Posted By IISS at 16/02/2012 15:04:35
Guest post by James Acton, Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Coming just a couple of weeks after the Obama administration announced its intention to work with the European Union on developing a space code of conduct, the special session of the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference on space and missile proliferation was highly topical.
To ensure freedom of access to space – not least in the face of the increasing problem of space debris - the need for enhanced space governance is widely recognised. However, there is a debate about whether the EU’s draft of a non-binding code of conduct or a formal treaty-based approach would be preferable. Sergio Marchisio, chair of the European Centre for Space Law, discussed legal aspects of the draft code and argued that the EU should be willing to discuss the Russian and Chinese proposal for a treaty in spite of its significant definitional problems. Götz Neuneck, Deputy Director of the University of Hamburg’s Institute for Peace Research and Security, welcomed the draft code as an important step forward but argued that it lacked key arms-control characteristics. He urged the EU to engage emerging space powers, to include ballistic missile defence in discussions about space security, and to study joint monitoring and surveillance. An EU official, however, cautioned against overloading the draft code.
Missile defence systems, which are spreading because of missile proliferation, can have important implications for space security. They can have an anti-satellite capability and, by threatening early-warning assets, can undermine crisis stability. Pavel Podvig, director of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project, argued that Russia and NATO have fundamentally different perceptions of the threat from missile proliferation. Moscow, he said, did not discount the possibility of Iran developing an ICBM but believed Tehran could not deploy robust systems in sufficient numbers to be significant. By contrast, Washington and its allies believed that even one Iranian ICBM would be highly significant.
In any case, Podvig argued that because the long-term goal of US missile-defence efforts is territorial defence of the United States, only Washington and Moscow can resolve their current disagreement. Cooperation between them might be useful in demonstrating to Russia that US missile defence systems are technically incapable of threatening its deterrent. The EU, he argued, had only a limited role to play, but cooperation with Russia on space situational awareness could be useful.
James Acton is Senior Associate with the Nuclear Policy Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; he is also the author of the recent IISS Adelphi book Deterrence during Disarmament: deep nuclear reductions and nuclear security. Views in this post are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the IISS.
Posted By IISS at 02/02/2012 14:22:40
By Dina Esfandiary, Research Analyst and Project Coordinator, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme
The final session of the EU Non-Proliferation Conference, to be held this week in Brussels, will discuss the most pressing problem in the non-proliferation arena at the moment: the Iranian nuclear issue. Three experts will lead a discussion examining the current situation and future policy options for the EU.
This comes just as a team of IAEA experts ended a much-anticipated trip to Iran, which followed the agency's most damning report to date, in November. 'Intensive discussions', characterised as fruitful, were held over three days and the IAEA has announced another visit 'in the very near future'.
But crucially, the delegation did not visit any nuclear sites. Despite Iranian rhetoric of openness and willingness for a dialogue to take place, including Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi's stated readiness to extend the experts' trip if necessary, the Iranian government did not allow them to carry out the discussed visit of the Qom facility. Whether the IAEA was granted access to any of the individuals they sought to interview, such as Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, is doubtful, though that may have been promised for the next visit.
The IAEA inspectors' visit can be read as an attempt to calm tensions after several weeks of escalation. Having threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz, Iran carried out military exercises, tested an advanced surface-to-air missile and a cruise missile, and announced it had developed new laser-guided artillery rounds. These moves were considered a response to US sanctions against Iran's Central Bank (its strongest round of economic sanctions yet) and the European-wide embargo of Iranian oil imposed by the EU in the past few weeks. Tehran threatened in turn to cut off oil exports to the EU before its sanctions come into effect in July.
EU members are significant stakeholders in the Iranian crisis. Since the revelation of the Natanz nuclear facility in 2002, they have been heavily involved in diplomatic efforts to halt Iran's nuclear programme. They are now taking a leading role in the imposition of sanctions and are committed to finding a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. During the final session of the conference, participants will have an opportunity to analyse the evolving landscape of the Iranian issue and to share ideas to help find a solution to the impending crisis.
Posted By IISS at 01/02/2012 14:59:45
Guest post by Giorgio Franceschini, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
One highlight of the forthcoming EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference will be the session on non-proliferation and security in the Middle East. The subject is highly topical because states in the region are expected to attend a UN-facilitated conference aimed at the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (which goes by the rather unwieldy acronym of MEWMDFZ) sometime this year.
The obstacles for the establishment of such a zone are enormous. It would require – at a minimum – a viable solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge, and a change of Israel's nuclear posture, one that would be acceptable to both Jerusalem and its neighbours. A further requirement for an MEWMDFZ will be the ratification of both the biological and chemical weapons conventions by all states in the region - first and foremost, Egypt, Israel and Syria - and a dense web of confidence- and security-building measures in the conventional military realm, especially with respect to WMD-capable delivery vehicles.
But tensions are high and some countries find themselves in the midst of a turbulent political transition. It is therefore not at all clear whether the MEWMDFZ conference will take place at all in 2012; and if it does, it is uncertain which countries will attend.
Some obstacles have been anticipated and already addressed, such as ways to get the conference started, and how to start designing such a zone. Last year, the EU organised a seminar on the MEWMDFZ with high-level participation by delegations from the Middle East, including Iran and Israel. Its purpose was to facilitate confidence building between the parties on matters of WMD control. The outcome of the seminar lead to moderate optimism by non-governmental observers on the possibility of advancing a legally binding arms control measure in the Middle East in the near future.
The Middle East session at the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference will see the participation of Prince Turki Al Faisal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (pictured), together with three other high-level experts. Prince Turki recently reminded the international community about the urgency of establishing an MEWMDFZ, saying that should the project fail, we may soon be confronted with a nuclearised Middle East, which could include Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and even Turkey.
It is high time to come up with new ideas to revive the stagnant process of arms control in the Middle East, and restart multilateral high-level talks on regional security. The EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference could be a first step in this direction.
Giorgio Franceschini is a research assistant at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, another member of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, alongside the IISS. Views in this post are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the IISS.
Posted By IISS at 31/01/2012 16:42:25
by Jasper Pandza, Research Analyst, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme
The threat of terrorists using nuclear and radiological materials will be on the agenda when 54 world leaders convene at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in less than two months. Twelve EU countries and President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy are set to attend. Denmark, current holder of the separate rotating EU Presidency, is one of three new countries recently invited by the Korean hosts.
European leaders accept that a nuclear or radiological terrorist attack is a real possibility, but they do not allocate quite the same priority to this threat as the US does. So what role should European nations play in strengthening global nuclear security?
European countries have done well in protecting weapons-usable nuclear materials from illicit access, and in complying with nuclear security treaties and guidance. But nuclear security conditions can also be improved in Europe. France is a case in point; it has not ratified core international agreements, like the 2005 CPPNM Amendment, and nuclear materials are handled at a many sites across the country.
Indeed, the most important role Europe can play is to set a good example. For countries that have not yet invested sufficient resources in protecting their nuclear and radiological materials, it is essential that developed states adhere to nuclear security instruments and best-practices. Some countries associated with the Non-Aligned Movement primarily see nuclear security regulations as a hurdle to their nuclear energy ambitions. But the EU could help to demonstrate that taking nuclear security seriously does not hinder nuclear energy programmes. EU countries should also boost the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, which relies on voluntary commitments, and share nuclear security know-how and capacities through the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre. Numerous countries, especially in Central Asia, have increased their nuclear detection and forensics capacities in that way.
Nuclear energy is an essential part of the EU's energy mix, producing about a third of its electricity. If Europe wants to keep the nuclear energy option open for the future, then the European public must see nuclear energy as both safe and secure, at home and abroad. Surveying the damage from the Fukushima accident, it's clear that the social and economic consequences of a possible nuclear sabotage attack would be immense and hard to mitigate. Amid public pressure after the accident, a pro-nuclear German government decided to discontinue its nuclear energy programme by 2022. Admittedly, the German anti-nuclear movement has a long history and Fukushima was a powerful catalyst rather than the sole reason. But Italy decided by referendum to stay non-nuclear and other countries followed suit with similar decisions.
From the 2012 summit preparatory meetings an agreement to minimise the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications seems very likely. One can hope for further tangible summit outcomes. But nuclear security summits are unlikely to continue for much longer as dedicated, bi-annual meetings attended by heads of government. Eventually, potential for reaching meaningful agreements at those meetings may peter out and, frankly, the process places a burden on national administrations. At that stage, nuclear security may need to be integrated into a different international process such as the GICNT or the G20 meetings. Whatever choice is made, European governments play an important role in making sure nuclear security remains a high international priority.
Posted By IISS at 30/01/2012 18:12:53
By Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of IISS Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme
Sometimes timing can be pivotal. Iran's controversial nuclear programme has rarely been out of the news in the past six months as we at the IISS have been organising the first EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference, which opens in Brussels later this week. But as this unprecedented assembly of experts on nuclear and other issues kicks off on 3-4 February, concern about the Iranian situation also seems to be at an all-time high – making our wonkish conference of more than usual interest.
The conference comes soon after the EU made its boldest move yet on the non-proliferation front by embargoing Iranian oil purchases, and immediately after inspectors from the IAEA visited Iran for the most senior-level talks in more than three years. The Iran issue will almost certainly be debated throughout the two-day meeting. The last session of the event, at noon on Saturday, should be a fitting climax in that it is devoted exclusively to the Iranian nuclear issue. We are likely to hear good suggestions for finding peaceful solutions.
But with the largest gathering of non-proliferation experts that Europe has ever seen assembled at the Crowne Plaza Brussels–Le Palace, Iran will not be the only issue. The conference will take up the broad sweep of proliferation challenges, including bio risks and chemical-weapons threats, space and missile proliferation challenges, proliferation-related crime, nuclear security, conventional arms trade and trafficking, and case studies of North Korea, Pakistan and Syria. One session will also focus on non-proliferation and security in the Middle East, with speakers from the region, including HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Fitting the title of the conference, disarmament objectives will also be front and centre.
The conference is being organised by a group of EU think tanks, the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, which was established last year through an EU Council decision. The founding members of the Consortium are the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in Paris (FRS), the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt (HSFK/ PRIF), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which has management responsibility for the conference.
One of the conference's purposes is to provide input to the EU in its work to stop the spread of nuclear and other dangerous weapons and to promote the EU non-proliferation strategy. Another purpose is to highlight the work of the various think tanks and academic institutions in the EU concerning the non-proliferation and disarmament field and to strengthen the bonds among these institutes. Those are also the goals of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium.
For those interested but unable to attend, we’ll be providing conference previews and highlights through regular blog posts. There will also be real-time commentary on Twitter (follow @IISS_org and @desfandiary, or search for #EUnonprolif), plus video clips and transcripts later on the conference website.
