In becoming nuclear-weapon powers India and Pakistan have taken on grave responsibilities for the safety and security of their growing armouries. In principle these responsibilities can be summarised simply: that while remaining dependably available for deterrence, weapons should never be discharged accidentally or without top-level authorisation; and that neither weapons nor related material, equipment or know-how should fall into the hands of irresponsible actors.
Longer-established nuclear powers learnt that meeting these objectives is a demanding task. It was successfully met throughout the Cold War. In the West (and the situation is unlikely to have been different in the Soviet Union) there were numerous mishaps involving nuclear forces and a few directly involving nuclear weapons, including even unintended release from aircraft in flight. However, there was never an accidental nuclear explosion or unauthorised seizure, and claims of many “near misses” exaggerate the nearness. Multi-layered defences against mishap were nevertheless required, and the effort had to be continuous, complex and costly.
India and Pakistan are undoubtedly taking their responsibilities seriously. For example, India maintains wide separation between the custody of weapons and the control and deployment of possible delivery vehicles; and in Pakistan some ten thousand personnel are dedicated to nuclear safeguarding. Neither country has fully revealed its plans for safety and security, but nor has any other nuclear-weapon state – reasonably enough, since unlimited public information could damage the objectives. Publics and Parliaments are however entitled to reassurance that all potential risks have been considered and sealed off as far as possible.
Relevant aspects include
weapon characteristics. At least among Western possessors, weapons have been designed so that they cannot be activated by any single individual; for the most part also, so that they can be activated only by electronic codes not held near the weapons; and so that there would be no radioactive dispersal – let alone a nuclear explosion – even if the weapon underwent severe impact in an accident;
custody of weapons and related materiel. Arrangements need to cater for accident, theft or disruption at research establishments, manufacturing facilities, storage depots and operational sites, and in transit between them, for instance in crashes or attempted hi-jackings of any mode of transport used. The effects of earthquake, fire, extreme weather or flood have to be considered. Plans must reckon with attack by spies, saboteurs, terrorists or criminals, and even by anti-nuclear protesters who, whatever their motivations, may both do damage themselves and provide cover for others more malign;
personnel security. Dangers include espionage and treachery as well as psychological instability or vulnerability to financial or other pressure;
disposal. Though South Asian disposal tasks must lie years ahead, plans will be needed for permanent deactivation and destruction or storage of sensitive equipment and material.
Absolute assurance may sometimes be unattainable, or attainable only at a cost disproportionate to the scale and likelihood of the danger. Probabilities have to be weighed, alongside costs and the scale of harm conceivable. Judgment about the level of insurance required, both objectively and to avoid public alarm, needs thorough evaluation of risk, preferably helped by independent expertise; and there needs to be provision for periodic re-evaluation, especially if new evidence emerges. Judgment is necessary also about the safety aspects of trade-offs between ideal peacetime control and effective operational security and availability in time of crisis, especially if dispersal to remote locations is envisaged.
During the Cold War Western nuclear powers, besides setting up substantial dedicated organisations, undertook regular exercises to test safety and security arrangements, both at sites and in transit. These exercises often involved agencies outside central government which might have a role in real accidents or emergencies. The exercises helped in setting standards, refining procedures and “rules of engagement”, establishing legal frameworks (for example on offences, penalties and permitted counter-action), and training personnel.
Regular audit of all the arrangements is very desirable, as independently as possible of those with line-management responsibility for normal operation (though they must remain fully answerable for safety and security). It may sometimes be feasible to assign aspects of audit to competent civilian authorities. Where problems of capacity, expertise or confidentiality make that impracticable, there is still merit in establishing within the defence community audit systems clearly distinct from mainstream management and accountable separately to higher authority.
All these tasks and concerns inescapably fall to India and Pakistan separately, whatever what the other may do. Action concerted between them might however help their discharge of the responsibilities. High-level contacts between the two governments indicate a shared will to build upon existing dialogue and cooperation. There is a long-standing agreement that neither will attack the other’s nuclear establishments, and information on these establishments is regularly exchanged. In the 1999 Lahore Memorandum of Understanding each country agreed to notify the other promptly of any accidental, unauthorised or unexplained event that might arouse fears of nuclear fall-out, and in June 2004 Foreign Ministers agreed to strengthen communications. There has however not yet been dialogue on reducing accident risks, though in February 2005 Foreign Ministers envisaged this. Such dialogue need not entail disclosing information prejudicial to national security. Beyond this, several aspects of the wider search to entrench strategic stability could reinforce safety and security.
Ideas of “nuclear risk-reduction centres” have been studied by non-governmental experts from the two countries. The 1987 US/Soviet agreement setting up such centres was of limited scope , but the concept might be further developed in the South Asian context.
India and Pakistan clearly recognise their responsibilities. Pakistan is moreover conscious that the activities of Dr. A Q Khan damaged Pakistan's international standing, with a deepened obligation to establish rigorous measures to prevent any repetition. Both countries, moreover, are bound, like all other United Nations members, by Security Council Resolution 1540 requiring states to reinforce barriers to the spread of “weapons of mass destruction”, particularly to non-state actors. India has recently introduced proposed legislation to strengthen safeguards. India and Pakistan might usefully draw upon work by other countries and groupings to formulate the wide range of action needed.
It took earlier nuclear-weapon powers many years to build up experience on safety and security. It would be in the interest of all that they should go as far as they can, within any unavoidable treaty or other legal constraints, in sharing that experience with India and Pakistan.
