Speaker: Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow for Regional Security, IISS-Middle East
Date: Tuesday, January 24, 2012
Venue: IISS-US, 2121 K Street NW, Suite 801, Washington, DC 20037
Emile Hokayem discussed developments in the Levant region, specifically Syria’s descent into civil war.
The Gulf States will play a more important
role in Syria in the coming months, but their lack of knowledge of the Syrian
opposition will prevent them from acting in unison. This was one of the
messages to emerge from a talk by Middle East expert Emile Hokayem at IISS-US.
Focusing on the Arab world’s perception of the Syrian uprising, Mr Hokayem
suggested that Gulf nations have few relations with important minorities in the
country, such as the Kurds. He admitted there was an undeniable sectarian
narrative on Syria in the Sunni-dominated Gulf States and that this had driven
a Gulf media war against President Assad’s Alawite Shia regime.
Each Gulf country 'had their favourites', he added. 'If you're Qatar you've dealt for years with the Assad regime so you've
developed relationships with senior businessmen'. They also 'have good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood...but also with key independent opposition figures'. Saudi Arabia
by contrast has closer links with tribes and former regime figures.
While the opposition in Syria had a strong Islamist character, Mr Hokayem said,
it was not a hardcore Salafist movement. There was considerable evidence of
inter-confessional relations; he said much of the sectarian tensions in Syria
had been stirred up by the regime and there was even evidence of Christian
support for opposition networks.
However, he warned that the leading opposition group, the Syrian National
Council, had no dominant figures from outside the Sunni community. He suggested
that the Muslim Brotherhood needed to make guarantees to protect minorities
concerned about a Sunni takeover.
Overall, he said, the situation remained in Assad’s favour. However, this
advantage was quickly eroding, since he could no longer claim to be protecting
the country from instability. The Syrian economy was also collapsing and most
businesspeople in Syria felt that the regime was on the way out.
Assad still had a great deal of firepower. Indeed, only 20-25% of Syrian forces
were being used for domestic repression. However, the president was probably
concerned about the loyalty of his troops, Mr Hokayem said. It was uncertain if
the regime could sustain its military onslaught, with increasingly exhausted
loyalist forces.
Ultimately however, defectors from the regime were aware that they needed to
win the loyalty of minorities before they could claim any victory.
