The workshop opened with welcoming remarks by Dr Gary Samore, IISS Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation. This was followed by introductory presentations by Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, U.S. Special Negotiator for Biological and Chemical Arms Control Issues, and Mr Patrick Lamb, Deputy Head, Non Proliferation Department of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Ambassador Mahley and Mr Lamb spoke on the urgent need to prevent BW proliferation and discussed current diplomatic efforts in this field of endeavour. Mr Lamb also reviewed the proposals contained in the newly released UK Green Paper on alternatives to strengthen the BWC.
Mr Michael Moodie, President of CBACI, in his speech stressed the need to tailor the response to the threat. According to Mr Moodie, the challenge of BW proliferation called for measures in addition to traditional arms control, due to trends such as the convergence of terrorism and proliferation, advancing science and technology, and the growing role of the biotechnology industry. The BWC should focus on doable approaches, he said, such as the strengthening of national legislation, international cooperation, investigations of facilities, and evaluating export controls.
Mr Paul Schulte, Director Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, UK Ministry of Defence, emphasized the importance of establishing a multi-layered structure of disincentives to adequately counter the threat of BW proliferation. Speaking in a personal capacity, Schulte suggested that such a package could include international condemnation of biological weapons, setting up annual meetings of expert groups to review and report on relevant technical and scientific developments, strengthening national legislation criminalizing BW use, the creation of industry standards, enforcing an international obligation for assistance to states which have been threatened or affected by BW, and improving Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs).
The conference underscored the importance of strengthening efforts to tackle BW proliferation, even as memories of the anthrax attacks in 2001 might fade and media spotlights turn elsewhere. Issues that were addressed included the importance of engaging the biotechnology industry as well as the scientific community to hinder the spread and use of BW. Other issues discussed during the conference included the need for thinking outside the box to identify sound strategies and responses to the threat, the possible creation of a code of conduct in biotechnology, national and international disease surveillance and control, technology exchange, and prospects of creating a Convention of Physical Protection of dangerous pathogens. Finally, the participants discussed proposals for achieving progress at the upcoming BWC Review Conference in Geneva in November 2002.
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