An IISS Forum in cooperation with the Wyndham Place Charlemagne Trust,
6 July 2006
Chairperson Robert Whalley, Former UK Home Office Director for Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence, reminded participants that the meeting was taking place one day before the first anniversary of the 7 July 2005 terrorist attack in London that killed 56 people, including the four perpetrators. It had been the first suicide attack on British soil and it was a time which lent itself to remembering the victims and their families. It was also a time which required an assessment of the progress made in understanding the causes of terrorism and tactics of terrorists.
‘Suicide Bombing as a Tactic’ – Nasra Hassan, Director, United Nations Information Service and Spokesperson United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, said that she had started her research because she found it impossible, as a Muslim, to understand why people chose to blow themselves up in the name of Islam. Her work had therefore focused on suicide bombings by Muslims and she had so far built up a database of approximately 400 Muslim suicide bomber profiles. The major part of her research was on Palestinian and Lebanese suicide bombers, and also focused on other countries that often went below the radar. Her profiles covered:
Location Nr. of Suicide Bombings Nr. of suicide bombers
West Bank and Gaza 207 220
Lebanon 38 40
Afghanistan 107 116
Pakistan 36 49
Kashmir 26 31
Bangladesh 7 10
India 3 3
In Iraq, recent statements by al-Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, suggested that there had been 800 suicide bombings.
Following interviews with jihadi leaders, suicide bombing planners and trainers, she found that most leaders when asked whether suicide bombings were a tactic or a strategy answered that jihad was the strategy and suicide bombings were one among many tactics. She disputed the theory that if terrorists had access to other options by using tanks or helicopters they would in all cases do so. It was clear that in some instances where the damage would have reached the same levels by leaving a bomb behind or by using remote controlled devices, terrorists had opted purposefully for strapping a bomb to a human being, thus causing more panic.
She stressed that suicide bombings had evolved, spread and mutated. These could be single or simultaneous, consecutive to maximise damage or come in a blitz of five to six a day (as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan). Whether explosives were strapped to a person, were hidden in a car or attached to a corpse or a donkey, the one thing she had found in her research was that suicide bombings were never an individual act. Invariably a sponsoring group was involved. Motivations ranged from occupation, resistance, sectarian, insurgent, sharia, proxy or a mix of these. Suicide bombings were also a calculated decision; there was always a specific point when the decision was made by a sponsoring group to engage in such tactics. When taking such decisions, implementation was always easier if clerics were on board, where geopolitical justifications could be found and when potential suicide bombers were hand-picked from different communities or villages.
Ms Hassan warned against policies that focused too heavily on psychological profiles and stressed that counter-terrorist agencies would gain more from focusing on group characteristics and network analysis. She said that after anti-terrorist measures, small cells, normally consisting of 2-5 members, were eventually forced to expand and provide their own logistics and organise their own financing and explosives procurement. In this context she referred to the hybrid cells that could emerge and made reference to groups operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the second intifada. Hybrid cells were the most virulent since they were not based on religion, ideology or national resistance alone, but were often a mix of these and even mercenary and criminal elements, as in Iraq and Pakistan.
Looking towards the future, Ms Hassan stipulated that carrying out attacks on the spectacular levels witnessed in New York, Washington, Madrid and London would be difficult to achieve for terrorist groups at the moment. She suggested that a more real and perhaps long-term threat were small cells carrying out smaller scale suicide attacks in different locations, spreading fear and panic across cities, nations and continents.
During the Q & A, Ms Hassan was asked about sponsoring groups. It was suggested that as a suicide bomber required a sponsoring group, such groups required a sponsoring community and a belief system that sustained them. More attention needed to be paid to the link between the individual to receptive audiences. Furthermore, it was suggested that given this audience, more spectacular attacks could be expected. Ms Hassan responded that many terrorists groups believed that though it was alleged that they rejected democracy, democracy too rejected them. Though the sponsoring community might perceive itself as downtrodden and oppressed, in reality, suicide bombers did not come from these two groups. She also suggested that spectacular attacks were difficult to pull off.
Ms Hassan was also asked how prevalent religion was as a motivation for suicide bombings; whether homegrown European terrorists had a unique set of motivations; and whether dirty bombs were a possible future threat. She stressed that while religion was a strong factor in the charter of the terrorist groups and in the way in which they described themselves, ultimately suicide attacks were “military” operations. She regretted that the number of fatwas issued condemning suicide attacks were outweighed by those condoning it as part of legitimate resistance and jihad. She said there was one Islam and one Koran, however there were several schools of interpretation and differing practices. With Islam lacking an organised priesthood, it was explained that virtually any semi-educated Muslim could see himself as an interpreter of the faith.
With regards to dirty bombs, Ms Hassan said that she had noted a clear aversion to the idea of viral/bacterial suicide bombs when interviewing extremists. She added that interviews had highlighted that suicide bombings were not carried out lightly, they had to fit into a strategy and occur at specific times. With regard to recruitment, she explained that once recruited and trained, there were very few “exit points” . When interviewing jihadis in Pakistan, she had only come across five people that had gone from being extremist to moderate and decided to opt out from their missions. Only one of the men had done so for what she regarded as the right reasons; the other four were now powerful criminals in the province.
‘Prospects for Suicide Bombing Tactics Outside the Middle East’ – Dr Samuel Grier, Dean, NATO Defense College, said the ‘tipping point’ was the moment when an idea, trend or social behaviour crossed a threshold, tipped and spread like wildfire. Using the metaphor of a virus, he said that a particular social behaviour could cross the tipping point and become an epidemic. Using the recent French riots as an example of the tipping point, he said violence had started after two young people were electrocuted. As the riots spread and passed the tipping point, the mere act of burning a car or being arrested had gained meaning equivalent to speech. He provided a timeline of the riots and explained that the violence had eventually waned, mostly due to the lack of continued support and encouragement.
In contrast, he said suicide bombings still received encouragement and were therefore likely to continue. He characterised the situation the world is facing as a suicide bombing epidemic. Looking at the situation in Iraq and Palestine, he said the tipping point in the former case had been in May-April 2005 when there were a recorded 15-20 suicide bombing incidents on average each week. In Palestine, he suggested that the tipping point had occurred in 2002, when the number of suicide bombings increased 50% over the previous year. He suggested that Israel’s aggressive response had reversed the tipping point, but Dr Grier said that it was unlikely the tipping point could be reversed in Iraq with the same tactics used by Israelis.
Looking at the London bombings and the profiles of the perpetrators, Dr Grier said an emerging profile suggested that each cell typically had one older member who surrounded himself by young recruits who were emotionally vulnerable to becoming part of the on-going suicide epidemic. He raised issues of motivation such as religion, the promise of paradise, disenchantment, coercion, financial compensation, religious pride and victimisation, and stressed that these were issues raised by extremist leaders to exploit and recruit suicide bombers. Actual motivation, he said, was different once suicide bombing passed the tipping point. There was an element of sub-culture and trends associated to the attacks. The highly publicised way in which attacks were covered by the media and by extremist Internet sites prompted those vulnerable to suggestion and those attracted to committing deviant acts to willingly join the suicide attack epidemic. To these people, highly publicised suicide attacks could be interpreted as a detailed set of instructions for an act that carries a preformed meaning.
Those most vulnerable for recruitment into the on-going suicide bombing epidemic were immature young people, those with psychological dysfunction, and those that had been coerced to join the fight. Islam played a role here, but only in the way it had been instrumentalised by extremist leaders to exploit the vulnerable.
There were changing dimensions and profiles of suicide bombers, which were confusing without viewing them in the context of the tipping point. Profiles change as a behaviour progresses from a few sporadic incidents to exploitation to beyond the tipping point. Dr Grier divided suicide attackers into the following categories to illustrate the changing profiles:
Originators: In this context reference was made to the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, the first Kamikaze, and those that carried out the Columbine massacre. The young boys that carried out the Columbine suicide attacks were characterized as psychologically dysfunctional. However, all three had the same effect and served as the genesis for suicide epidemics patterned after the original acts.
Zealots: Here he referred to the first group of WWII Kamikaze pilots and the 9/11 set. He said 24 Kamikaze aviators modelled the suicide process. By the battle of Okinawa six months later, the concept had been institutionalised and crossed the tipping point, and there were 1,800 Kamikaze pilots. In WWII as a whole, an estimated 4,000 pilots willingly flew to their deaths. He said that the 19 suicide attackers of 9/11 modelled suicide for both Palestinians and those who were part of the Iraqi insurgency.
These two categories were used as examples of how the WWII high command in Japan and extremist terrorist leaders today exploited recruits, taking a ‘conscious plunge into the irrational’, leading to supporters of the cause being divided into ‘soldiers’ and ‘expendables’.
Dr Grier also stressed the importance of distinguishing between those acting in a local context (Palestine, Kamikaze pilots) or because of a local phenomenon and those acting in the broader context (9/11, Iraq). Successfully reversing the tipping point is more likely in the context of a localised phenomenon than in the global situation faced by the international community today.
Looking towards the future and the possibility of more suicide attacks outside the Middle East, he pointed to attacks and foiled attacks in the last five years. Dr Grier stressed that the perpetrators were often self-financed and self-motivated people seeking others out to join their cells. He suggested that with the continued encouragement by extremist leaders, the suicide bomb epidemic would continue. Inspired amateurs, lacking training and attracted to copy-cat attacks would continue to emerge. He suggested that the intersection of terrorism and organised crime might be joined by the related psychological phenomena of joining gangs and joining the on-going suicide bombing epidemic.
Dr Grier expressed particular concern about a possible attack in Italy, where he claimed that on top of the above motivations there were geopolitical issues such as Italy’s support of US forces in Iraq. He suggested that Italy’s weak immigration system and many soft targets contributed to its vulnerability. An attack could force the withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq, and by implication weaken the US-Italy relationship and US-led coalition effort in Iraq.
With regard to the United States, he said that a copy-cat type motivation for suicide attacks would be more likely than a geopolitical one. He said that 22 months after the Columbine incident, the police had noted 19 copy-cat attempts at a similar attack. A geopolitically motivated attack on the US was unlikely, since it might strengthen US resolve in the war against terror and continue current policies after President Bush departs from office. Instead he suggested that attacks would focus on US public opinion, which could be targeted through continued attacks on US and coalition troops in Iraq. He said that as a new administration enters the White House, it was important that the lessons learned during the Bush administration were retained and that expertise was not lost. He suggested that the United States would be at its most vulnerable at the very end of the outgoing administration and the very beginning of a new administration.
During the Q & A session, participants pointed out that Iraq could perhaps be described as suffering from a suicide epidemic, but that this situation was a far cry from Europe and the United States. It was also highlighted that the choice of terminology ‘war on terror’ might have been counterproductive since it treated terrorists as fellow warriors rather than belittling their actions. Responding to these questions, Dr Grier agreed and suggested that the phenomenon of suicide bombing viewed as a whole could be characterised as an epidemic. He also said that Europeans and US academics had expressed concern about the use of ‘war on terror’, however it would be difficult for the American people to accept a war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the losses of life, the Patriot Act and other infringements on civil liberties unless the US effort was framed in a context of war. He also suggested that the actions of suicide bombers should be belittled by classifying them as the work of immature young people, the psychologically dysfunctional, or the coerced.
Discussant Jonathan Paris, St Antony’s College, stressed that suicide bombings were not the result of socio-economic conditions or social exclusion. He believed that the root of the problem lay with the persuaders, the key leaders and often charismatic recruiters. The key to Muslim radicalisation, he said, could be found in the teachings of the Imams. He welcomed the UK government’s decision to outlaw the glorification of terrorism and the decision to act on a local and national level by ridding themselves of people like Imam Abu Hamza. More attention was needed on the audience of people like Abu Hamza, as did the large numbers of fence sitters. He agreed with Prime Minister Tony Blair who had appealed to the Muslim community to do more to ostracise its extremists. The 400,000 sympathisers that had been uncovered in recent polls needed to be targeted. They needed to be convinced to work alongside the police. He hoped that policies would encourage this type of support and referred to the slow yet eventually significant support received by the police from the community in Northern Ireland.
Robert Whalley said that the decision to make the glorification of terrorism an offence in UK domestic law had been a difficult decision since it could be seen as an encroachment on the freedom of speech. With regard to Muslim community leaders, he pointed out that many leaders had been invited to address the Prime Minister and the government after the 7 July attacks. However, some difficulties had been encountered. For example, it was very difficult to identify Muslim representatives since it was by no means a homogenous group. In addition, for the representatives in question to have credibility in their communities, they could not be seen as reporting to the government. There were some political issues here which he hoped could be overcome.
Robin O’Neill, Wyndham Place Charlemagne Trust, raised three points. He said the UK experience with Irish terrorism had suffered from problems related to a disaffected community that for a long time had been under the control of extremists. He said all that is possible must be done to avoid that today’s Muslim communities associate themselves or identify themselves with terrorists or their cause. He felt more attention was needed on motivation and the leadership. In Iraq, the motivation was clear: It was focused on getting the US-led coalition to leave the country. However, in the case of 11 September and 7 July the aims, goals and motivations seemed less clear cut and more complex.
In a second Q & A session questions were raised on the role of traditional/religious teachings. Reference was made to studies on terrorists in Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines who were more vulnerable to radicalisation because they had not received religious education. Some speakers disagreed with Dr. Grier’s categorisation of the motivational factors spurring suicide bombers and said that attention was needed on the perceived or real geopolitical injustices that motivated young people to kill themselves. Whilst some speakers stressed that suicide bombings may one day have outlived their usefulness as a tactic, others said that as long as there was advocacy for the practice it would continue.
This was the third in a series of workshops on ‘Countering Terrorism in Europe: The Enemy from Afar, or the Enemy Within?’ organised by Dr Patrick M. Cronin, IISS Director of Studies, with support from Robert Whalley and Robin O’Neill.
