Werner Bauwens
The good news, ladies and gentlemen, is that, for once, I prepared a statement; the bad news is that I left it at home this morning. I tried desperately to rewrite it this morning, but this has allowed me to pick up some of the points that Annalisa and François made. As astonishing as it may be, I believe that the three interventions will bring together an integrated view, which I believe, after all, is the purpose of this panel.
My brief remarks deal with what I believe to be one of the challenges of 2012, which is the need to revisit the 2003 EU strategy on WMD proliferation. While focusing on the WMD-proliferation strategy, some elements apply also to other disarmament and conventional-proliferation policies that we have developed within the EU.
2013 is coming up in 11 months’ time. Our strategy dates back to 2003. For me, it looks normal that we revisit a strategy after 10 years; after all, that is what happens at NATO too, where I was privileged to work for a while. It also happens rather frequently in another big power, which is the US, where the latest revisiting occurred in 2010. That is one element that calls for a need to be open‑minded about revisiting our 2003 strategy. The other one is that we did that work in 2003 with 15 EU member states, whereas, tomorrow, there will be 28. I believe that it is a matter of courtesy to imply more fully and more respectfully all of the member states in this important exercise.
Revisiting is not necessarily redrafting, but re-analysing. The 2003 EU security strategy would also be open to revisiting. As far as I understand from discussions within the EU and among the 27 member states today, there seems to be some reluctance to reopen it. That may complicate, of course, the exercise that I am pleading for, which is a revisiting of the non-proliferation strategy, because our WMD-proliferation strategy is part and parcel of our overall EU strategic concept, so the two go hand-in-hand. If you reopen one, you should reopen the other.
The second element is that revisiting is not necessarily a form of criticism or negative attitude. The 2003 strategy was elaborated in very specific circumstances. I know a little about this, having been involved in it in those days, and the real origin occurred under the Belgian presidency of 2001. It was related to 9/11, when we started looking at EU policy in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, taking into account the very specific challenge of terrorism as it occurred in the US on 9/11. 2003 was also, of course, the year of Iraq and the US military campaign there. Indeed, that campaign caused a lot of turmoil in terms of transatlantic relations, as well as fallout within the EU itself.
That is also reflected in the strategy, and I would like to draw your attention to one paragraph in particular – paragraph 15 in the 2003 document, which says at the end that the measures that the EU would contemplate when political dialogue and diplomatic pressure ‘have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law’ (sanctions – Iran) ‘selective or global, interceptions of shipments’ (the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)) ‘and, as appropriate, the use of force could be envisioned’. This is rather revolutionary in terms of EU language, the EU being traditionally seen as a soft power, where even mentioning words like ‘the use of force’ is not done. It was done in 2003, and the reason for that is to be found in the very complicated relationship that we had with the US over the Iraq issue.
EU working methods at the time were also fundamentally different. We worked in various working groups – COARM, CODUN and CONOP. The dual-use working party was involved. Ultimately, it ended up like a patchwork or the cut-and-paste method that some of us still use in our academic environment. There was little overall management. There was a rotating presidency. Three EU countries were involved in steering the vehicle towards the end result in December 2003.
It is not all about criticism, and I am very happy to see that some of the elements contained in the 2003 EU strategy influenced the US, for instance, in the drafting process that led to its 2010 strategic review. These elements include multilateralism and partnerships, attention to root causes, power by example, and a reference to values. A balanced approach to non-proliferation and disarmament is to be found in the 2010 US strategy. In many cases, there are very clear references to what we already foresaw in 2003. At the same time, I believe that you can also learn from the 2010 US strategy, which I will come back to later in greater detail.
There are three elements that I would like to propose for consideration: objectives, the environment, and the tools. First, we have to revisit the objectives:
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We have to develop a better narrative as the EU. In a way, that means really coming up with a mission statement for 2013. That could read like ‘Work for a safer world for all, in which we protect the safety, the interests and the values of the EU and its citizens’. The relationship between diplomacy and force should be revisited, as well as that between objective analysis, such as that being done in the case of Iran through the IAEA, and the political interpretations that unavoidably occur when you discuss the same issues at the level of the UN Security Council. There should be a balance between non-proliferation and disarmament. There should be clear reference to the rule of law, and respect for the authority of the Security Council.
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There needs to be a better distinction between the threats from state actors, state-sponsored terrorism and non-state actors. Right now the text is too fuzzy and is overly influenced by the events of 9/11.
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There needs to be greater distinction between our non-proliferation foreign policy – the outreach that the EU does towards third countries – and the internal organisation in terms of WMD proliferation; i.e. the in-reach, which we are very good at. The two go hand-in-hand.
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Finally, there needs to be a whole-of-government approach, which is very much what the US too is calling for in its 2010 strategy. For example, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threat protection programmes – a second line of defence – should be part and parcel of our strategy. There needs to be a linkage between civilian and military programmes; for example, the increasing number of political-civilian missions and battle-group deployments being considered by the EU.
The second revisiting occurs with regard to the environment in which the EU operates. We need to do that with an open and critical mind, and I refer you to a very good analysis that was done by Daniel Korski from the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Look at the outer world in terms of globalisation and emerging powers. We talk in our 2003 strategy about relations specifically with Japan and Canada, but there is not one word about India, China, Brazil, Turkey or Mexico etc. This is clearly missing. There is a marginalisation of the EU occurring, which François referred to. Look at the discussion about the EU Status Resolution at the UN General Assembly. In this regard, despite the massive EU financial support given to certain states and regions, those countries voted against specific representation rights for the EU within the UN General Assembly context.
Post 2003, we have seen developments at the level of the Security Council: Resolution 1540 in 2004, and 1887 in 2009. The Nuclear Security Summit process started in 2009 and is leading us at least to 2014. All of these elements influenced our dealing with non-NPT states, which should also filter into our strategy in the future.
We need to interact with countries outside the multilateral scenes that we are most accustomed to; i.e. BWC, CWC, NPT and CTBTO. Some states simply do not belong to those groupings, yet we have to deal with them. The question is how.
Efficient multilateralism is a thread throughout our strategy but its concept is fundamentally changing. It is outdated. Where can the EU act most efficiently today? It is not necessarily in these classical multilateral environments, but will be much more in purely national formats and ad hoc coalitions built around specific teams. The G20 is a key example of that – a foreboding of fundamental reform at the level of the UN Security Council.
We must invest more in 21st century centres of influence, as termed by the US in its 2010 strategy. Regional settings such as ASEAN, GCC and the Arab League are fundamental interlocutors for the EU – not the EU alone but in partnership. That is the message for the future.
I will spare you the discussion about the revolution within the EU – the financial crisis, the intergovernmental recuperation, and consensus-building at 27. Maastricht created a financial union without a political and economic-governance union; Lisbon, on the other hand, created a political union without a financial or economic-governance union. Neither of the two seems to be working well. The creation of the EEAS offers a tremendous opportunity but cannot and will not happen in a vacuum. EU foreign policy is not and will never be a substitution for national foreign policy, but an element of complementarity.
My final words deal with the revisiting of the tools, where it is very important to realise the dramatic situation in which we find ourselves today in terms of budget lines. We have to keep a very open mind, in terms of both the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget and stability budget. There is an impressive amount of money involved today in new support programmes, but we should have the courage to evaluate the return on investment too. Spend less but spend wisely – again, that comes literally from ‘spend taxpayers’ money wisely’ in the 2010 US strategic concepts.
The EEAS offers the perspective of a more integrated approach. It involves Commission colleagues more than ever. We should also, however, interact with the regional working groups within the EU. A whole-of-government approach is needed. The consequences, for instance, of the non-proliferation clauses in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement – the so-called ‘essential’ clauses – need to be revisited. Are they, indeed, essential clauses? What are the consequences if our trade partners do not respect these clauses? Finally, the new lines for action, which come to an end in December 2012, offer, in my view, the ideal opportunity to open, with 27 member states, this issue of revisiting our 2003 strategy.
I apologise for being somewhat long. Thank you.
