It is an honour and a pleasure and a privilege for me to stand here and to have the opportunity to give a couple of words on a broad spectrum and a variety of topics, which have come into mutual interest, and I think it’s a proof of highest diplomacy that after yesterday’s afternoon IISS asked a Frenchmen to introduce a German in England. And I won’t dare to get into any poor analogies that link to football and the only thing that has been written down for me yesterday was a sentence which is just so striking and brings me to a probably rather interesting bridge between security and football, which is that one famous member of our national team once said football is like chess, just without dice. As you know it’s all about strategy in Germany and maybe it was this innovative view on our favourite game that helped us win yesterday. Thank you for those who found that quote, that’s an excellent one.
The year 2010 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture is a great honour for me and I feel particularly honoured by seeing so many distinguished guests, and old friends as well amongst us today, and I would also like to greet the members of the Buchan family, thank you for coming, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.
Strategies are not only needed in football but are also needed in security policy, that’s a truism that things are constantly changing. Today security issues are strongly influenced by the far-reaching effects of globalisation, which are both beneficial and disruptive in nature.
And I’ve had the opportunity today and yesterday night to exchange views with our friends here in the UK and I can underline again that the UK and Germany have come a long way. In today’s world the parallels between our two countries are striking and it is not primarily the result of an ever-closer Union. European integration has fortunately not led to the disillusion of any nation state or the disappearance of differences. I again recognise that lamb with peppermint sauce and haggis and neap have not disappeared from the menu, and mark the difference and undoubtedly differences make life more interesting.
But the parallels mainly stem from the sheer fact that our two countries face the same challenges, share the same values and we both struggle with the acceleration of life in our era of globalisation. But we still have room for improvement when it comes to the questions where we could work together. I think it’s just not enough only to repeat again and again how close and how friendly our relations are, I think we have recognised today and yesterday that there are many issues where we could and should work closer together.
The free flow of goods and information is essential for our nations’ prosperity, as is the unhindered access to energy recourses. Globally, demand for fossil fuels is projected to increase by half within the next decade, that’s well known, and clearly an increase in competition for energy recourses and raw materials is the consequence. Demographic trends show, we have discussed this yesterday night as well, the world population is projected to grow to 7.7 billion within the next twenty years and population ageing will become a predominant demographic feature in developed countries. In the less and least developed countries in contrast the average age is likely to sink which will have effects on social structures as well as people’s attitudes. To these global trends we can add regional trends. Regional conflicts are both more likely to influence the international system and have a more direct impact on us thus forming threats which are already known as well as causing new ones.
One example is Africa. This continent is likely to remain outside the mainstream of economic globalisation and will continue to struggle with serious problems such as HIV/AIDS, terrorism and internal conflict. Continuing terrorist activity in parts of Africa is virtually a certainty. Many states lack the security capacity necessary to break up terror cells, thwart arms trafficking, and prevent well coordinated attacks. While the sources of these conflicts are most often local, we may be drawn in to provide emergency assistance, peacekeepers or conflict mediation.
Climate change, is a, for many the, major global trend with significant impacts on economic development, the availability of food resources and on fresh water supplies. Talking after two days of what I’ve just experienced here in London about climate change is also at least a challenge. Ethnic tension might be exacerbated if decreased rainfall leads to food shortages or if diverse weather developments lead to flooding or desertification. Climate change will undoubtedly have a variety of geo-political consequences and most likely will lead to a renewed emphasis on geo-strategy. I’m mentioning this because I’m quite sure that in London this debate has more than just started, but in Germany there’s still a certain lack of depth when it comes to that very link.
Borderless environmental and demographic trends as well as threats from non state actors, the proliferation of information and the worldwide capital flow, have had a revolutionary impact on national security. I can therefore only underline what Liam Fox just recently stated in this speech. He said that the strategic defence and security review would make a clean cut with regard to the military and political mindset of cold war politics. It was very close to the thoughts that I’m having in Germany as well. As you know some of our structures are still clearly reflecting cold war thinking.
So this has had consequences for the issue of defence. Today it seems that financial obligations and especially over-indebtedness of states can jeopardise their national security and stability more seriously than changes in the traditional military balance.
All members of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance have been hit by the current financial crisis. Many of us are facing severe budget cuts. Which of course have massive implications, both for our defence budgets and for the Alliance.
It is crystal clear that we must renew and reform our alliance so that its success in the twentieth century is matched by success in the twenty first century. The debate about reforming NATO has certain, some limited, but certain parallels with the debate about reforming the United Nations. Both seem to be never ending debates; however in NATO we do see a light, a very shimmering light at the end of the tunnel. We should regard the current crisis as an incentive to advance our reform agenda. Reforming NATO - this means that we have to review our aims, adapt our structures, and identify the capabilities needed, a process which will find its expression in a new strategic concept.
I think we can follow Sir Lawrence Freedman who once described strategy as the theory of application of power and power as the ability to produce intended efforts. Leadership is key. As Henry Kissinger rightly pointed out, the real challenge for a statesman is to recognise change in the international security environment as it might undermine a nation’s security. So if strategy is the application of certain means in order to achieve a political objective we have to be precise in the determination of our aims. And the aims are to preserve peace, values, free trade, welfare and stability. It may sound simplistic, but the objectives are threefold, dealing with challenges, security and confidence building in our neighbourhood, and working for a stable international order and the rule of law.
It is clear that our aims and interests cannot be achieved by military means alone. The need for a whole-of-government approach is an imperative. This will be reflected by an adaptation of the instruments. A clear understanding that saving has its limits is yet another imperative.
The limits are best described by three principles.
First, the principle of the national security interest means the understanding that the protection of the country and its citizens is a truly indispensable prerequisite of any strategy. Credible protection at home will be decisive for public support, and there’s not only one example we’re talking about here.
Secondly, the principle of alliance solidarity. The commitment to the core function of the alliance which is to safeguard peace and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic area not only forces us to adapt our strategies and instruments accordingly, but also to contribute to them accordingly. Maintaining and strengthening the transatlantic link remains vital. Well knowing that next to the transatlantic link there are growing transpacific links and other things and a discussion we also note, guiding in the depth we actually need to. The alliance is an institution based on solidarity and burden sharing. For its survival and wellbeing it is therefore crucial that nations maintain their willingness to contribute their share of the sum. I would definitely send this page to my finance minister.
Thirdly, the principle of adequate financial support for current and future missions. This means, as a consequence, that missions have to be matched to means, and not the pursuit of current missions to the scarcity of recourses available. I say that well knowing that I have just mentioned the opposite in Germany when I was describing the necessity of reforms and structural reforms. That was a wakeup call that was urgently needed and sometimes you need to scare those whose vote you need.
Most of NATOs capabilities are based not on binding legal contracts but on declared political will. Providing troops to operations, filling posts in alliance structures or meeting mutually agreed targets; all are voluntary in nature, but for NATO they are essential. The alliance not only depends on appropriate structures and capabilities, it also needs a common spirit. So how can we ensure that nations continue to bring in their share, also in times of severe financial crisis? We need to set a pragmatic framework of action by identifying key areas and tasks. This framework has to be strictly limited to what is truly necessary. We strongly need reforms in areas that cut across the mission spectrum. We must modify the consensus rule, not on every level, for instance on the NAC level I don’t see the necessity to modify it, but on other levels. Review the defence acquisition, reform command structure, reduce NATO’s bureaucracy, change the way NATO spends money, and generate appropriate military capabilities.
NATO’s commitment should never exceed what the alliance can do. It was Otto von Bismarck, the iron chancellor who created a German empire in 1871 and in these days one might recall the words of another great Tory leader, Benjamin Disraeli, who warned against the wider implications of what he called the German revolution. Bismarck was right in saying, “he who knows his aim is best at mastering the art of the possible”. And another German, the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, taught us, “wo Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch”, “where danger is, the saving power also grows”; it’s not as poetic as the German phrase. In practical terms, this means capabilities to carry out missions that allies have agree upon, further restructuring to ensure that more resources are available, and commonly funded force enablers, especially strategic airlift, interoperable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, but also greater efficiencies and cooperative procurement.
Germany currently leads an initiative on synchronisation and harmonisation of EU-NATO capability development. It sometimes already shows if you have such a wording for a certain context that one needs to be a bit more precise. An initiative on synchronisation and harmonisation of EU-NATO capability development, explain that to the German public. It aims at achieving progress in a pragmatic way, leaving the currently unsolvable political issues between NATO and the EU aside.
Another avenue to explore might be that of further role specialisation and division of labour among NATO allies and EU member states. We have discussed this now for years and years and years. Greater expertise in a specific area and cost savings might be the benefits of such an approach, but clearly there are also limits: i.e. in terms of sovereignty and freedom of decision; it’s part of a discussion we’ve had this morning. In short, more multinational cooperation might not be a panacea to all our troubles, but it might lead us out of the gravest impasse.
The fact that our two countries are currently facing a hard headed assessment of the current security environment, and that both are looking for further savings, can be regarded, as I’ve just said before, as a wakeup call for closer cooperation. So the current situation also implies chances and opportunities. And to give you a glimpse of what we have to deal with at home: compared to our financial requirements, we will face a structural deficit of almost 14 billion Euros in the coming four years just for the defence budget, that’s quite a bit. I’ve tasked my ministry to explore our options and make recommendations taking due account of present and future security needs, and this will result in a comprehensive defence review. In the reform process, changing structures and reviewing procurement projects will not suffice. We will also have to reduce our personnel significantly. Under these premises, even conscription has to be regarded carefully and is currently under discussion; that’s probably the euphemism of the evening.
As NATO is adapting to the changing requirements of the international security architecture, it also needs to review its relations with other international organisations. The EU has pushed forward major changes with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is on the verge of becoming a security player in its own right. However, we must be very careful not to duplicate structures; that’s also not a new sentence, we have also discussed this again and again. As encouraging as individual steps might be, institutions must not only adapt in parallel, they must adapt together. We must use the chance for reform to coordinate and synchronise our efforts, and make better use of available resources. This is why we must do more for our strategic partnership between NATO and the United Nations. With their joint declaration of September 2008, they have opened up new perspectives for cooperation in many fields. In this context of future UN-NATO collaboration one might think of peacekeeping training initiatives, mutual support in emergency scenarios or in common efforts in capacity building in post conflict states just to name a few. You know that there is a certain romanticism and nostalgic feeling in Germany whenever anyone mentions the United Nations, but on the other hand we need to be pragmatic when it comes to cooperative elements.
Article 5 is the acknowledged core element of NATO. Interestingly it became the main issue of debate at the end of the reflection phase in the context of reassurance. Further questions were: what does Article 5 include? Only traditional or also new threats like cyber attacks? How do we reconcile Article 5 with out of area operations? And is it actually possible to draw a clear line between these tasks? What this shows, is that Article 5 embodies the key security concerns and interests of all members. Especially new members put much emphasis on collective security issues.
The purpose of the alliance is and will remain the collective defence of its member states.And if such a situation should arise, if action should be required, the alliance has to be capable to shoulder the task. This we will have to continue to ensure with the right policies, structures and capabilities, and of course with the necessary financial means.
The primary task in security and defence policy is to limit the risk of war, whilst safeguarding prosperity and a life in freedom. For many decades, a successful basis for this was deterrence, both through conventional and nuclear means. Our adversaries would know that an act of aggression on their part would entail severe retaliation with costs outweighing possible gains. This principle worked successfully for many decades and nuclear weapons enhanced our security.
Today however, the role of nuclear weapons has changed. Due to nuclear proliferation and the growing risk of so-called ‘dirty bombs’, a new threat has emerged which partially undermines our concept of deterrence. New factors have appeared which are difficult to control and put a considerable strain on deterrence. Hence, just as our enemy adapts, we have to adapt our tactics. In my view ladies and gentlemen, the only way forward is a double track approach.
Firstly, push for the reduction of nuclear weapons and strictly control the enrichment process and the fuel cycle. However, disarmament alone cannot substitute an adequate defence. Hence, we need to combine our disarmament efforts with a missile defence system.
Missile defence would not be an alternative to nuclear deterrence. The purpose of the system is to neutralise an enemy’s new capabilities, to deny him the military courses of action and the possibility of successfully attacking us. As such, missile defence will be the third component in the field of deterrence, complementary to nuclear and conventional deterrence. The United States have offered NATO to contribute significant capabilities to a common missile defence system, to our mutual benefit. We would have to provide a certain share, but the offer in my view is tempting. Can we afford it? Missile defence does cost a great deal, but the gain in security is considerable. This is why I recommend developing this system within NATO. The alternative would be a bilateral security arrangement, or many bilateral security arrangements, which run counter to what the alliance wants, and to what it tries to strengthen with its new strategic concept: its inner cohesion.
Intensive discussions have been held about whether Russia should participate in this programme, specifically over here as I do know, and I support this. Russia is an important partner for the alliance, and only if we manage to establish a security environment from which we both can benefit, will the lasting difficulties be diminished, well knowing that this is a long process. Practical cooperation is key. Missile defence would be a good project for collaboration; however, it is also clear that Russia has no veto over alliance decisions. If it decides not to take part, we will continue without them.
Deterrence and defence are, and continue to be, vital elements of our strategy; however we will be all the more successful in making the world more secure, if we simultaneously push forward disarmament. With its modified approach to nuclear issues which reduces the significance of nuclear deterrence, the US have provided us with the opportunity to do more in the field of nuclear disarmament. This, however, should not prevent us from being realistic, it’s a discussion we are having quite often in Germany as well. President Obama’s vision of a Global Zero has started a long awaited discussion, you might recall president Dwight D. Eisenhower who once summed up the dilemma posed by new weapons technology as follows: there is no alternative to peace.
Certainly, we all share the principle of a nuclear free world, and regard the new START treaty as a milestone. But the nuclear forces which the United States are building up today must also be able to act as a reliable deterrent. Without credible and effective options to respond to attacks on members states of the Atlantic alliance, the United States will have difficulty in deterring such attacks. The strategic position of the United States is intrinsically linked to the maintenance of potent counterforce capabilities as long as nuclear arsenals still exist. That gives you also a glimpse on a rather interesting debate we are having probably not only in Germany, but there have been some misunderstandings during the last couple of months about the main aim of the government, and in certain elements it’s reflected in what I’m saying over here.
Let me quickly, ending soon, switch the topic to just a couple of sentences about Afghanistan, maybe part of the discussion afterwards, and let me say that Afghanistan is currently the biggest and most import task in our security policy, although well knowing that we have to be careful with such sentences.
The persisting insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan have implications far beyond their borders. Failure to achieve stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the overall region, would likely increase various forms of extremism and terrorism throughout the region and the world, and especially the western part. Hence we have to bring the operation to a successful end, successful for us and for the Afghans, and respectively the region. And this will only be possible if we manage a transition in responsibility. This will only be possible with, let’s say, a certain amount of backing by our respective publics, if we lower some aims, and we have lowered some aims already at the London conference, and at least come closer to realism, we can not only work with illusions and dreams.
At the same time, ladies and gentlemen, we have to answer the question of what’s next; what will a NATO post Afghanistan look like? The key question in this regard is, under what circumstances would alliance members be willing to enter into another major operation. Of course, final decisions can only be taken on a case by case basis, but criteria must include the following:
Only if there’s a grave and imminent danger to alliance members; only with a clearly defined political goal; not unless there is no other alternative and all other options have been exhausted; and only if the capabilities required for success will be provided from the very beginning; only then.
When thinking about future operations, Afghanistan should not be used as a blueprint. Afghanistan is one scenario, of course, yet we also have to plan for more stabilisation operations as well as missions in support of the United Nations. These may vary in scope and tasks in accordance with the UN charter.
Against this background it becomes clear that we will continue to need flexible capabilities across the full spectrum. Can we measure successful security policy? Can it be measured in number and size of operations? I think it should much rather be measured in operations not led and wars not fought because we managed to prevent them and avert crisis before they broke out. It sounds to a certain extent also romantic, I know that. But we must construct international order before a crisis forces us to do so, we must widen our perspective so that the present does not overwhelm the future, and we must renew our transatlantic partnership. We should redouble our efforts in as much as that the European Union must develop, and eventually use the full range of the capability spectrum. We desperately need closer cooperation between Europe and North America that goes beyond the military sphere.
This is the only way of creating a larger and truly common understanding of what security means for, and demands from, our nation states. Ladies and gentlemen, those were a couple of thoughts, which we are trying to discuss and debate right now in Germany but not only there. I think we need to be much more frank and open in our discussions; we need to use the opportunities that the very situation is offering us. And it’s not an opportunity that brings us only to duck down and not to see the realities. I think there is a chance also under budget restraints as we are having them right now, and certainly for Germany it’s the first chance since a long time to go into reforms we have missed for at least twenty years. Some things have been put on its way, we called it transformation, but now we have to come from transformation to reforms. And the closer we work together, and the more we see the commonalities and also the spectrum of chances that it offers, the better it is. And yesterday’s football game has at least taught us one thing: what defence really means.
Thank you for your attention.
