Patrick Cronin, IISS Director of Studies, and Robin O’Neill, Wyndham Place Charlemagne Trust, introduced the series of meetings. Robert Whalley, Chairperson and former Director for Counter Terrorism and Intelligence at the Home Office, asked participants to bear strategies for Europe, the EU and other fora in mind during the analysis of threats and motivations.
THREAT PERCEPTIONS & TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS
‘Threat Perceptions in Europe Today’ - Phillipe Errera, French Foreign Ministry
France has developed a White Book on Countering Terrorism (now out in English) which shows that globally, specialist academic and government perceptions of threats were increasingly homogenous. However, on the national level, threat perceptions were complex and varied (specialist vs. public opinion) and could be corrosive. Governments perceived global jihadist terrorism as the major current threat, as opposed to groups operating on regional or national basis.
Jihadist terrorism ideology: Simple enough to draw on perceived grievances, complex enough to give the impression that it provided answers and alternatives to globalisation/modernisation. In the post-Cold War vacuum, the ideology managed to recycle non-religious elements, use post-colonial elements and create a more potent and lasting threat. Iraq allowed Islamist terrorists to re-position themselves as Arab nationalists. The war in Iraq did not bring about the marginalisation of the ideology but created a ‘triple convergence’ of religious, operational and geographic elements. Before, al-Qaeda operated out of Chechnya, Afghanistan etc. Today, it now operated within the heart of the Arab world.
The combination between political and ideological terrorism was particularly powerful, especially in a ‘global’ context - the threat is now de-territorialised. The objective, ideology, recruitment, zones of operation and links were no longer based on local grievances. The flexibility and plasticity of the structure also posed a threat. The structure had originally been simple and hierarchical, however the structure was now divided into three levels: al-Qaeda leadership, territorial and regional groups, and individuals. In addition, with cyberspace and increased speeds of communication, there was an added threat of increased lethality.
Governments did not understand the trigger that pushed one individual to act. Analysis was carried out in generalisations, though the act in itself was fundamentally individual.
The White Book showed that despite progress finding and arresting terrorist suspects, investment in manpower and technology, the policy could no longer focus on finding a needle in a hay stack. Many individuals had no previous contact with law enforcement and were on no databases. The route to terrorism was today a direct and short process. With globalisation and the ease of using the internet, would-be terrorists could remain in Europe and still have access to madrassah or jihad camp information.
Three factors made EU concerns unique - the near Middle East was more accessible; the development of sometimes newly converted home-grown terrorists with national passports and no previous contact with the police; links with North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) that could lead from logistic support to participation in violent acts.
He highlighted three areas that needed attention:
1) The gap in threat perception by specialists and public opinion
2) The role of Islam in the radicalisation problem, the intensity and longevity of the threat
3) The eventuality of a mass casualty attack, required communication policies
Given the speed of communication and the difficulty in predicting the next terrorist target, he concluded by stressing that any threat assessment needed to give space for a ‘strategic surprise’.
‘Terrorist Motivations in Threatening Europe’ - Magnus Ranstorp, Swedish National Defence College
The speed of globalisation fused with ideology had resulted in jihadist reverberations around the globe from the local context to the global environment. The most critical issue was the realisation that there was no single causation or catalyst driving radicalisation. Al-Qaeda engaged the near-enemy and far-enemy simultaneously, with an endurance and long-term vision that called for different strategic concepts.
Factors that drive radicalisation:
1) Structural factors could provide the environment needed for terrorism to breed. These included demographic imbalances, modernisation, globalisation, unemployment.
2) Motivational factors were found in the spread of the ideology, the content of Salafist and Wahhabi doctrine that identified and demonised the enemy and justified violence.
3) Physical and virtual nodes of radicalisation, such as closed study-groups, prisons, cyber-space, presence of charismatic leadership, regional conflicts and conflict zones.
4) Personal triggering mechanisms
5) Small group dynamics, notions of revenge, crime vs. terrorism nexus, and the lack of exit strategies.
There was no single profile but factors had different variables:
Internal factors:
- Absence of Muslim public debate on the justification of violence
- Muslim identity crisis
- Alienation and perceived injustices
- Presence of charismatic leadership
- Glorification of jihad
- Experience of discrimination, social exclusion, etc
External factors:
- Western foreign policy to the Muslim work perceived as exposing hypocrisy
- Military interventions, such as Iraq, seen as thinly veiled colonialism
- Cyber-space
Recruitment often took place in closed meetings, including prisons where some joined for protection/to atone past sins/to get a feeling of belonging or a sense of mission. Prison release programmes required further attention. Cyber-space provided a medium for propaganda, recruitment, and directives within and between members, and linked the local to the international and the international to the local.
Targets highlighted in the Centre for Islamic Study and Research’s ‘Management of Barbarism’, were vulnerable areas in Pakistan, Yemen, Nigeria, etc, where attacks on tourist targets and oil installations were possible. Jihadist media strategy focused on kidnapping diplomats and to carry out executions to create maximum effect thus polarising society. Actions like this could be seen in the killing of Theo van Gogh. The polymorphic threat of al-Qaeda was capable both of large-scale attacks and small scale attacks, which in a globalised world, had tremendous impact.
During the first Q&A session, questions were raised about universities serving as recruitment grounds; the need to engage the Muslim community when dealing with extremism; and the necessity of relating policies to the local context. One commentator stressed the need to focus on political terrorism and intra-community alienation.
Another participant put forward a threat model ‘Four Baskets and a Cloud’ that pulled various types of terrorism together. He said that all terrorist groups could be placed in one of four baskets:
- Anarchists
- State-sponsored groups
- Westphalian secessionist
- Caliphate ideologues
Since their motivations were different, they must be analysed differently. The variable (cloud) could elucidate further and represented strategic enablers, clandestine illegal activities, money laundering, etc. The problem currently faced by the US government was the gap in the intelligence community between people working on terrorism and, for example, drug trafficking. He stressed that this gap needed to be bridged.
‘Expanding International Cooperation in Countering Terrorism’ - Paul Wilkinson, St. Andrew’s University
A European response to Jihadi terrorism must be audible, yet cautious. Europe could not have a separate response to a global phenomenon. European thinking must feed into global thinking about Jihadi terrorism and the threat it poses.
There were three major models of response put forward since 9/11
1) Military response; this position had been influential in US/Pentagon since the Bush administration. The attraction to this response was obvious – it showed the public that the threat of terrorism was taken seriously and sent a message to those contemplating carrying out a terrorist attack. However, the military response was costly, both in terms of lives lost and in its lack of exit strategies. It also risked leading to further alienation among the local population and loss of support at home. The military response was an invaluable contribution if precise and combined with other counter-terrorism tools.
2) Criminal justice model; using the judicial system to bring al-Qaeda cells to justice. Though a slow and difficult process, evidence to convict could be obtained. In addition, courts were increasingly well-informed in understanding the special features of terrorism. Though the US federal system had carried out some trials, the criminal justice system had been circumvented by Guantanamo and military courts. It was important to return to the criminal justice model in order to avoid double standards and human-rights violations. Problems in this slow process were associated to judicial procedures often being inadequate, different stages of development of national anti-terrorism laws, added to the difficulty in ensuring due process or extraditions.
3) Multi-pronged multilateral model; this model had been adopted in the EU and the US war perceived to be moving towards it. It showed that democratic countries could respond effectively without withdrawing from international legal instruments such as the Convention against Torture.
Elements of the multi-pronged multi-lateral strategy that required attention:
- Intelligence: gaps in intelligence were a major problem in dealing with al-Qaeda. More resources and training were needed in human intelligence. In addition, intelligence sharing needed to be improved. Though intelligence sharing has improved, it was no way near the levels required. Operational intelligence would be difficult to increase, however there could be real benefits in sharing assessment materials. Bilateral intelligence and joint investigations were also needed, as well as capacity-building.
- Public support: better information needed to be given to the public about emergency management. Training was expensive but required in order to mitigate effects of a massive attack.
- Counter-proliferation: The methods elaborated by the UN-resolution 1373 that countries were obliged to adhere to, were not sufficiently developed to cover non-state activity.
- Research: Government spending on research was inadequate and further resources needed to be invested in independent research, including technology research.
In the Q&A session, City Circle emphasised the need to be innovative when dealing with counter-terrorism. The organisation was currently working on a qualitative empirical research piece on understanding religious formation and identity among Muslims in the United Kingdom. Such initiatives could be part of innovating counter-terrorism strategies focusing on winning the ‘cultural hearts and minds’. The fact that and importance of this research being carried out from a Muslim perspective was highlighted.
Other questions focused on whether the US gave as much as it demanded from Europe in terms of law enforcement and asked whether there was substantive cooperation. One participant highlighted that though the criminal justice model was slow, the actual ability to commit terrorist activities ended with an arrest.
It was stressed that intelligence alone was not enough; cooperation was needed between intelligence services and the police in areas where people could fall prey to jihadist ideology. Comments were also made suggesting that Imams needed to be educated in their political context and have citizenship training.
Concerning the military/legal models, one speaker said that the invasion of Afghanistan had prevented the al-Qaeda leadership from being more than inspirational figures because of the pressure put on them. He stressed that law enforcement was not enough and the US military foresaw playing an important role in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, especially in capacity-building. Concerning non-proliferation he said the intelligence community faced a huge challenge, but was looking at both secure nation-states and crumbling nation-states. It was his hope that looking at the latter would allow a deeper understanding of rogue elements, arms bazaar middlemen and terrorists.
