The central component of global nuclear-weapon arms-control architecture is the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which only India, Pakistan and Israel among United Nations members have not acceded. It is clear that neither South Asian state will become a party; they will not reverse their 1998 emergence as overt nuclear-weapon states and join as non-nuclear-weapon states, and present parties will for several reasons not be willing to attempt the difficult task of re-opening the sensitive bargain at the heart of the Treaty in order to admit them as nuclear-weapon states. Within that basic limitation, however, India and Pakistan might judge it appropriate to do as much as they can to align themselves with the global regimes. Though they have in the past sometimes criticised elements of the regimes as excessively tilted towards serving the concerns of the recognised nuclear states, pragmatic convergence would underline politically their resolve to act as responsible nuclear-weapon possessors – particularly desirable for Pakistan in the wake of the damage done to its international standing by the activities of A Q Khan. In addition, any avoidable risks of proliferation and the instability it could cause would seem contrary to their direct interests.
Non-party states can be observers at the five-yearly NPT review conferences, and Pakistan has occasionally attended (though not since the 1998 tests). The vigour of previous Indian condemnation of the Treaty’s asymmetry may make it very unlikely that India will begin doing so, especially since attendance at the imminent May 2005 conference might facilitate unwelcome pressure upon both countries in relation to moves to widen and strengthen the inspection powers of the International Atomic Energy Authority. The two countries could however, as a follow-up to the declarations they have both already made of support for the basic concept of non-proliferation, consider undertaking publicly, in respect of the transfer of materials and know-how potentially related to weapons, to act in practice as though they were bound by the relevant provisions of the Treaty. This was the position long adopted by France before her accession in 1992.
There seems at present no likely scope for formal limitation treaties between India and Pakistan on the size or content of nuclear armouries, of the kind that operated from 1972 onwards between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War conditions of broad symmetry, mature armouries and a vigorous and expensive technological competition do not exist in South Asia, though India and Pakistan may well wish, either in parallel or in dialogue, to consider ways in which restraint in further build-up might contribute to bilateral stability (see IISS Strategic Comments, Volume 11, Issue 1, "Towards Nuclear Stability in South Asia").
Both India and Pakistan are party to the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty prohibiting nuclear explosive tests above ground, and are observing a moratorium on any further tests beyond those of 1998. Initial pressure upon them to accede formally to the 1996 Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty has been eased by the refusal – apparently certain now to be maintained at least until 2009 – of the United States ratification without which the Treaty cannot come into force. The United States, like the other NPT-recognised nuclear states, continues however to observe the general moratorium that has held now for almost a decade, and India and Pakistan will recognise that any resumption of testing would carry heavy political costs.
Proposals for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty could pose problems for India and Pakistan, depending in some degree on whether its terms bore upon existing stocks of weapon-usable material and on when further production was required to cease altogether. It is not publicly known what holdings the two countries have, or what they assess to be their future requirements for the level of weapon stocks they plan eventually to maintain. Potential difficulties in such respects do not however seem in need of urgent attention. The pursuit of an FMCT has lost some impetus in recent years, and such indications as there are of US views suggest an inclination to regard international verification as impracticable. That may make it easier for reluctant states to oppose the project as lacking merit.
Other elements of nuclear arms control include the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967), the South Pacific (Rarotonga, 1985), South-East Asia (Bangkok, 1995) and Africa (Pelindaba, 1996). Each of these has one or more protocols under which nuclear-weapon states can undertake to respect the aims of the treaties. The terms of the later three, concluded after the NPT, restrict these protocols to the NPT-recognised nuclear states, so that India and Pakistan could formally accede only to the relevant Tlatelolco protocol (if, uncertainly, that were welcome to the Treaty’s parties). Again, however, it would be possible for India and Pakistan to make political declarations of intent to conform with the substance of all the protocols. India has already done so in relation to the Treaty of Bangkok.
There are widely-accepted global treaties prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space (1967) and on the sea-bed (1971). Both countries are party to the former, but only India to the latter. It seems unlikely however that any substantive concern or intent underlies Pakistan's non-accession.
Beyond the ambit of formal treaties, there exist a number of voluntary inter-state arrangements for further constraining the export or development of equipment or materials usable for constructing or delivering nuclear weapons. These include, for example, the Missile Technology Control regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the International (Hague) Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the Proliferation Security Initiative. It may be open to question whether present memberships would agree to welcome the direct participation of states whose de facto nuclear-weapon status many continue to prefer not to acknowledge; and India and Pakistan may themselves have reservations about a few elements of the arrangements.
Once more, however, it would be open to India and Pakistan, where they are in sympathy with the purposes of the arrangements, to commit themselves to operate in conformity with the substance of the disciplines concerned, in line with the thrust of the unanimous Security Council Resolution 1540 – a resolution passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and binding upon all UN members - aimed in particular at reducing risks of leakage to non-state actors.
Any such commitments would need to be partnered in each country by ensuring that there were in place effective systems of protection and control, including any necessary legal, financial, administrative, intelligence and policing capabilities.
