



INTER 2005

The Gulf Dialogue
2nd ISS Regional Security Summit

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India, Japan,
Kingdom and

THE 2ND ISS
REGIONAL SECURITY
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THE GULF
DIALOGUE

Delegate Biographies
BAHRAIN, 2005

THE IISS
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APPENDICES

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Appendix I: Press Coverage of the 2005 Gulf Dialogue

The Washington Post 8 December 2005

Wolves in the Gulf: Arabs' Two Fears: The U.S. and Radical Islam

By Jim Hoagland

The wolf is no longer at the door of the wealthy Arab kingdoms and emirates of the Persian Gulf. It is now in their midst, threatening to devour these plump, slow-moving gazelles of states from inside their fragile defense lines.

That was the consensus I heard expressed by Gulf Arab leaders, intellectuals, senior military officers and national security officials who gathered here last weekend to compare notes with each other and their Western counterparts. They quickly agreed that both the severity and proximity of the existential threat they face have changed dramatically.

They could hardly do otherwise. The bomb blasts in nearby Iraq reverberated through two days of speeches and informal exchanges organized by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Regional security in the Gulf is now a daily concern to be lived and breathed, not an abstract concept left to policymakers to debate.

Even a decade or so ago, their deep (and deeply justified) distrust of each other would have prevented such a collection of Bahrainis, Kuwaitis, Omanis, Saudis, Yemenis and others from gathering to seek common ground on military and counterterrorist strategies.

They would have also been deterred by concern about reactions from Iran and Iraq, the outside predators that the smaller oil-producing states most feared then. (Iran and Iraq were represented here as well.) This greater semblance of seeking cooperation now springs from the challenge that radical Islamic groups such as al Qaeda pose to all Arab governments. Traditional balance-of-power strategies to import security through bilateral agreements with outside protectors have been upended by three decades of revolution, conventional wars and the lengthening reach of organized terrorism in the Gulf.

Differences remain among and within the states that gathered here -- and those differences may have been exacerbated by the conflicting, at times confrontational, advice they heard from high-ranking U.S., French and British envoys. Those stunningly discordant Western views are the subject for another day.

The more immediate and important divide was over the nature and identity of the new wolf that the Gulf Arabs see stalking the region.

Government representatives described Islamic-inspired terrorist networks as the urgent threat to citizens and to stability -- and then put forward some fresh ideas on what Muslims themselves must do to defeat the terrorists. Those suggestions constituted the originality and the promise of this conclave.

"The terrorists have instrumentalized religion for their illegal purposes," Sheik Sabah Khalid Hamad Sabah, Kuwait's national security adviser, told those gathered. "We now face a multinational terrorist threat that is no longer isolated geographically or organized in small secret cells." He then outlined a six-point plan that emphasized the need for a balance of tolerance in Muslim countries as well as a balance of power in military terms.

The keys to achieving tolerance and social peace, Sabah said, will include curbing hate speech through the training of Islamic clerics who preach in mosques, barring charities from contributing to terrorist groups and "deepening democratic practices, including greater participation by women" in government and the economy. He called this "the Middle Way" in Islam and urged other countries to adopt the Kuwaiti program.

Muslim nations have for too long shied away from openly talking about the need to wage, and win, a spiritual battle within Islam. The willingness of a member of Kuwait's ruling family to do just that in proceedings that were televised on Bahrain's national television is a step forward.

But Arab academics suggested that the most threatening sources of destabilization lay elsewhere. They identified U.S. mishandling of the war on terrorism and the large American combat presence in Iraq as the new and urgent security problems confronting the region.

"The U.S. image is not what it was," observed Abdullah Shayji, a professor at Kuwait University. He cited reports of secret American prisons for torture abroad, the Abu Ghraib scandal and U.S. military actions in Iraq that he asserted "have made people in

the region feel less secure. You should be setting the example" if you are going to preach about democracy and freedom, he added.

It is tempting for an American to focus exclusively on the promising emphasis on moderation within Islam that emerged from the Bahrain meeting, and to argue that the U.S. intervention and military presence in Iraq have contributed in important ways to bringing that about.

But the troubling concerns of Shayji and others that even a well-meaning wolf can be a dangerous and destructive partner need to be taken into account as well. The Bush White House has, in fact, paid too little attention to the example its actions and words set abroad.

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The Washington Post 11 December 2005

The Mideast's Battle of Ideas

By Jim Hoagland

BAHRAIN – East is East and West inalterably West, Rudyard Kipling maintained. But the international gathering held on this Persian Gulf island last week-end suggested that today East is increasingly West, the West is less and the twain do meet in a Middle East that is up for grabs.

This contemporary East is dominated by China and India. West means Britain, France and the United States. And the Middle East is a battle zone of ideas, religions, oil and a cultural use of tribal violence that is now projected onto the global stage.

But increased interdependence – whether forged by trade or by mutual bloodshed – does not a unified globe make. Disconnects and divergences were on display from the moment the two-day conference on security and terrorism in the Gulf region began.

Lavishly robed Arab leaders listened with disciplined courtesy as a trim, intense American woman perhaps half the age of some in the audience crisply framed the need for "robust information sharing" and the adoption of "best practices standards" in cargo screening, financial controls and other tools of law enforcement to defeat "transnational terrorism."

Speaking was Frances Fragos Townsend, White House adviser on homeland security and counterterrorism. Listening were princes, sheiks, assistant emirs and various nabobs from the Arab side of the Gulf.

Many of them wore gold-braided headdresses or elaborately wrapped turbans and wispy beards that denote authority – unquestionable, undemocratic authority – in the traditional societies they rule in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere.

Looks of puzzlement spread across some faces as Townsend urged the autocrats to embrace "the ideology of reform" that will make "freedom, democracy and human rights . . . the future of the Gulf region." That is, a future that would sideline most of this audience.

When Arabs spoke, most of them focused instead on what America should do: Help jail or eliminate the violent extremists of the al Qaeda network. Grant more visas for their citizens to study in the United States. Pressure Israel to grant concessions to the Palestinians. "American ears are not open to what we are saying," a Saudi general protested.

These complaints triggered the brisk articulation and the dramatically earnest entreaties that have won Townsend the respect and the ear of President Bush, whom she briefs almost daily.

Bush recognizes that a post-Sept. 11 drop in visas for Arab students and others is "a national security problem" that requires increased resources, Townsend said. Homeland Security Department staffers are being posted to Saudi Arabia to speed visa processing, she offered.

And she noted that the audience had missed the emphasis she placed on Palestine – including her view that Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority is "the best hope for peace" in upcoming Palestinian elections. "This is not typical" of a U.S. speech on terrorism, she accurately added. Her listeners agreed. For them, she had just inadvertently blurted out the heart of the problem.

France's defense minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, astonishingly did the same thing. She told the Arabs not to let the Gulf be "an exclusive preserve of the United States" and waved off an Arab official's suggestion that NATO play a greater military role in the region.

The European Union is forming a "battle group" of 1,500 troops that can be deployed within 15 days for "crisis stabilization," she trumpeted. Alliot-Marie also pushed bilateral security accords that would increase French arms sales to the Persian Gulf as an answer to terrorism, in contrast to Townsend's call for reform.

"In a crisis we won't need 1,500 troops, we will need tens of thousands," responded a Qatari sheik. "You seem to want the Europeans to cooperate with

everyone except the Americans," added a British participant.

British Defense Minister John Reid's subtle and effective speech defies easy summation here. He alone gave no appearance of lecturing his audience – even while advancing the case for greater British influence through the Arab League and London's traditional clients in the region. "Regional Arab involvement is part of the solution" in Iraq, he asserted against much contrary evidence.

The special envoys from China and India who addressed the gathering underlined their nations' separate bids to become manufacturing, financial and information powers on a par with the developed nations of North America and Europe. If a surplus of American-style optimism about the future exists anywhere on the globe today, it is in these emerging Asian powers.

Margaret Thatcher, a Kipling admirer no doubt, was given to talking on occasion about this being "a crazy old world." Had she come to Bahrain, she might have concluded that it is a crazy new world we inhabit.

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FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung 8 December 2005

Iraq and Iran: The Arabian Gulf States Face New Dangers

By Günther Nonnenmacher

MANAMA, Early December – The Persian Gulf is the oil barrel of the world. It was a powder keg of international politics well before the successful US and British-led campaign against Iraq, a country whose only access to the sea is along a short stretch of coast to the South-East. This region acts as a link between the wider Middle East and Central Asia; it is the place where the Arab world and Persian culture meet, and where the confrontation between two great Islamic movements, Sunni and Shia, is most acute. It is a region where small traditionalist states and mini-states are confronted with large neighbours striving for supremacy, and it has always been threatened by crisis and conflict.

Since 1979, when the Shah was toppled and the Islamic Republic of Iran was established, the eastern coast of the Persian Gulf has become the main outlet for the export of the Islamic Revolution. In the 1980s, Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the mullah regime in Teheran fought for control of the Gulf region. When Saddam invaded the oil-rich state of Kuwait in 1990, the international community intervened under the military leadership of the United States in order to restore international law and prevent further destabilization of the region. Following the second US-British intervention in March 2003 – this time without the approval of the United Nations – and the fall of Saddam, Iraq became a focal point for terrorism, whereby local "resistance" against the US and British occupiers and the struggle by international jihadists against the Western "crusaders" merged and grew in strength.

The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman) felt threatened by this development. Despite their wealth, they have neither the military means nor – with the exception of Saudi Arabia – the strategic infrastructure that would enable them to defend themselves. For the second time round, the famous International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London was able to organize a second "Gulf Dialogue" in Bahrain, which was attended by all of the Gulf states – in an unofficial, virtually neutral, setting – to discuss the security issues affecting their region with each other – or at least in each other's company.

The most urgent problem at the time was the internal situation in Iraq. The greatest danger was presented by a massive spillover of terrorism into the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Saudi Arabia had already experienced this development. On the other hand, a Western-style democracy in Iraq would threaten the dynastic legitimacy of the conservative Arab families of the Gulf, who have ruled for centuries and have only recently enacted reforms from above in their countries (tentative parliamentary reforms; in some states, such as Kuwait, women's suffrage). However, Iraq's representatives attempted to instill confidence in their emerging democracy: Sunni political parties will also participate in the elections on 15 December, making the new government more representative. Most notably, for the first time, this government has a mandate of four full years, which will lead to greater stability and continuity.

However, the possibility of Iraq moving in the direction of an Islamic Republic ruled by a Shiite majority presents a danger for the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which are ruled by Sunni dynasties with their (sometimes large) Shiite populations (in Bahrain, Shiites have a 70% majority).

However, the worst-case scenario (not mentioned in public) would involve splitting Iraq into three parts, with a Shiite Islamic Republic in the South that would ally with Iran. At the end of day, nothing that happens in Iraq can fail to entail some risk for the ruling monarchs of the Gulf region.

Those attending the conference were approached by Iranians with an offer to make the Gulf region a nuclear-free zone. The Gulf Cooperation Council had put forward this proposal days earlier, fearing that the region could find itself sandwiched between an Iran armed with nuclear weapons and Israel, an undeclared nuclear power. Iran's proposal must be dismissed as pure propaganda, since Teheran does not provide the world with any satisfactory information on its nuclear programme. With regard to resuming talks with Europe, Deputy Foreign Minister Bageri had nothing new to say. The question of whether Teheran could imagine opening talks with Washington brought the curt reply: not at present.

Iran's proposals were to establish joint institutions involving all the countries in the Gulf region to promote economic development and prevent or resolve ethnic and religious conflict by fostering mutual respect. Further proposals involved an organization for collective security. One condition for all this would be the removal of all foreign troops from the region and all outside interference in its affairs. Their strategy is clear: with this blueprint for the future, and with their demand to be included in the Gulf Cooperation Council's discussions, the Iranians are strengthening their claim to regional supremacy. That this can no longer be disputed by Iraq, which has been weakened for years to come, is a source of uneasiness for the other Gulf states. Sure enough, the Iraqi response to the Iranian proposals was markedly polite and even friendly, in stark contrast to the American participants. Despite attempts by Washington to re-establish contact with representatives of the Iranian regime, a White House envoy – directing her remarks at Teheran – spoke of “rogue states” that finance terror and strive to acquire nuclear weapons.

The Iranian blueprint for the future is aimed against America: the United States (together with the British, whose post-colonial influence is still clearly felt) ensures a balance of power that the region itself cannot provide. Above all, however, they are the protectors of the small Gulf states. Military cooperation on the Gulf Cooperation Council has never gone further than the proposal stage. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, all the states rely on bilateral military agreements with Washington. They provide support for US naval and air forces, and there is a strong US presence in almost all the countries. This provides

a security guarantee, but also a security problem, given the prevalence of anti-American feeling among the population.

The Saudi Arabian representatives expressed their criticism of the United States openly and in dramatic terms: propagating an “Iraqi model” for the region was naïve. The “War on Terrorism” was accompanied by a campaign to distort or disparage Arab civilization and Islam. While it seems irrefutable that the Gulf Cooperation Council states cannot solve their security problems without Washington, they would prefer to render the US soldiers invisible. Here, too, no solution is without risks.

What role do the Europeans play in the Gulf region, apart from the traditional presence of the British, who sent Defence Minister Reid to the conference? French Defence Minister Alliot-Marie reaffirmed her demand that the European Union assert itself in the Gulf and not leave the region to the Americans as its “chasse gardée.” She pointed warmly to the policy of reconciling old enemies in Europe as a model for the Gulf and cited the development of EU rapid reaction forces, which can deploy 1,500 soldiers within fifteen days, as a practical military solution. Qatar's foreign minister replied dryly that, in this part of the world, 10,000 soldiers can be deployed in just fifteen hours in a crisis. That said it all.

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Le Figaro 6 December 2005

Alliot-Marie extols European defense systems in Bahrain and Qatar

EVEN when all ambitions with regard to geopolitics and energy are taken into account, there should not be a “hands off” attitude to security. This is the substance of the message that Michèle Alliot-Marie delivered in the Gulf this weekend. The French Minister of Defence is in Bahrain to attend a conference on security in the Gulf, organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. She called for the establishment of a strong and viable strategic relationship between Europe and the countries of the region.

Which avenues should be explored? To start off with, a face to face dialogue is needed. This requires that the countries of the region, which have already come together in the rather ineffectual Gulf Cooperation Council, should equip themselves with a viable regional security architecture.

This development is complicated by the occasionally problematic relationships and imbalance between large countries with 18 million inhabitants and micro-states such as Bahrain and Qatar. The French minister cited, for instance, the example of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which could serve as a reference with regard to introducing confidence building measures at regional level. The second example produced by Michèle Alliot-Marie related to the new rapid reaction mechanisms now available to the European defence forces, the project having been realised within a space of three years. The Union is going to be able to deploy 1,500 men in under a fortnight, or to assign the new European Police Force to areas torn between peace and war. Speaking before of a gathering of top officials and experts from around the world – Americans, Europeans, Chinese, Iranians and Iraqis – Michèle Alliot-Marie announced her belief that the time has come, not, of course, to question the American presence in the Gulf, but to ask whether France and Europe should not, for all that, take cognisance of their well-received overtures.

Finally, the minister proposed looking at tried and tested mechanisms for regional cooperation, such as Recamp, a French initiative for providing military assistance to African countries, which is in the process of being applied at a European level. Another example would be the dialogue about security in the Eastern Mediterranean, called 5 + 5, which links the countries of Southern Europe with North African countries. Within the Minister's entourage, confirmation was forthcoming that her overtures had been well received both by the Gulf authorities and the British Minister of Defence, John Reid, who was present in Bahrain.

During her visit to Qatar, Michèle Alliot-Marie found herself on more familiar territory. This tiny emirate has been favoured by fortune – it owns the third largest gas reserves in the world and has long enjoyed a special relationship with France, which enables it to limit its strategic dependence on America. So, they share a common point of view, but, for the moment, there are not many large arms contracts to promote. Like its neighbours, Qatar, whose military equipment is 80% French – is concentrating on its internal security due to the terrorist threat. The discussions in Bahrain have shown that the Gulf monarchs are very concerned about Iran's regional

ambitions. An appeal to denuclearise the region was launched on this occasion.

Competition from NATO

A few hours prior to Michèle Alliot-Marie's appeal to the countries of the Gulf, the NATO Secretary General was doing the same thing. Last Thursday, at a conference on “NATO's Role in Gulf Security” in Qatar, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer called for greater cooperation between the Atlantic Alliance and the Gulf states in the struggle against terrorism. The NATO Secretary General stressed that the Istanbul Initiative offered “a range of instruments for practical cooperation in the defence and security field”. Four countries, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, are taking part in the Istanbul Initiative, which was launched in June 2004, to strengthen links between NATO and the Arab countries. A. L.-G.

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Gulf Daily News 5 December 2005

Forum ‘a boost for security’

BRITAIN yesterday said an international defence conference held in Bahrain could further strengthen security in the region.

British Secretary of State for Defence John Reid said the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) Gulf Dialogue conference was a vital opportunity to develop co-ordination on security issues.

He was among the ministers and security officials taking part in the conference, which concluded at the Ritz-Carlton Bahrain Hotel and Spa yesterday.

“I sincerely hope that the momentum from this conference will drive forward the positive work already underway and strengthen security throughout the region,” said Mr Reid.

“It is only by building understanding and common ground that solutions can be found to the security challenges facing the Middle East.”

Mr Reid commended Bahrain for hosting the conference, which he said was a vital opportunity to develop co-ordination on security issues.

“It has been immensely useful to have met His Majesty King Hamad, Crown Prince and BDF Commander-in-Chief Sheikh Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa and Defence Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa,” he said.

The three-day event brought together defence, interior and national security officials, as well as scholars and academicians from the GCC, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Singapore, France, Russia, the UK and the US.

Joining them for the first time this year were China, India and Germany.

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Gulf Daily News

5 December 2005

Envoy lambasts terror backers

By Soman Baby

COUNTRIES which harbour or sponsor terrorists must be brought to book, a top Indian official declared in Bahrain yesterday.

Security in Iraq and this region is also a global issue, said Indian Prime Minister's Special Envoy to the Middle East C R Gharekhan.

He was speaking on Regional Security and International Co-operation at the second Gulf Security Conference in Bahrain.

The three-day conference, which ended yesterday, was organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) at the Ritz Carlton Bahrain Hotel and Spa.

The over-riding preoccupation of the international community in recent years has been with the emergence of terrorism as a global phenomenon, said Mr Gharekhan.

"India has been no stranger to this menace, and has been a victim of terrorism for much longer than other countries," he said.

"Recently about two weeks ago, an Indian citizen, who was engaged in helping the people of Afghanistan in building its roads, was brutally murdered by the Taliban."

Recent events in Iraq have brought home the fact that a politically unstable area can become the spawning ground of terrorists, said Mr Gharekhan.

"Linkages with illicit trafficking in narcotics, as well as in small arms have enhanced the destructive potential and lethal reach of the terrorists," he noted.

"The fight against terrorism has to be long-term, sustained and comprehensive. It cannot be adhoc,

selective or compartmentalised in terms of region or religion.

"No terrorist network can sustain itself without a safe haven and without external support."

Mr Gharekhan talked about India's support to the people of Iraq and Palestine.

"We strongly support the right of the Iraqi people to freely determine their political future and control their natural resources," he added.

"We are confident that the forthcoming elections on December 15 will see the involvement of all the people of Iraq, leading to the formation of a truly representative government."

As for the Palestinian issue, support for the Palestinian cause has been a central feature of India's foreign policy since even before India achieved independence in 1947, said Mr Gharekhan.

"We believe that there can be no military solution to the Palestinian issue," he noted.

"India has welcomed the Gaza disengagement and hopes that it will lead to a resumption of the peace process."

The security and stability of the Gulf region as well as the wider Middle East is of paramount concern to India, said Mr Gharekhan.

"As such, we are ready to contribute to the security and stability of this region in any manner feasible," he added.

"We could identify areas for co-operation, like sharing our experiences and expertise in combating terrorism, maritime security and military training."

Mr Gharekhan endorsed the views expressed by Bahrain's Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa in his speech on Friday at the conference, that the many challenges facing the region and by extension the world, cannot be solved by any one country.

"I endorse his call for a strong, co-operative and complimentary web of international links as the best long-term guarantee of regional security and stability," he affirmed.

"India is willing and able to participate in this co-operative endeavour."

The Indian delegation to the conference included New Delhi-based National Security Council Secretariat deputy director Kapil Kaul as well as Indian Ambassador Balkrishna Shetty.

Defence, interior and national security ministers, security advisers, scholars and academics from the GCC, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Singapore, France, Russia, the UK and the US were among those taking part in the conference. China, India and Germany joined them for the first time.

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Al Jazeera

4 December 2005

Qatar urges unity to fight terrorism

Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabor Al Thani, Qatar's foreign minister, has called on Gulf Cooperation Countries to do more in their fight against terrorism-tainted extremism.

Addressing the second session of the Gulf Security Dialogue forum in Bahrain on Saturday, Sheikh Hamad, also the first deputy prime minister, said: "GCC countries, which have generally scored successes on the security level ... may still have a long way to go."

These countries, he said, had to take into account the delicate regional and international balance on the one hand and the internal security front on the other.

He noted that "energy security, for instance, cannot be viewed in isolation of an overall security strategy".

Globalisation

"One cannot overlook the fact that the Arabian Gulf is the passageway for about half the global oil output," the minister said, adding that such a fact made Gulf security a vital interest to other countries, especially the United States.

Gulf security should be the responsibility of its nationals and would depend on mutual confidence-building and self-reliance, he said.

"In reality, however, the international challenges and developments can hardly be overlooked, while globalisation is broadening its scope to cover various economic, financial, social, cultural and political patterns," Sheikh Hamad said.

Increasingly, he said, globalisation is becoming "a matter of fact and a 'de facto' that we have to acknowledge and deal with".

"The concept of security should not, therefore, be viewed from a purely regional perspective, because such a perspective would never give the right picture."

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Appendix II: Selected IISS Publications

Survival, the Institute's quarterly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs. Recent articles of interest include:

FITZPATRICK, MARK. 'Iran and North Korea: The Proliferation Nexus'. *Survival*, vol. 48, no. 1, Spring 2006.

SAID, YAHIA. 'Iraq in the Shadow of Civil War'. *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 4, Winter 2005–06, pp. 85–92.

HENDRICKSON, DAVID AND ROBERT W. TUCKER. 'Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War'. *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 7–32.

SYNOTT, HILARY. 'State-building in Southern Iraq'. *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 33–56.

GORDON, PHILIP H. 'Trading Places: America and Europe in the Middle East'. *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 101–30.

GHEISSARI, ALI AND NASR, VALI. 'The Conservative Consolidation in Iran'. *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 175–90.

BYMAN, DANIEL. 'Five Bad Options for Iraq'. *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 7–32.

KÉCHICHIAN, JOSEPH A. 'Review Article: What's Wrong with the Arab World?'. *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 173–78.

TAKEYH, RAY. 'Iran Builds the Bomb'. *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 2004–05, pp. 51–64.

BAR-JOSEPH, URI. 'The Paradox of Israeli Power'. *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 2004–05, pp. 137–56.

JONES, SETH G. AND K. JACK RILEY. 'Law and Order in Palestine'. *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 2004–05, pp. 157–78.

DODGE, TOBY. 'A Sovereign Iraq?'. *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 39–58.

OTTOLENGHI, EMANUELE. 'Why Palestinians and Israelis Are Not Ready for Peace'. *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 41–54.

RYNHOLD, JONATHAN. 'Israel's Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours?'. *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 55–76.

TAKEYH, RAY. 'Iran: From Reform to Revolution?'. *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 131–44.

The *Adelphi Papers* monograph series is the Institute's principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research. Recent publications include:

VALENCIA, MARK J. *The Proliferation Security Initiative: Making Waves in Asia*. Adelphi Paper 376. Routledge for the IISS, 2005.

PARK, BILL. *Turkey's Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives*. Adelphi Paper 374. Routledge for the IISS, 2005.

DODGE, TOBY. *Iraq's Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change*. Adelphi Paper 372. Routledge for the IISS, 2005.

PERTHES, VOLKER. *Syria under Bashar Al-Asad: Modernisation and the Limits of Change*. Adelphi Paper 366. Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2004.

DODGE, TOBY AND STEVE SIMON. *Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change*. Adelphi Paper 354. Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2003.

CHUBIN, SHAHRAM. *Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security*. Adelphi Paper 342. Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2002.

PETERSON, J.E. *Saudi Arabia and the Illusion of Security*. Adelphi Paper 348. Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2002.

IISS Strategic Dossier

Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment. Routledge for the IISS, 2005.

Strategic Comments is the Institute's online source of analysis of international security and politico-military issues. Recent articles of interest include:

'Israel and Palestine – Politics in Flux', *Strategic Comments*, vol. 11, no. 10, December 2005.

'The GCC and Gulf Security – Still Looking to America', *Strategic Comments*, vol. 11, no. 9, November 2005.

'Syria under Siege – Bashar's Greatest Test', *Strategic Comments*, vol. 11, no. 9, November 2005.

'Iraq after the Referendum – Electoral Portents', *Strategic Comments*, vol. 11, no. 8, October 2005.

'The Iranian Nuclear Impasse: UN Security Council Pptions'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 11, no. 8, October 2005.

'Iran and its Neighbours – Reactions to Tehran's Nuclear Programme'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 11, no. 6, August 2005.

'Political Reform in the Middle East – Structural Impediments'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 11, no. 5, July 2005.

'Iran's Presidential Election – Ahmadinejad's Landslide'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 11, no. 5 July 2005.

'Taming Hizbullah – Prospects for Normalisation in Lebanon'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 11, no. 4, June 2005.

'Iran's Terrorist Sponsorship – Winding Down?' *Strategic Comments*, vol. 11, no. 2, March 2005.

'Lessons from the Iraqi Insurgency – Gauging the US Response'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 11, no. 1, February 2005.

'Sea-change in Israel and Palestine – Arafat's Death, Sharon's "Transformation"'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 10, no. 10, December 2004.

'Iran's Nuclear Programme – Suspended Animation'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 10, no. 9, November 2004.

'Elections in Iraq – A Crucial Test'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 10, no. 9, November 2004.

'Syria and Lebanon – Damascus Tightens its Grip'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 10, no. 8, October 2004.

'Syrian Priorities in Iraq – Pursuing Opportunities, Hedging against Risks'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 10, no. 7, September 2004.

'Turkey Eyes the Middle East – Strategic Realignment'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 10, no. 6, August 2004.

'Iran Contemplates Iraq – Sponsor, Spoiler – or a Bit of Both?' *Strategic Comments*, vol. 10, no. 5, July 2004.

'The Hamas Factor – Counter-terrorism and Israel's Gaza Withdrawal'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 10, no. 4, June 2004.

'The Greater Middle East Initiative – Implementing a Vision'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 10, no. 2, March 2004.

'Iraq's Constitution – Breakthrough Overshadowed by Violence'. *Strategic Comments*, vol. 10, no. 1, March 2004.

Strategic Survey is the Institute's annual review – and, to a lesser degree, projection – of strategic developments throughout the world. Recent sections of interest include:

'Iraq: Quagmire or Opportunity'. *Strategic Survey* 2004/5, pp. 180–190.

'Iran: Ongoing Crisis'. *Strategic Survey* 2004/5, pp. 191–205.

'Saudi Arabia's Evolutionary Change'. *Strategic Survey* 2004/5, pp. 206–219.

'Tipping Point in the Middle East'. *Strategic Survey* 2004/5, pp. 220–230.

'The Iraq War's Messy Aftermath'. *Strategic Survey* 2003/4, pp. 162–71.

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The Military Balance is the Institute's annual assessment of military capabilities and defence economics worldwide. Region-by-region analyses cover the major military and economic trends and developments affecting security policy and the trade in weapons and other military equipment. Comprehensive tables portray key data on weapons and defence economics. Defence expenditure trends over a 10 year period are also shown.

The Military Balance 2005–2006. Routledge for the IISS, 2005. An Arabic version is available from the Gulf Research Center, Dubai.

Appendix III: The First IISS Gulf Security Conference: The Gulf Dialogue

Bahrain, 3–5 December 2004

The rationale for the Gulf Dialogue was articulated most eloquently and powerfully by the backdrop against which it was convened: an intensifying insurgency in Iraq, with elections scheduled for January 2005; a crisis over Iran's nuclear programme, put into temporary abeyance by a deal reached in late November between Tehran, London, Paris and Berlin; the death of Yasser Arafat and the prospect of elections for a new Palestinian leader; and, at the close of the conference, terror attacks in Saudi Arabia that further underlined the prevalence of threats to Gulf security. Many of the diplomatic, military and intelligence practitioners whose decisions bear directly on these matters, and a good number of the opinion-formers who help governments to frame policies towards them, were present in Bahrain.

It was with this in mind that Sheikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Bahrain's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, noted in his welcoming dinner address that the Gulf Dialogue represented a 'unique opportunity for open debate and private discussion'. Drawing on the Bahraini saying 'we all live around the same courtyard', he stressed the importance of developing regional institutions, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in pursuing common interests and fending off common threats that included, but were not limited to, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Gulf Dialogue, too, he hoped, had its part to play in the formation of a durable regional security structure.

But security and stability, he cautioned, would also require nimble and adaptive policies at home. Diversifying economies away from an over-reliance on energy sectors would be key to sustaining the prosperity on which social ease largely depended. Stability would be further enhanced through more inclusive and consultative political systems. Bahrain had been a pioneer in this last regard. Yet the Gulf consisted of 'young states and old civilisations', which needed to move towards reform at a pace consistent with individual local conditions; nor should change be imposed from outside. Turning to the wider strategic dimension of Gulf security, he stressed the primary importance of a stable Iraq, but also looked to allies in the West for 'a more balanced approach' towards the Israeli–Palestinian dispute – the cause of much animus and militancy in the region. Terrorism was so pernicious, he concluded, not only because of

the risks posed to physical security, but because of its tendency to fuel a climate of distrust that led to 'barriers of perception'.

Commenting on these remarks in his capacity as leader of a US Congressional Delegation – also including Senators Dianne Feinstein and Lincoln Chafee – that had come to Bahrain fresh from high-level meetings in Rahmallah, Tel Aviv, Amman and Baghdad, Senator Chuck Hagel spoke of a moment of 'historic and dramatic possibilities' for Iraq and the wider region. If it was not to be squandered, more committed and visionary leadership from the US and the Gulf states would be required. The IISS Gulf Dialogue, he said, was 'part of recommitting to a sense of urgency' about these matters. 'As mighty as America is', he went on, 'we cannot field enough armies to deal with these problems', and a 'new sense of diplomacy' was required.

Formally opening the conference, which he described as an exercise in the promotion of collective security, Sheikh Salman Bin Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, Bahrain's Crown Prince and the Commander-in-Chief of its defence forces, talked fluently about the tactical and strategic dimensions of the counter-terrorism campaign. Tactically, for example, the manpower of the terrorist networks would have to be captured or killed; strategically, it was vital to prevent further recruitment of terrorists through the resolution of political conflicts that spawn radicalism. It was just as important, in religious terms, that 'outcasts' should not be allowed to 'define what it is to be a Muslim': extremism would have to be combated through the active advancement of a positive 'counter-idea'.

In weighing up the magnitude of the threat of international terrorism, he assessed that it was in its potential destructive implications less severe than the Cold War, which was defined by a raw sense of nuclear antagonism. Yet terrorism tended to provoke a fear that that was all too much in evidence, and which needed to be controlled if it was not to lead to rash action and poor policy. Following his speech, the Crown Prince entered into a lively debate regarding Bahrain's strategy for economic modernisation and political reform; the Israeli–Palestinian dispute and what the Gulf states have to contribute to an eventual solution; and on whether and in what circumstances terrorists ought to be engaged in a dialogue.

The first two plenaries in effect took the form of a discussion between officials from within and outside the Gulf on the practical and political dimensions of the campaign against terrorism. Major-General Dr Rashad Muhammad Al-Alimi, the Interior Minister of Yemen, argued that his country's experiences in this regard had broad applicability, combining domestic law-enforcement and fulsome participation in international anti-terrorism efforts with preventative measures to reintegrate into society and the political system jihadist elements who had, perhaps, fought the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and were prone to sympathise with other radical causes.

Iraq's National Security Advisor, Dr Kassim Daoud, turned his attention to the importance of fostering consultative democracy in efforts to stamp out the Iraqi insurgency. In the debate that followed, he gave a detailed account of technical preparations for January's elections, arguing that there were no practical grounds, nor any legal justifications, for further delay to a timetable that was well established and formally prescribed. He described the security situation inside Iraq by noting that 15 of 18 provinces were essentially stable, and went on to comment on the steady progress being made by Iraq's own security forces. Some of Daoud's conclusions were challenged in a spirited way by another Iraqi present at the conference, but the National Security Adviser welcomed the fact that it was now possible for a minister of state to be held to account by a private Iraqi citizen in such a public manner.

Singapore, as a country that has been a target of the al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiah, has evolved a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister and Co-ordinating Minister for Security and Defence, argued that this strategy was in all its specifics not necessarily applicable to the precise circumstances of the Gulf, but in setting it out he felt it did provide a useful example of the scope and forms of collective and individual action which might be contemplated by Gulf states. Domestically, Singapore's strategy involved capacity-building and the facilitation of interagency coordination. Abroad, it comprised multilateral cooperation on maritime security, intelligence exchanges and data collection, and a dialogue between law-enforcement and police agencies throughout Southeast Asia.

A British perspective was provided by Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat of the UK Cabinet Office. British counter-terrorism policy, he said, was guided by the need to pursue terrorist at the operational level; protect the

homeland, for example through enhancing aviation security; prepare for the consequences of possible attacks; and prevent the rise of new generation of terrorists by addressing terrorism's underlying causes.

Stephen Hadley, US National Security Advisor-designate, characterised US policy towards the region as both practical and idealistic. Its immediate focus would be to confront terrorists and the states that support them; its long-term objective was to advance freedom and democracy. The lack of participatory and accountable government was linked to poverty and at the heart of many of the region's problems. The difficulties of the Middle East, moreover, were the result of faulty policies rather than an inevitable product of cultural and religious impulses and traits. A striking political transformation was now being achieved in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Hadley dwelt at length on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, reaffirming Washington's commitment to a two-state solution, and stressing that it stood ready, along with the EU and multilateral financial institutions, to work with a reforming and accountable Palestinian leadership. Israel would have to support the emergence of a viable Palestinian state. Hadley noted that the Gaza pullout amounted to an important 'down-payment' on that prospect. Yet Israel also needed to help by facilitating the forthcoming Palestinian elections, ensuring greater freedom of movement and ceasing further settlement activity in the occupied territories. In his concluding remarks, Hadley said in referring to the Gulf Dialogue: 'I hope it becomes a permanent feature of the regional scene'.

The conference then divided into three simultaneous break-out groups. The first focused on regional border controls and produced a lively and constructive discussion, chaired by Ellen Laipson, President and CEO of The Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington DC. The discussion embraced a diverse range of issues, including technical considerations, trade-offs between security and commerce, and the social dimensions of counter-terrorism policy. There was a consensus that while formal boundary disputes in the Gulf had been substantially resolved, enforcing borders remained a serious problem. Some national officials aspired to 'total security', including robust post-entry monitoring and inter-governmental data-sharing, in the GCC. Discussants also cautioned that the GCC was not amenable to a European Union-type solution of open internal borders, especially because common tribal areas often traversed legal borders, rendering their strict enforcement all the more important. Border security enforcement, it was noted, would be eased by more effective economic policies that kept populations

relatively sedentary. Nevertheless, officials from the region acknowledged that physical restrictions were only a single limited ingredient of counter-terrorism, given the recruiting function that the internet and indigenous groupings performed. Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa region were identified as sources of terrorists, and several proactive remedies were put forward for stopping them. These included the use of more advanced monitoring and tracking technology; improved training for border troops; and close military and law-enforcement coordination among GCC countries. The need to secure Iraq's border, especially jihadist infiltration routes from Syria, drew comment.

But Iran's border challenges emerged as arguably the most acute in the region, in light of the large number of countries that are contiguous with it and their lack of political stability.

The second break-out group, on counter-proliferation challenges, was chaired by Thérèse Delpech, IISS Council Member and Senior Research Fellow at the Center for International Studies in Paris. Presentations were made by William Ehrman, Chairman of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee; Ambassador Hossein Mousavian, Foreign Policy Chairman of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran; Senator Robert Hill, Australian Minister for Defence; and Shigeru Nakamura, Director General of the Intelligence and Analysis Service of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Much of the discussion focused on efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, especially negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 scheduled to begin in mid-December 2004. This included an exploration of different potential 'objective guarantees' that might serve to demonstrate that Iran's nuclear programme was intended for purely peaceful purposes, and a consideration of how regional security discussions and arrangements could be part of a final diplomatic agreement. In addition, the group discussed broader measures to combat proliferation, including the importance of effective domestic controls over sensitive materials and equipment, and proposals to strengthen international norms and treaties to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery vehicles. An issue of particular importance discussed by the group was the danger that non-state actors might seek to acquire and use biological weapons.

The challenges of dealing with terrorism and insurgency, particularly in Iraq, dominated a break-out group on 'Military Trends and New Security Threats'. The session was chaired by General Sir Michael Walker, Chief of the UK Defence Staff, and included among its speakers General John Abizaid,

Commander of US Central Command; Iraqi National Security Advisor Dr Kassim Daoud; Admiral Bernard Merveilleux du Vignaux, of the General Staff Headquarters of France; and Major General Mike Hindmarsh, Special Operations Commander of the Australian defence forces.

While approaches to counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency were the primary topic, other regional threats such as nuclear proliferation were also mentioned. Armed forces were adjusting themselves to deal with new, globalised threats. The need for good intelligence, and for coordination at every level in both the gathering and sharing of information, was stressed by several delegates. It was stated that intelligence on Iraqi insurgents had improved considerably since the end of the combat phase of the war in April 2003, but that there was still room for improvement.

The nature and strategy of the Iraqi insurgency was debated. Several delegates believed the media was giving an unbalanced – even a distorted – picture of Iraq, and regional media in particular were not adequately portraying the true nature of the insurgents. One delegate referred to a 'huge disconnect' between media coverage and reality. A further strong theme of the discussion was that coalition military presence, and denial of 'safe haven' to insurgents, were not sufficient to bring stability to troubled countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. It was important that national security forces were able to assume control for elections to be successful and for domestic political resolutions to be reached. The outside world needed to provide not just military support, but political, economic and other civil assistance. A European delegate expressed the view that a strong US role was required to bring stability to the world's crises, because America's partners could not by themselves 'keep the lid on the cooking pot'.

The third plenary, which was introduced by Sheikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, considered the impact of political and economic reform on Gulf security. In his presentation, Yousuf bin Alawi bin Abdulla, the Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs of Oman, concentrated exclusively on the contribution of economic policy to stability. Extremism and terrorism, he felt, would best be fought through economic development and increased prosperity. Deeper and wider trade relations with powers outside the region would be crucial to this effort. The Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabber Al Thani, argued that neglect of economic and political reform would present the region with major challenges. Change should not be imposed from outside, he said,

but driven organically by conviction and consensus. While this implied variations in the speed of progress, there was a need for a timetable for action and clarification of objectives. In the discussions that followed, a number of delegates questioned whether ruling elites in the region would in fact be willing to cede powers as part of a programme of political reform; others argued that the emergence of greater pluralism would be frustrated by an intolerance of political parties who might represent sections of society.

The final plenary was devoted to the crafting of new frameworks for regional security. Leading off the discussion, HRH Prince Saud Al Faisal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, described this session as providing a 'timely opportunity to exchange views on a current and important topic'. Turning to the GCC states, he called for greater efforts to enhance defence capabilities in an integrated manner, including exploring the scope for joint command-and-control mechanisms and logistical arrangements. GCC states that had defence or economic agreements with third parties should not give these precedence over accords with fellow members; there was a need to uphold the collective spirit and combined bargaining power of the GCC. In the same vein, he argued for the expansion of the GCC to include Yemen.

The GCC's main regional priority in the short term was to define its relations with Iraq and Iran. As far as former was concerned, the recent Kuwait-Iraq accord provided a model for how the GCC as a whole might come into association with Baghdad. Iran, meanwhile, needed to build relations in the region on the basis of a policy of non-interference,

and through more active participation in the campaign against terrorism. Yet Prince Saud Al Faisal also argued that Iran had a right to security, and in this regard Israel's advanced nuclear capabilities were a source of particular concern.

Ali Reza Moayeri, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Research, speaking on behalf of Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, expressed his hope that the Gulf Dialogue would 'contribute to the promotion of peace and security through open exchange of ideas'. Describing the Gulf as an object of competition between great powers, whose interventions had detracted from the sum of regional security, he advanced a plan for a 'Persian Gulf Collective Security Framework'. All states of the region would participate in it, and none would form new alliances with non-members. A 'Regional Security Assembly' would be established, which would handle pacts and treaties while avoiding interference in the internal affairs of member states. It would define the goals of regional interaction, and its mandate would include crafting policies to combat terrorism and its causes, and to pursue a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. In the question and answer session, attention focused in particular on the criteria that Yemen would have to fulfil in order to be admitted to the GCC. Other presentations on this panel were given by Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of France, and Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al Hamad Al Sabah, President of the National Security Bureau of Kuwait.

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