13 October 2010: CSIS Gulf Roundtable
Introduction
I will describe an approach to Iran that is a mix of diplomacy and deterrence, and which I discuss in more detail in the October/November 2010 issue of Survival.
My talk will be in four parts: Assumptions; Deterrence; Diplomacy; and Politics.
1 Assumptions
Let me begin with six assumptions about how I approach Iran and US policy toward Iran.
First, I agree with the Obama Administration that preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon is a vital national interest of the United States for the following reasons: it would probably make worse already difficult and volatile challenges regarding Gulf security and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and it would be a setback to global nonproliferation efforts and possibly spark other states to pursue nuclear weapons.
Second, there will be no resolution of our conflict with Iran absent a negotiation with Iran, including direct talks between Washington and Tehran.
Diplomacy is the first resort, the use of force is the very last resort in dealing with Iran.
Third, the credible threat of force in my view is essential in all diplomacy involving threats to US vital interests.
That said, the use of force to deter an Iranian nuclear weapon would be a failure of diplomacy and probably result in an even more volatile and dangerous Middle East than we have today.
This outcome, which is not a good one, would only be overshadowed by an even worse outcome -- Iran developing a nuclear weapon.
Fourth, I acknowledge and respect the view of strategists who argue that a strategy based upon non-proliferation, that is preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon, may already be a step behind the curve, that another possible scenario involves Iran as a virtual, undeclared nuclear power, utilizing its ambiguous posture to intimidate its neighbors and expand its influence in the region. Or an Iranian nuclear weapon break-out could come as a surprise at any time.
These are fair points, and I welcome discussions about this contingency of iving with an Iranian nuclear weapon, which Ken wrote about in his book The Persian Puzzle and is worth reading or re-reading.
I believe, however, there is still an interval for diplomacy and deterrence, perhaps another 12 months to get a diplomatic process going.
Fifth, three sub-points about how we think about decision-making in Iran. This seems to me in the realm of the known unknowables, except by those who go to Iran and have the type of access to information and principals that most of us are not able to obtain.
So we should be careful that speculation, even informed speculation, and assumptions, including reasonably good assumptions, not be mistaken for fact in building a case for this or that policy option.
Three points on this score.
First, I do not know if Iran has decided to go ahead with nuclear weaponization. There are on the one hand very concerning reports from the IAEA, and on the other hand, denials by Iran’s top leaders that it does not pursue nuclear weapons.
My assumption, therefore, is that Iran is retaining the option of weaponization, and that the burden is on the US and others, to convince it otherwise.
Second, I do not accept that Iran’s factional politics is an excuse for diplomatic inaction. We cannot game the Iranian system. Whether President Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader Khamenei is up or down or at odds with each other is interesting, and indeed relevant, but should not be debilitating for US initiatives or an excuse for the US holding back on engagement.
The president of Iran is the man and office charged with engaging the US, including on the nuclear account. My assumption is that he cannot and would not do anything that is not blessed by the Supreme Leader and the other powers that be in Iran. And while I would respect efforts to develop discreet channel to Iranian decision-makers, including the Supreme Leader, I think it is unlikely that the Supreme Leader himself will take a lead on diplomacy with the US. The decision in Tehran seems to be that Ahmadinejad is the lead, at least for now.
Third, the analytical preoccupation with Iran’s presumed debilitating factionalism, in terms of policy practice, seems a uniquely Washington obsession. Turkey, Brazil, India, Japan, Korea, China, Russia, Qatar and many other countries do diplomacy with Iran. We should can learn from their foreign policy practice.
I would add here that the May 17, 2010 “Tehran Declaration” seems case in point that Iran is able to overcome its presumed factionalism and negotiate an agreement dealing with its nuclear programs.
In sum, whether Iran is capable of dealing with the US is provable or falsifiable by Iran’s responses to US initiatives.
Sixth, and finally, we are in the realm of bad to worse options. Absent a diplomatic breakthrough, and when I say breakthrough this is a very high bar, there will probably be either a confrontation involving Iran and Israel and/or the United States; an Iranian nuclear weapon; or a prolonged period of high tension that contributes to more radicalized politics, uncertainty and violence in the region.
2 Deterrence
Deterrence in its most common usage involves the credible threat of military force to prevent a nuclear attack.
In my score, deterrence would be defined as the use of force as a last resort to prevent Iran from crossing a nuclear-weapons threshold.
Obama administration officials have referred to ‘all options on the table.” Deterrence could benefit, I believe, from clarity on the red lines or tripwires for possible US military action. These could include discovery of an undeclared Iranian nuclear-weapons facility, or Iran’s expelling International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, declaring or testing a nuclear weapon, or withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Another tripwire for military action, albeit more problematic, could include Iran’s exceeding a threshold amount, set in advance, of its stockpile of low enriched uranium.
Presenting red lines for possible military options has its own challenges. Let me list five.
First, if the red lines slip, the US loses credibility and things go from bad to worse. This has been a criticism of US policy toward North Korea, for example.
Second, a military strike would have to have an effect that substantially sets back Iran’s nuclear programs. This is critical because the use of force against Iran would represent an acute failure of US and international diplomacy. While any military action in a deterrence scenario would be targeted solely at Iran’s nuclear facilities and related targets, the use of force would likely have unforeseeable negative consequences in the region.
Third, the effect of a military attack inside Iran is unknown and could prove unpopular among Iranians.
An attack could also leave the regime in power, which it would portray as a victory, and perhaps accelerate its clandestine weapons program.
Fourth, there would probably be little overt support for a US or Israeli military strike against Iran in the Middle East. Even those countries which might privately endorse military action would likely stay quiet to avoid a popular anti-American or anti-Israeli backlash, and to avoid Iran’s wrath.
Fifth, an attack on Iran, however surgical, could also be the beginning of a slippery slope to a wider conflict.
If this does not sound like an endorsement of the use of force against Iran, it is because it is not an endorsement of the use of office. Recall my assumption of bad to worse options.
That said, deterrence requires that the US would have to enforce its red lines, or the threat of force is not credible. Iran should be aware of potential consequences, beyond sanctions, should it continue to defy UN security resolutions and decide to pursue a nuclear weapon.
3 Diplomacy
While a credible military deterrent is a last resort to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon, the first resort remains diplomacy backed by sanctions.
The United States and its allies must choreograph the mechanism and substance for further diplomacy with Iran. These initiatives are unlikely to come from Iran. The US is the more powerful and more assured party, and time is not infinite, so the US needs to be more pro-active with its diplomatic outreach to Iran.
Diplomacy should be focused in three general areas: multilateral talks on Iran’s nuclear programmes, regional security, and US–Iran bilateral talks.
With regard to nuclear diplomacy, the Tehran Declaration should be seized by the US as an opportunity for intensified diplomacy with Iran.
This has so far been an opportunity missed, but it is not necessarily too late.
I take the US point that 1200 kg of enriched uranium agreed to be transferred in October 2009, in per centage terms, is not the 1200 kg of May 2010, or October 2010, as Iran has continued enrichment since last year.
But the US should be talking about the fuel swap with Iran and the other members of the Vienna Group (the US, France, Russia, and the IAEA), and involve Turkey and Brazil, both of which have interests and credibility with Iran, in the discussions.
Ahmadinejad said in New York on Sep. 24, “We were not interested to carry out 20 percent enrichment. They (the U.S. and its allies) politicized the issue. We were forced to do it to support the (medical) patients…We will consider halting uranium enrichment whenever nuclear fuel is provided to us."
These statements, and there are others like them, need to be explored in direct talks, to see if there is something to it beyond the rhetoric.
If there is agreement between Iran and the Vienna Group on the fuel swap, Iran might be able to claim a face-saving win for its own diplomacy, perhaps justifying a pause in its enrichment activities, as called for in UN resolutions.
Let me just mention a few other specific diplomatic steps the US might consider:
--institutionalize, as soon as possible, technical, working-level discussions on the TRR, inspections, and other pending IAEA questions among the parties, away from the media spotlight.
--accept President Ahmadinejad’s offer to send US nuclear scientists to Iran.
--commence a Gulf regional initiative, involving Iran, the GCC states, and Iraq. This effort could build on the annual IISS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue) and include as starters:
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invite Iran to begin discussions about signing on to existing GCC statements for a nuclear-weapons-free zone and the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the region.
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confidence-building mechanisms for economic, environmental and maritime cooperation in the Persian Gulf.
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the reconstruction of Iraq.
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Combatting trafficking in narcotics and persons.
These Gulf regional security discussions are distinct from Washington’s deepening defence and intelligence coordination with its Gulf allies with regard to Iran.
-- Begin a regional security conference on Afghanistan, involving Iran.
-- Initiate direct US-Iran talks which would probably have to be quiet to be productive.
4 US politics and policy
The US may have gained just over a year for diplomacy with the passage of UN, US and EU sanctions, given the many questions about Iran’s nuclear intentions, Israel’s own timelines for dealing with Iran, and the US political calendar.
US politics cannot be left out of our discussions of US policy toward Iran. Two brief points on this score, before concluding.
First, the Obama Administration should take note its predecessor’s experience with Iraq and avoid hyping the Iranian threat, including referencing even the most caveated timelines about weaponization in public speeches, and base its claims about Iran’s nuclear programs primarily on the reports of the IAEA.
Second, leading members of Congress will seek aggressive enforcement of US sanctions on Iran. Democrats and Republicans agree on a tough line on Iran, which is likely to intensify over the next year or so absent a diplomatic breakthrough. There seems no constituency that I can tell on the Hill for living with an Iranian nuclear weapon.
Congressional pressure on Iran policy could therefore increase in mid-2011 and into the 2012 US presidential campaign, especially if Republicans enjoy substantial gains in the November 2010 congressional elections, as is expected. Republicans may seek to portray President Obama as naive or misguided for seeking to engage Iran.
In that context, the first order question on Iran could be, one year from now, “What is the President doing to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon?” If diplomacy has failed, and sanctions, another year or so on, have not themselves shown progress in obtaining Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, what will be the answer?
In conclusion, a combination of deterrence and diplomacy would dampen speculation about the if and when of possible US military action, reassure Congress and US allies that Washington will not tolerate an Iranian nuclear weapon, and, most importantly, shift the focus to the intensive and creative diplomacy that will be required to avoid the consequences of either a US attack on Iran or an Iran with nuclear weapons.
