The concept of “confidence-building measure” (CBM) is inevitably imprecise, and its potential ambit very wide. Any kind of amicable dealing between states or their citizens is capable, cumulatively, of strengthening confidence. In conventional usage, however, the term usually refers to actions taken or agreements reached by governments with the deliberate aim, over and above the value of their specific content, of fostering trust between states alongside, or on the path towards, major substantive deals to prevent conflict or resolve disputes. CBMs are typically seen as relevant when relationships are wary or uneasy, lying somewhere between general comfort (when CBMs are unnecessary) and stark hostility (when they can have little purchase). The situation in South Asia has often fitted this template, and the potential contribution of CBMs has seemed increasingly attractive since the 1998 emergence of India and Pakistan as nuclear-weapon possessors sharpened perceptions of risk both within and beyond the Sub-Continent.
CBMs do not have to be of a military character. The establishment of a regular bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad exemplifies other possibilities, and India recently identified an extensive menu of ideas most of which were political, cultural, religious, social or commercial. Military options have however always drawn particular attention, and this note concentrates upon those.
There have been several past efforts in South Asia, though their record of effectiveness has been uneven. Since the 1980s “hot-lines” have existed at various levels for direct communication in crisis; some have remained mostly dormant, but that between Directors-General of Military Operations has been used often and (so far as is known) without being made a vehicle for manipulation or misinformation. At the end of 1988 an agreement prohibited the targeting of the other country’s nuclear facilities; this is still in force and up-to-date lists of qualifying installations were most recently exchanged in January 2005, though compliance is inherently unverifiable in peace-time and the lists have sometimes in the past been suspected of being less than complete. A very extensive agreement in 1991 provided for the exchange of information about military exercises and for constraints upon their location and conduct, as well as for reducing risk of misunderstanding about encounters between naval vessels and aircraft approaches to borders; but it is possible that neither party believes the other to have been always meticulous in observance. In 1992 the two countries jointly renounced the development, possession and use of chemical weapons. The February 1999 Lahore Agreement between Prime Ministers envisaged a wide-ranging re-invigoration of CBM effort, including a technical upgrading of communication links, notification of missile flight tests, information exchange on any accidental or unauthorised events involving nuclear weapons, and dialogue on concepts and doctrines.
The abrasive Kargil episode later in 1999 halted progress in these matters, but a desire in both governments to renew the drive has been evident since the improvement in political relations over the last two years. Progress has not been rapid, though a preliminary meeting in June 2004 took discussion forward. In early August 2005 a text was negotiated, for high-level ratification in October, on advance notification of ballistic missile flight tests, though this did not cover all missiles, as was underlined almost immediately when Pakistan announced after the event that a nuclear-capable cruise missile had been tested. The August meeting also agreed on establishing in September improved “hot-line” arrangements for risk reduction.
The ceasefire that has held since early 2004 along the Line of Control in Kashmir is formally a matter of unilateral choice by each country and not of agreement between them, but it amounts in practice to an important CBM. The two countries have recently welcomed it jointly and assured one another of intent to maintain it, and to continue monthly meetings between local commanders along the Line.
It is impracticable to enumerate in detail every step that might conceivably and usefully be taken under the “CBM” heading, especially between neighbours with so extensive and close a geographical and human interface. Broadly, however, military options might arise in the following categories –
Information Exchange. There is evident value in having each party provide to the other (or not prevent the other from reliably acquiring) information on matters that might otherwise become a source of suspicion about capabilities, intentions or risks. Present arrangements about accidents and exercises might be more fully developed or entrenched, as the missile-test agreement is about to be. Information about the nature and scale of nuclear armouries, and plans for their evolution, might be another candidate. The exchange of observers at major exercises is a further one.
Constraints on Behaviour. Existing examples include prohibitions on “buzzing” ships or on military flights (especially by combat aircraft) very close to borders. Candidates for addition might be bans on the deployment of potentially nuclear-capable weapon systems close to shared borders, or of heavy weapons close to the Line of Control.
Discussion to Improve Understanding. There will be merit in the gradual development, perhaps initially in informal settings, of conversation to deepen - especially in the field of nuclear weapons - each country’s comprehension of the other’s concepts and doctrines, as well as of thinking on such issues as safety and security, states of readiness and the strategic and tactical use of warning. (Some possible themes are surveyed in IISS Strategic Comments Vol.11 Issue [2?], March 2005.) Calm “non-crisis” professional contacts between significant authorities, whether at local or national level, can moreover have utility in themselves almost irrespective of the particular agenda.
Communication. The technical and organisational improvement of communications, as envisaged in the Lahore Agreement and already being pursued in some respects, could enhance speed, clarity, regularity and dependability. There might be a case also for coordinating and systematising all the exchanges of information required under the various particular agreements through the establishment of permanent jointly-manned centres for the purpose.
This taxonomy is not exhaustive. Some valuable possibilities might be of a quasi-negative character not easily codified – the more careful avoidance than in the past, for example, of incendiary or belligerent public rhetoric, or of the use of missile tests for either domestic or external political signalling.
Whatever specific agreements are concluded or refined, it is important that commitments and requirements be laid down adequately and unambiguously. As experience in the region has occasionally shown, if bargains leave significant gaps or room for divergent interpretation they may risk, under stress, doing more harm than good.
