some of the most polluted cities in the world, up to 70 per cent of its rivers and lakes are seriously polluted, and ecological degradation is widespread. Desertification now covers one-third of China’s land base, forestry resources are scarce, and two-thirds of China’s 660 cities are water stressed. Most of the water supply to major cities depends upon ground water pumped from aquifers. But these are drying up, or becoming depleted due to salinization.
The spill-over effects of China’s environmental problems began to attract attention in the early 1990s when it became apparent that a significant proportion of acid rain in Korea and Japan had its origins in China. Dust and aerial pollutants are now transported as far as the United States, and high levels of toxic pollution in the Bohai Sea and Pearl River Delta is having a serious impact on regional fish stocks. More recently the explosion of a state-owned petrochemical plant in Jilin province that released tons of toxic benzene into the Songhua River affecting water supply in Harbin as well as the Russian city of Khabarovsky placed a spotlight on the need for preemptive action to set up monitoring and information disclosure systems across the Sino-Russian border.
At a broader level, China’s pattern of development inevitably affects the international mode of resource allocation and the global environment. It is essentially a two-way process. China’s environment is affected by globalization through the activities of multinationals. As a ‘world factory’ China pollutes on behalf of OECD consumers. At the same time, its increasing demand for energy and natural resources is affecting the regional and global environment. At the regional level, it is widely known that the cascade of dams built on the Mekong River in Yunnan province poses serious risks for countries downstream. Equally worrying is the destruction of Burma’s northern frontier forests by Chinese loggers. Following a logging ban imposed by the central government in China in 1998, the importation of illegal logs from across the China-Burma border has increased exponentially to meet timber demand. In effect, China conserves forests by exporting deforestation.
Of particular concern at the global level is China’s contribution to global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion that rose from 11 per cent in 1989 to 15 per cent in 2005. China is now set to overtake the United States (with 25 per cent of the world’s total) by the end of the decade. Per capita emissions, however, are still relatively low – in 2005 China emitted 3.9 tons of CO2 per capita compared with 25.6 tons in Australia and 24.5 tons in the United States. China not only contributes to global warming but is also affected by it. The National Climate Change Assessment Report in 2007 revealed that China’s average annual temperature could increase between 1.3 - 2.1 degrees by 2020 and as much as 3.3 degrees by 2050. Major cities in coastal areas will face serious challenges due to rising sea levels, and extreme weather patterns are likely to increase. This, of course, is already evident from the recent hurricane, floods, snowstorms and earthquake that have struck China with devastating humanitarian consequences
Second, in responding to the crisis important initiatives have been taken by the Chinese government as well as civil society organisations, but these efforts have tended to stop at the border.
Over the past decade, the Chinese government has expressed a growing commitment towards environmental protection: legal and regulatory frameworks have expanded; environmental priorities have been integrated into state five year plans for development; and more recently the environment agency has been elevated to ministerial status. Despite political restriction, civil society organizations are also playing a leading role in protection at the grassroots.
Progress in dealing with transboundary issues has been far slower. Attempts to establish an Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia and a Transboundary Biosphere Reserve in the Tumen River Delta have been thwarted by Chinese opposition.And despite continuing tensions over its dam building projects on the Mekong, the Chinese government still refuses to become a member of the Mekong River Basin Commission. There are some signs, however, that attitudes may be changing. China has recently participated in newly established environmental dialogues under the auspices of ASEAN +1 and ASEAN + 3 regional fora.
Third, from a Chinese perspective, the current environmental crisis is largely perceived as a development challenge that requires rethinking the relationship between humans and nature. New thinking on global ecological security reflects this deeper cultural aspiration, but it has not, as yet, permeated through the domestic agenda.
In traditional Chinese philosophy wise leadership was predicated on achieving a balanced approach to the human-nature relationship known as Tian Ren He Yi – harmony between heaven and humankind. The values of moderation and adaptation meant that sustainable forms of agriculture, forestry management, and the protection of endangered species were in evidence centuries ago. Such practices, however, did not prevent environmental mismanagement. This reached a peak during the Maoist era when Ren Ding Sheng Tian – man must conquer nature – became the new slogan with devastating environmental consequences. In the early 21st century Chinese leaders are caught between a continuing desire to control nature via large-scale engineering projects such as the Three Gorges Dam and the South-North water transfer scheme, and a new aspiration to chart an alternative development path that reconciles human and environmental needs. Ecological civilization is the contemporary metaphor for understanding the relationship between humans and nature that promises to transform the processes of industrialization and, in turn, reconnect Chinese civilization with its environmental genesis.
In thinking about the current crisis, less attention has been given to the security risks involved, however the emerging official discourse on global ecological security may help to advance the internal debate and facilitate international cooperation. In China, as elsewhere in the world, the impacts of climate change are helping to raise awareness of the relationship between the environment and security. The extent of ecosystemic degradation on the Tibetan Plateau is particularly worrying both for China and the region. I will now provide a brief overview of the multiple security risks involved and then conclude with some thoughts about future regional cooperation.
2. Climate Change Impacts on the Tibetan Plateau
The Qinghai - Tibetan Plateau is the largest high altitude landmass on earth covering an area of approximately 1.6 million km2 equal to one quarter of China’s land mass. As the largest freshwater reserve outside the polar ice caps it is also known as Asia’s water tower or the third pole. For climate change the Plateau is the equivalent of the canary in the coalmine. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the glaciers that feed Asia’s great rivers - the Yellow, Yangste, Mekong, Salween, Indus, Ganges, and Bramaputra - are shrinking by an average rate of 7% per annum. Data from UNEP and the World Glacier Monitoring Service reveal that the Himalayan glaciers are shrinking faster than anywhere else and could totally disappear by 2035. Glacial melt has dramatic adverse effects on biodiversity, people, and livelihoods with long-term implications for water, food, and energy security. Over the longer term, higher temperatures will increase flooding in the rainy season and reduce water in the dry season thus affecting food production in the provinces downstream as well as the livelihoods of over a billion people in India, Nepal, Bangladesh. Eventually water shortages will occur on a massive scale. This is particularly troubling given that Asia already has less fresh water - about 3,920 cubic metres per person – than any other continent outside Antartica.
Glacier melt also leads to a higher incidence of natural disasters – landslides, flooding, and glacial lake outbursts that can lead to internal displacement and the destruction of critical infrastructure. Overall, the impact will be greatest on poor communities that are least able to adapt.
The interaction between climate impacts and pre-existing ethnic tensions also poses a serious risk of political instability. Although the motivations behind the recent protests in Tibetan areas of China are complex and difficult to disentangle, environmental problems did play a role. In recent years the government’s response to the degradation of the grasslands has been to accelerate the resettlement of the nomads placing disproportionate blame upon the problem of over-grazing. In the absence of alternative forms of employment this has led to further alienation and merely reinforced pre-existing inequalities with negligible environmental benefits. Ultimately, adapting to climate change can only be achieved if the people who stand to benefit are central to the process. If this does not happen then conflicts over access to resources as well as the distribution of the benefits may well gather momentum.
The problems are likely to get far worse before they get better. Even at a time when global warming poses a severe threat to the region, resources shortages in China and high prices on the world market mean that mining operations will expand rapidly in the coming years. According to the Geological and Minerals Exploitation Bureau in the TAR, tapping minerals in Tibet – gold, copper, chromium, lead, iron ore, and zinc – could be worth more that 1 trillion yuan (US$145 billion dollars). At the same time, ambitious plans are underway to further develop the region’s hydropower potential which may well lead to a vicious cycle of sediment accumulation that cripples the ability of dams to control floods and reduces the capacity for power generation.
What is taking place on the Tibetan Plateau raises two critical questions: how can we negotiate between material aspirations and moral responsibilities? And how is it possible to satisfy immediate needs while planning for an uncertain future? These are difficult questions that can only be addressed on the basis of a cooperative and human centred security approach. To date regional environmental cooperation has lagged far behind economic cooperation, and it is now in desperate need of catching up. Towards this goal, I will end with four observations.
3. Coping with an Uncertain Future: Implications for Regional Cooperation
First, adaptation needs to be given a stronger priority in both global and regional cooperation. Until recently, adaptation has received little attention. Mitigation is easier to address because uniform solutions relating to energy efficiency, renewable energy, transportation etc can be universally applied. In contrast, adaptation is context specific. As noted by the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change it is a ‘process thorough which societies makes themselves better able to cope with an uncertain future.’ This involves appropriate adjustments ranging from technological options to the establishment of early warning systems for disaster relief, institutional reforms, and behavioural changes. In the absence of an integrative approach that is suited to local conditions, climate change adaptation is unlikely to work.
Second, the impacts of climate change on the Tibetan Plateau pose a massive humanitarian challenge that cannot simply be addressed on the basis of a command and control approach – instead appropriate action needs to be determined by focusing on the people that are most vulnerable and least able to adapt. For this to happen, regional, national, and local interventions need to be carefully coordinated.
Third, and somewhat optimistically, in addressing a bigger threat, the potential exists for climate change to unite divided communities on the Tibetan Plateau. Conflict resolution has long been an important motivating factor in designing institutions for managing resources. And placing conflict dynamics within a broader regional framework may well help to ease ethnic tensions.
Fourth, and at a deeper level, the threat of large-scale environmental catastrophe reaffirms the need for a 21st century view of progress that moves imperatively beyond the nineteenth century model of nation building based on the expansive exploitation of natural resources. Rather than simply a strategic buffer zone caught between the ambitions of two great powers, the Tibetan Plateau could become a Strategic Conservation Zone acting as a buffer against environmental catastrophe that threatens a fifth of humanity. Clearly, such a transformative approach would not be without its immediate economic costs, but as a guarantee of future Asian security it may well be a price worth paying. Industrialized countries have accrued a large debt for past malpractices and they are now seeking to make amends. But in some cases environmental damage is irreversible - losses in biodiversity that provide essential services for human survival such as the control of crop pests and carbon storage are difficult to restore. The threat of massive ecosystem decline is, in part, a consequence of the failure to act. If this is to be the Asian century then China and India need to lead and not just follow. For all countries in the region there is a need to look forward and build cooperation on the basis of collective responsibility. As aptly noted by the Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, historically risk managers have looked to the past as a guide to the future. But with climate change the future will no longer resemble the past.
3 June 2008
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